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Date	Original Topic
15th July 2002	A-Level Project on Isandhlwana By George Hulmes Hi, I'm a student at St. Brendans Sixth Form College down in Bristol, and am currently starting my A2 course (second year) in A-Level history. One of our coursework modules is to choose any historical topic/ event, to ask a question about it, analyse, and answer it. Personally, I've been profoundly interested in the Zulu war since I was 8 when I first saw "Zulu". However, it was the epic battle of Isandhlwana that has really captivated me over the last year or so when I first saw "Zulu Dawn". Anyway, I'll cut to the chase. My essay title is on the lines of "British Defeat or Zulu Victory". I've done some research as of late, and I've been espescially interested in the work of Ian Knight on the subject of Isndhlwana, and the recent evidence he has brought into light, dispelling such aspects of the battle as the failure to adequately supply ammunition to the firing lines, and the question of the ammunition boxes themselves. Dr. Knight's research is very impressive, and as a result I've had to rethink a lot of the evidence I was going to use in my essay. However, I feel a few points still need clarifying, such as the attitudes and actions of the Regimental Quartermasters themselves. (And whether they contributed minutely or significantly to the outcome of the battle or not.) I have a few sources supporting the way they were portrayed in Zulu Dawn, and would really like to know in Ian knight, or any members of the Rorkes Drift VC community could clarify them. I plan to try to contact Dr. Knight through his official site which I discovered as a result of links from this excellent webpage. However, if any of you could pass on word to him me and my project, or even provide me with an email address I would be deeply thankful. Best Regards, George Hulmes
Date	Replies
15th July 2002	CLIVE DICKENS Hi George I think you may have some difficulty in tracking down Ian he is like the Scarlet Pimpernell you never know where he is but of course you can still try, but two other gentlemens names spring to mind and if approached in the correct manner I am sure that they would be ready to help you (1) is John Young chairman of the Anglo/Zulu War Society and (2) M r Martin Everett curator of The South W ales Borderers Museum, both these gentlemen can be contacted through this web site. Best of luck Clive
15th July 2002	Alex Rossiter Hi i was wondering after reading some zulu and british sources , it seems the british firing line was doing well to stop the zulu advance and the advance was even on the brink of collapsing and if ammunition was in ready supply to the men on the firing line so why did they fall back? it seems that the order to fall back was catastrophic because the zulus were able to rush the 100 yards to the redcoats at a frighting fast pase which caught out many men . So if the british would have stayed instead of falling back so soon would it have been a slightly diffrent out come or even a zulu defeat? Just a thought
15th July 2002	Martin Everett Dear George, If you contact me or Celia Green at the SWB Museum in Brecon, we would be pleased to help you - that's what a museum is for. Tel: 01874 613310 or email [email protected] I look forward to hearing from you - alternatively pay us a visit.
16th July 2002	George Hulmes Thanks very much for all the replies guys! Alex, I've thouhgt over the reasoning behind the retreat of the firing line, as I agree that it was this event that ultimately resulted in the British defeat coupled with the sheer grit and determination of the Zulus themselves. However, the reasons behind the retreat are still confused. Personallly, looking at established and new evidence from Dr. Knight, I think the Durnford might have influenced the descision for the line to pull back; not through the lack of ammunition, but perhaps the POSSIBLE lack of ammunition the firing line might face. When Durnford's men returned, they were completely out of ammuntion, and there must have been a significant commotion around the supply wagons as result of Durnford's native runners unable to get the ammo from quartermasters. As a result, I think the line was pulled back to PREVENT and ammuntion shortage due to the influx of new requests for ammunition from Durnford's men. (Bullets would be easier to obtain if the supply routes were shorter.) Anyway, to my delight, I seem to have been contacted by Ian Knight himself by email. :-) Thank-you also Martin, for your offer of help with my project, you can never have too much help in my opinion. Best Regards, George
16th July 2002	Bill Cainan George To understand the ammunition "problem" at Isandlwana, you need to look at the way the distribution/transport of ammunition was organised in the centre column of the British invasion of 1879. Each British Infantry Company of approx 100men was issued with TWO GS Mule Waggons. One would be for ammunition and would be prominently marked (usually by red flags) and the other would be for general stores - tentage and cooking gear. The ammunition waggon would have the Company's Ammunition Reserve (ie all of the ammunition, less the 70 rounds carried in the men's ammunition pouchres). This could work out at about 40 to 45 ammunition boxes each containing 600 rounds of ammunition, a total of 24,000 to 27,000 rounds. When Chelmsford left the camp early on the 22nd January he took the six companies of the 2/24, but NOT their resreve ammunition. Presumably he thought that the engagement he anticipated with the Zulus would not require more than the 70 rounds each man carried ? Nevertherless, I suspect the ammunition waggons of the 2/24 were all packed and ready to move forward to support Chelmsford column if they were needed. The mules would probably have been held locally ready for hitching to the waggons. This would be SEVEN waggons (also including the waggon for Pope's G Coy who had been on picket duty the night before and who were still in camp). These waggons would originally have been located in the 2/24 tent lines, which were in the centre of the line. However, they may have been re-located to a position on the Ulundi track where they could more easily be moved to support Chelmsford. I would suggest that the orders given to man in charge - Qurtermaster Bloomfield - were quite specific. He was to have all of the seven waggons ready to move to support the Companies of the 2/24 should the need arise. The waggons would have been prepared for movement with the loads roped down under tarpaulins. You can thus see why Bloomfield would resist any requests for him to issue ammunition off his waggons. His responsibility was to keep his ammunition ready to support his OWN Companies. What other ammunition waggonswere available ? Well, there the five company ammunition waggons of the 1/24 (probably located at the tent lines of the 1/24 at the southern end of the tent lines) - as far away from the firing line as was possible (at around 1200-1500yards away). How was it possible to resupply the line ? Not a real problem. These were professional Infantry Companies with time served NCOs. The ammunition could have been brought in bulk up to the firing line in the two wheeled "scotch" carts. Or individual boxes could have been brought up by the simple measure of detaching say ten or twelve men from each company to bring up extra boxes. Three men can carry two boxes between them. It would thus be possible for twelve men to leave a Company's position on the firing line and return with ammunition within about 40 minutes. Each man handled load would have provided the Company with 2,400 rounds (24 rounds perr man). It only becomes a problem when the Zulus outflank the line and cross this re-supply route, cutting off the resupply. The NNC would have had their own ammunition waggons. but with a reduced issue of rifles and ammunition, their ammunition stock would be considerable less. Maybe one waggon per Battalion ??? Durnford's ammunition waggon(s) had lagged behind on his move up from Rorke's Drift, but would probably have stuck to the Ulundi track. When Durnford started to run low on ammunition, he sent two officers (Henderson & Davis) to organise a resupply. They found it difficult to locate their own waggons, perhaps they had evenb reached the neck ?by this time ?. They may well, as an alternative, have approached the loaded waggons of Bloomfields 2/24 and were probably given short shrift. Nearby would have been the five opened waggons of the 1/24 and again I'm sure Quartermaster Pullen would not have willingly given any of his ammunition to the "native" elements of the camp defence - he was engaged in a contiuous resupply of his five companies on the firing line - and they NEEDED the ammunition ! Henderson and Davis ultimately failed to find their own waggons and no resupply was forthcoming to Durnford, who was then, as a consequence, was forced to abandon his position in the dongoa, leaving the British right flank exposed, and the rest is history ! Hopefully, this will have put the "Zulu Dawn" sequence into some perspective. Both Qurtermasters of the 24th were (in my mind)correctly doing their jobs, supporting their own Battalion Companies. Neither were blindly beaurocratic morons as portrayed in the film. Having said that, it has been my experience with the Army stores world, that there exists a school of thought amongst storemen that "stores are for storing, if they were meant for issuing they would be called issues !" So perhaps the film portayal was right after all. Neither Pullen or Bloomfield survived the battle, so we may nver know the true situation ! Bill
16th July 2002	George Hulmes Thanks for that extensive piece of info Bill, I'd definately heard reports of smaller ammunition wagons being pulled up to the firing lines, an example coming to mind, that of a one Captain Essex who managed to requisition a large amount of ammunition for his company on the line. One of my main sources of information comes from a BBC publication from it's programme "The British Empire" which is quite old and undoubtably outdated, but nethertheless is quite useful. There was a source in there that was used to convey the problems that the author of the article said the soldiers faced when trying to obtain ammo from the quartermasters. I think it was conversation between one of the quartermasters and a Captain of the 1st BTN. It went something like this when the officer tried to take an ammunition box without authorization; QMSTR: "Don't do that, for than belongs to OUR battalion!" CPN: "Hang it all! You don't want to requistion now, do you!?" It's a great quote, but as you say, the extent to which the quartermasters behaved during the battle will forever remain a mystery. (And i'm inclined to go with you and Mr. Knight with the argument that ammuntion for the firing line was not a problem.) However, the fact that Durnford's runners NOT being provided with ammuntion, resulting in them retreating from the donga is a VERY interesting argument. (One that I'm inclined to agree with.) Thanks again for your help!
16th July 2002	John Young George, Just to clarify matters, the conversation you mention above actually is recorded in General Sir Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien's autobiography, 'Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service'. I quote '...Bloomfield, the quartermaster of the 2/24th, said to me in regard to the boxes I was then breaking open, 'For heaven's sake, don't take that, man, for it belongs to our battalion.' And I replied, 'Hang it all, you don't want a requisition now, do you?'...' That information was published in the work which dates from 1925. However, Smith-Dorrien, does not recount the discourse in a letter to his father, written shortly after the action. Nor does he mention it at the Court of Inquiry. As Bill has mentioned above, supply that Smith-Dorrien was opening belonged to the 2nd Battalion of the 24th (2nd Warwickshire) Regiment. Bloomfield, (if the conversation actually took place!) like many others, I contend, was still labouring under the misapprehension that the part of No.3 Column that was out with Lord Chelmsford were about to engage the full might of the Zulu force. The ammunition was ready if required for the 2nd/24th men accompanying Chelmsford. In 1879, Lieutenant Smith-Dorrien was actually a "special-service" officer, on detached service from his own regiment, the 95th (Derbyshire) Regiment of Foot, he was detailed as a 'Transport Officer'. I've actually mentioned it elsewhere on this forum, but it is worth mentioning again, not all of Durnford's men were actually armed with .45" calibre weapons. Many were armed with .577" Snider-Enfields. Others were armed with Westley Richards carbines which was of a .476" calibre. There would have been little or no point for troops armed with those calibre weapons presenting themselves to any quartermaster, save for their own. Durnford's wagons were apparently still arriving when the battle had actually commenced. Having said that it is worth mentioning that not all of the British troops engaged at Isandlwana had the same calibre weapons. At the time the gunners of 'N' Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, were armed with a limited supply of .577" Snider-Enfield carbines. Add to this, the fact that the colonial volunteer units were armed with the Swinburne-Henry carbine, which although chambered to .45", it fired a different grained bullet to fuller charge of the Martini-Henry rifle. Put too many rifle rounds through a carbine, and it is feasible you'll either damage the weapon or yourself. I've also discussed elsewhere on the forum, the fact that the ammunition boxes were not quite as flimsy as have been portrayed. There was actually a defect with the ammunition box, relating to the tin liner handle. The other point I have raised in the past is, how many people in a battalion actually knew how to open an ammunition box? I contend only a few - the Quartermaster; the Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant; the Instructor of Musketry; the Sergeant Instructor of Musketry; the Armourer Sergeant and their associated other-ranks staff. Lose those men. and you're left with "Tommy Atkins" who doesn't really have a clue, as his ammunition has always been presented to him in packets doled out by those aforementioned officers and n.c.o.'s. The thing about Isandlwana, it is open to theories, some of which can be dispelled by facts. However, I contend, we are never going to reach a definitive answer, as to what actually occurred at Isandlwana. John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
16th July 2002	Alex Rossiter I think thats why im more interesrted in isandlwana than rorkes drift because isandlwana is still a relative mystery and new facts surface all the time .
17th July 2002	George Hulmes Thanks John, looking at what you said about Durnford's (native) troops being armed with older weaponry with different calibres to the .45 boxer-henry does well to contribute to the reasons why Durnford had no choice but to pull back from the Donga. However, Ian Knight claims that it is possible to open the Mk.V ammunition box, such as those used at Isandhlwana with a well-placed blow to the retaining lid with a rifle butt. I think I recall that this was meant as an emergency procedure, just in case as you say, the quartermasters and other specialised personnel were killed, or their tools and screwdrivers lost. (However, one can assume that this was frowned upon, as the quartermasters would not have taken kindly to the wanton vandalism of her majesty's army's property!) Thanks as well for clearing up the Smith-Dorrien quote as well, and providing more detail on it. By the way, when I mentioned it to my dad, he recognised the name, and said that the Smith-Dorriens were a prominent military family, and that one (maybe not the same) Smith-Dorrien had lead the British Expeditionary Force during the Frist World War. Best Regards, George
17th July 2002	John Young George, It's the same man, but I only wish it had been Smith-Dorrien that commanded the B.E.F. He actually commanded II Corps, B.E.F., Sir John French was the B.E.F.'s commander. If you can find it on the forum, I rather put pay to the smashing open of an ammunition box with one single blow theory. The boxes were, for the most part, made from hard woods - teak & mahogany. Not some flimsy piece of pine as smashed open in the documentary. Ron Lock, a South African-based tour guide, as an experiment tried opening a reconstruction of a Mk. V ammunition box, using various implements - rocks, club hammers etc. and it took him some time to actually force the lid open - and as we know time at Isandlwana was precious. John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society
18th July 2002	Dave Nolan John, I am sure that the British soldiers would have had the common sense to try to 'break into' (Quote Smith-Dorrien and Essex) ammunition boxes as they didn't have screwdrivers and would have done so with whatever was at hand a rifle butt being as good an implement as any 'at a time like this' - the sight of 20000 Zulu bearing down on them would have concentrated the mind wonderfully. As for whether the boxes could be broken into in time on the firing line - that was the whole point af the documentary reconstruction - accounting for the particularly bent screws out on the firing line - If the boxes could not be opened in time by a single blow or several blows (it matters not how many) then how do you account for these screws and their shape and their location on the firing line - the documentary accounted for these by showing the particular deformation was caused when the boxes were broken open in the manner suggested. Don't the Zulu accounts of the battle say that the British were still firing as they retired on the camp - hardly something that people out of ammunition would be capable of! Dave
18th July 2002	John Young Dave, I don't doubt for one minute that there were those there with the common sense or initiative to make every effort to open those boxes. Nor do I doubt that there were still troops firing as they withdrew on the camp. However, who is to say that those bent screws weren't caused by people other than British soldiers opening the boxes? I refer of course to the victors of the field of battle - the Zulu. We don't know, we will never know. The fact they were found on the firing line, still proves nothing to me. What Zulu wants to carry around a big lump of a heavy box, when he can whack the the box open, where he finds it, and help himself to the contents. I have in my collection a piece of copper banding, allegedly from the field of Isandlwana. It bears 'R^L' mark of the Royal Laboratory, Woolwich. The band has the screw holes at their regular intervals, but it also has a small calibre bullethole, from a pistol, I contend, which, certain ballatics experts vouch, has been discharged at close range. I obviously don't know who fired that shot, or either when or why. But if, (As contend when I introduce this strip of metal into my Smith-Dorrien lecture.) this shot was fired by British soldier or colonial volunteer, or any other person in the camp at Isandlwana, why was done? Did that person in a blind panic think they could open the box by shooting off the copper banding? I don't know, hence why I proffer the argument as to who knows how to open the boxes. I do it just to throw another fly in the ointment. What I do know to be fact is that the List of Changes No. 3752, of 14th May, 1880 introduced the 'Box, Wood, Ammunition, Small-arm, with Tin Lining. Service Pattern. (Mark IX)' Two major changes were introduced with this pattern of ammunition box. 1, 'It differs from the previous patterns (L.o.C. 3653) in the mode of fastening of the lid, the alteration having been made with the object of preventing delay and difficulty in opening the box in the field, when a scredriver may not be at hand. The lid, instead of being fastened by a screw, is now fastened and kept in its place by means of a small brass split pin. With an eye and a copper twisted-wire tag attached, as shown in the sketch. [The sketch clearly depicts this, JY] The lid, when closed and fastened by the brass pin, is sealed by having the calico label, which was formerly in a recess at the side of the lid, fixed by shellac over the head of the pin in the recess for that purpose.' 2, Remembering the defect with regard to the tin lining handles I have previously mentioned on the forum. 'The tin closing-plate also differs from those in previous patterns, in having a larger wire handle, in order that it may be more conveniently torn off.' A year after the lesson of Isandlwana, with typical speed the War Office were making changes. For those not lucky enough to have an original I recommend Ian Skennerton's compilation, 'List of Changes in British War Material...' Volume 1 1860-1886, published by the compiler in 1979 (ISBN 0 9597438 3 9). As Alex says above Isandlwana is still a mystery. A mystery shrouded by myth and legends - half-truths and downright lies. Errors made over a hundred years ago are willing accepted as fact by even the most pre-eminent in this field; even when there is contemporary documentary evidence to refute their conclusions. Yet still the errors are perpetuated, how long will it before those errors is accepted as fact, merely on the grounds that an authority has written it? Thank God, I'm merely "an anorak" as my family deem me. John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
18th July 2002	Dave Nolan John So the Zulus could work out how to get into the boxes but the British, who had lived with these boxes on campaign, couldn't????? Why do the Zulu accounts refer to the British still firing as they withdrew if the British had run out of ammo? I would agree with you that the damage to your strap was done by someone who was not familiar with the box - a Zulu. Remember the ammunition failure story is a convenient one for those who wanted to show that it was a British defeat rather than a Zulu victory - something those on the campaign and at Whitehall were keen to get across - so any subsequent changes in regs/designs may have been coloured by this bias in the reports of the action. To say otherwise is to take away from the achievement of the Zulu on that day. Dave
18th July 2002	Bill Cainan God, I love the debate on the ammo boxes ! Could I be allowed to add a few thoughts ? The problem in designing an ammunition box is to make it robust enough to withstand bad handling and transportation around the world (and also, ideally, to last for ever !) but yet make it possible for it to be opened "fairly easily" in a period of emergency. I believe the boxes used at Isandlwana met both these criteria. The metal bands maintained the integral strength of the box. On the top of the box (inside of the two bands) is a sliding lid which moves on a tongue and groove basis. This lid is secured by one screw of fairly soft metal - but strong enogh to keep the lid in position under normal circumstances. Normal opening would be achieved by unscrewing the screw. The box would then be undamaged and could subsequently be refilled and resecured. However, in an emergency, if you give the lid a severe clout (or two), say with the but of a Martini Henry, on the edge opposite the screw, and preferably as near to horizontal as you can, the lid will be forced out, bending the "soft" metal screw. The image of someone trying to bash open the box at random with a club or a big rock is one that probably springs to mind, though this is most unlikely to succeed as the box was "designed by experts" to put up with the roughest of handling in transit. I don't think the demonstration put on by Ian Knight in "Secrets oif the Dead" was really good enough to put this matter to rest once and for all, which was a pity. His "ammo box" was obviously too flimsy and he was really belting it at the rong angle. Sorry Ian - you should have let a squaddie demonstrate it ! As to whether the average squaddie could figure out the best way to open the box ? Well, in times of non-emergency, this would have been rewarded with a flogging (damaging her Majesty's property), so practice would not have been much of an option. However, over a period of 35 years I have not come across many squaddies that are unable to open boxes they are not supposed to - despite the extensive use of metal banding tape !! I suspect that the alteration referred to by John above, was meant to allow the boxes to be opened even easier in an emergency, which would mean less broken boxes, and therefore less expense in replacing/repairing them !!! The British Army once again demonstrating ways to save valuable pennies ! I can't really think of an answer to why someone would want to fire a pistol at an ammunition box. I can only presume it must have been an officer ! Bill
18th July 2002	John Young Dave, I've actually never been one for the ammunition failure theory. I'm more for the extended and exposed positions of the British & colonial forces being a major contribution for the Zulu victory. I didn't doubt the resourcefulness of the British troops at all. Having seen the screws that retained the lids, they could have been easily removed with a pocket knife. The point I raised is merely a theory, a supposition, nothing more or less. But unless we debate these things openly, theories and findings are accepted as fact. No more, or less, than the theory as to the smokescreen caused by British rifle fire, obscuring the targets of the oncoming Zulu warriors. Or how much did the eclipse effected the vision of the combatants? Very little I contend, it must have looked like an overcast day, at best. Do forget even the Victorians were trying to take away the success of the Zulu generalship in 1879. One of the most common questions asked to survivors appears to have been asked was; I paraphrase, "Did you see Europeans leading the Zulus?" I agree that the changes made were coloured by bias, but I still think they are worthy of note. Regards, John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
18th July 2002	John Young Bill, Saw your last comment after I'd added my response, and I've got to go for that assumption as well! John
18th July 2002	George Hulmes Fascinating, absolutely fascinating. John, I would also add in a couple more factors to the argument that the eclipse contrbuted to the British defeat inside the camp. Not to be facticious, but maybe the Zulu's skin tone might have been to thier advantage if the conditions during the clip were as dark and murky with smoke as Ian Knight claims. The scarlet coats of the 24th conversely would have acted as visible counter-camoflage, if this was so, making them easier to see than thier Zulu foe. If the physical effects of this enviroment were not as bad as claimed then certainly it must have had a psychological effect on the soldiers retreating deeper into the camp. (Some being surrounded with scores of their comrades, and not knowing it due to the mass of tents obscuring the view.) In addition, accounts from Rorkes Drift as well as physical and documentary sources say that the Martini Henry was prone to jamming after prolonged firing. If this was so during the retreat into the camp, many soldiers must have been caught in combat with the Zulus, without the advantage of a working firearm. Regards, George
18th July 2002	Alex Rossiter Also if their was the ammount of smoke coulped with the eclipse obscured the zulus it would of also obscured the british from the zulus if you were a zulu imagine advancing through smoke not able to clearly see the enemy and then hails of big calibre martini henry bullets hurtling out of the smoke taking down your comrades the pyschological effect would of probably effected both the british and the zulus
19th July 2002	George Hulmes Touche, although the fact that the Zulu's advance at this stage did not even falter, despite thier superstitions, shows how the enviromental conditions were not detrimental to thier efforts in the battle. Regards, George
19th July 2002	Ron Lock Was the ammunition box difficult to open without a screwdriver? Yes, I believe it was. As mentioned by John Young, several years ago I made a mock up of an ammunition box lid, using 3/4 inch teak planking, the lid being secured by a 2" brass screw. Attempting to open the lid by kicking or hitting it with a rock resulted in bruised toes and fingers. It was ony after 19 swinging blows with a 7 lb. hammer that the screrw burst through the side planking, being bent in the process, carrying a large chunk of the planking with it. The box that was seen being opened in the Discovery documentary was a flimsy affair made of local S.A. pine and the opening of it was farsical. Most boxes had a wedge shaped lit with the securing screw positioned at the wide end of the lid. Thus to open the box by force, blows had to be delivered to the narrow end, opposite to the screw position. In the documentary the single tap with a rifle butt was delivered on to the screw itself, thus bending it. This was purported to prove a point! It proved nothing other than brass screws bend easily when hit with a heavy object. A similar distortion of brass screws found on the battlefield came about by the boxes being forced open as described earlier, not by a direct blow, which, in any event, would not have been possible with the screw embedded in a hardwood lid. The eclipse only started as the battle ended so it was not a factor in the outcome of the battle itself. The eclipse began at 13.10 hours and was at its maximum (magnitude of eclipse 0.650) at 14.36 hours. Last year I was in Ladysmith when there was a similar eclipse, 65%. It was a fine, cloudless day and the effect was as though it was a dull, overcast afternoon - nothing more. As for the smoke of the Martini Henrys obscuring the proceedings, there were only three companies, about 250 riflemen, left to man the final firing line. As they were spread out over some distancae, there would certainly not have been a great pall of smoke hanging over the battlefield. As far as I am aware, there has never been any reference to Durnford's firing line being obscured by smoke.
19th July 2002	Julian Whybra I've just come back from holiday and can therefore throw in my fourpenceworth. There are to my knowledge no survivors' accounts which speak of any ammunition failure. I believe, the reason why the line was withdrawn was that Durnford realised his position was over-extended and that he would need to concentrate his forces in order to defend the camp. It was while this was occurring that the Zulus charged home.
26th June 2003	Simon Copley Why does portraying the battle as a British defeat rather than a Zulu victory sugar the bitter pill? Surely the reverse is the case. It was superb Zulu courage not the crass incompetence and arrogance of Pulleine, Chelsford and the whole British system that brought about this tragedy. To highlight your own incompetence as reason for defeat, rather than your enemy's skill, is to lay yourself open to all sorts of criticism. Then we have the added complication of Rorke's Drift which redeemed the defeat.
29th June 2003	Simon Simon, You are on to one of my pet topics now. I think the problem lies deep within the British Psyche. They just couldn't accept that the Zulu's (mere natives) were capable of that mixture of courage, intelligence planning and organisation that leads to victory. By God that would mean they were as good if not better than us, and that our only superiority was that we were from an industrial nation that provided better weapons. The Victorians of course believed they were great purely because they were British and white.
29th June 2003	James Garland Simon, I'm sorry the last entry was mine I don't know how I managed to attribute it to you James
18th June 2005	Mike McCabe A sense of deja vu? Julian, The notion of 'Durnford realising his position was overextended' appears to imply that the overall design of the tactical layout at the camp was somehow Durnford's. Durnford realising that, in the donga, he was isolated and beyond the support of other fire units is more likely the case. The general nature of Durnford's tactical layout as he deployed forward of the camp is suggestive of an initial intent by him to leave the camp permanently - and in the hands of Lt Col Pulleine. MC McC