No.3 or Centre
Column began crossing the Buffalo
in thick mist and drizzling rain at 4.30am on the 11th January.
The advance was led by the mounted troops and the N.N.C., some of
whom drowned in the river, which came upto their necks. The less
expendable battalions of the 24th crossed on flat-bottomed ponts,
operated by the Royal Engineers. They were covered by Lieutenant-Colonel
Harness' battery of N/5 Royal Artillery. A bridgehead was established
without opposition and the whole day was spent getting the column
across while Chelmsford rode north
to confer with Colonel Evelyn Wood of the left column, his last
opportunity.
Before the column
could advance, a Zulu kraal commanding the track had to be captured
to allow the Natal Pioneers to reinforce the track. The task fell
to the 1/3rd NNC commanded by George Hamilton-Browne. He had contempt
for his command, save for three of his companies which were formed
from renegade Zulus. Encouraged by the bayonets of four supporting
companies of 1/24th, the 1/3rd NNC attacked Sihayo's
kraal on 12th January. The Zulu companies showed themselves
proud and the position was taken along with a quantity of sheep
and cattle captured.
The next few
days were taken up with improving the track and moving the transport
forward. The mounted troops scouted ahead towards Isipezi Hill.
No Zulus were seen and an intermediate campsite was found with good
fuel and water. From here a further advance could be made to Ispezi
which lay beneath Isandhlwana hill some 10 miles along the track.
Chelmsford decided to form an advanced
base there so that the wagons could be offloaded and sent back to
Rorke's Drift for fresh supplies.
At noon on the 20th January, the wagons were left behind as the
column reached Isandhlwana and began setting up camp.
The hill at
Isandhlwana runs north for about 400 yards from its highest point
just north of the track leading up from the Buffalo, until it drops
sharply. The ground rises again for about 1,500 yards along a spur
up to the Nqutu plateau. The plateau stretches north and east towards
Isipezi Hill 10 miles away, forming the northern boundary of the
plain, which is some 4 miles away. The track to Ulundi runs across
the plateau to the east of Isandhlwana. South of the track and forming
the southern boundary of the plain lie the Malakata, Inhlazatye
and Nkandhla hills. The southern edge of the plateau forms an escarpment,
broken at various places down which streams flow and the track spur
runs down to Isandhlwana. The streams flow to join in wide ditches
known as 'dongas' and cross the plain in a north-south direction.
The east of
the plateau is wide open with no cover except among the boulders
and dongas, the force had a fine field of fire with its back to
Isandhlwana, observation reaching out to the escarpment and a conical
hill to the east of Isandhlwana and the Malakatas. Only where the
northern spur joined the plateau was there an opportunity for an
enemy to get round and strike in close to the hill.
The column did
not put the standing orders of entrenchment into effect, probably
because of the stony ground, but no breastworks were built or obstacles
placed to slow an enemy attack. Several of the experienced officers
of the 24th expressed concern.
View towards
British line and initial central Zulu attack
On the morning
of the 22nd January, Chelmsford divided the force, sending out mounted
troops and sixteen companies of the 3rd NNC to scout the south-east
for the Zulu army and sent other patrols out in other directions,
The main patrol, under Dartnell, encountered 1,500-2,000 Zulus some
10 miles from camp who withdrew after a skirmish. Dartnell decided
to bivouac for the night as it was getting dark and asked for reinforcements.
Chelmsford decided to move out to support Dartnell assuming the
Zulu force was a portion of a much larger Zulu force in the area.
The camp at
Isandhlwana was left to the command of brevet Lieutenant-Colonel
Henry Pulleine, who had taken over the 1/24th when Glyn was appointed
to command No.3 Column. Pulleine had seen no active service. To
defend the 900-yard long collaction of tents and over a hundred
wagons and draught animals he had five companies of the 1/24th,
G Company and the rear details of the 2/24th, 115 mounted men of
the Police, Mounted Infantry and Volunteers. Two guns of N/5 RA,
Nos 6 and 9 Companies of the 2/3rd NNC and 13 staff officers and
assorted administrative troops.
Chelmsford believed
that Pulleine's defences were strong enough to beat off any attack
and was not concerned when it was reported that Zulus were heading
for the camp in force. Chelmsford stuck to his plan and moved to
the new campsite. Chelmsford ordered Glyn to gather his scattered
troops and move in the direction of Mangeni valley.
At Isandhlwana,
Pulleine set out his protective screen. All the mounted men were
deployed as vedettes on the high ground to the north-east and east.
Infantry picquets were in an arc, with two companies of the 24th
guarding the right front and flank, extended in posts of four from
the stony hill right round to the centre where they men the No.9
company of 1/3rd NNC midway between the camp and conical hill, No.5
Company of 2/3rd NNC completed the line. A party under Lieutenant
Anstey was sent out to repair the track and the rest of the camp
settled down to its normal routine. Just before 8am a trooper galloped
down from the spur to report a large force of Zulus approaching
from the north-east across the Nqutu plateau.
The site of Durford's
stand, known as 'Durnford's Donga'. It is between the four trees
on the left and the group of trees on the right.
Pulleine sent
off a message to Chelmsford and called in the road party and the 24th
companies on picquet, but left the NNC companies in position. He sounded
the 'fall in'. All remained quiet until 10am when five troops of Natal
Native Horse, followed by the rocket battery and two companies of
the 1/1st NNC rode upto Isandhlwana. They left their wagons behind
on hearing Chard's warning about the Zulus approaching Isandhlwana.
The horse, rockets and NNC arrived about 11am. Durnford,
who had been commanding the Horse, arrived at the camp and this put
Pulleines' position into question. Durnford
was more experienced and older than Pulleine as well as having considerable
experience in South Africa. Pulleine was willing to hand over command,
but Durnford said he and his command would
not be staying in camp. They moved out to clear the plateau of scattered
parties of Zulus.
Hamilton-Browne
who was returning to Isandhlwana was still some 9 miles out as Durnford
and Pulleine sat down for an early lunch. They had captured two
Zulus, who informed Hamilton-Browne that the impi was close to the
camp and was going to attack. Browne sent a message back to Chelmsford
but the message did not reach the General until about 2pm.
Receiving a
report of 500 Zulus to the north-east moving away east, Durnford
decided to ride out with his two remaining troops, the rocket battery
and a company to head off this force and asked Pulleine for two
companies to support him. Pulleine demurred but gave in under pressure.
His adjutant strongly protested at the decrease in the camps' strength
and Durnford agreed to leave them behind and at 11.30 rode out of
camp. At about midday, a troop of Sikali Horse found the main impi.
20,000 Zulus all packed into a ravine some 5 1/2 miles north-east
of the camp and nearly 11 miles north of where Chelmsford was searching
for them.
The impi was
resting while small detachments gathered food. The troop was pursued
as it fell back and joined by another troop. The two horns of the
Zulu attack closed in around the camp, Durnford recovered a warning
while some 4 miles from the camp as he saw the left horn of the
Zulu attack advancing over the skyline to his left front and coming
on fast. Durnford extended his troops
and opened fire but the enemy was not even slowed and the force
began to retire. At about 12.15 messengers reached the camp and
Pulleine sounded the Alarm and scribbled a note to Chelmsford about
the oncoming enemy force and that he could not break camp now. Pulleine
sent F Company 1/24th to plug the gap between Durnfords troops and
Cavaye's which were retreating before the right horn of the Zulu
attack.
Pulleine now
had a dilemma; he had undertaken to assist Durnford
who was far out on the plain but his orders were to draw in a compact
defence close to the hill. Durnford was also in danger of being
cut off as the Zulus began spilling over the lip of the escarpment.
Pulleine deployed two guns and some companies to the east of the
NNC camas others on the left took up a position to cover the retreat
of Cavaye and Mostyn who fell back to form their right front. The
whole line was a mile and a half long from Young-Husband on the
left to Scott on the conical hill to the east and faced north and
north-east. The guns opened fire with shrapnel as the Zulus boiled
down the escarpment. Rifle fire was added as the range shortened
to half a mile.
On the right,
the right horn overran the NNC and rocket battery as it pursued
Durnford which picked up Scott from the
concial hill and rode hard for the safety of the big donga. On reaching
it, he dismounted his men and lined the bank, opening fire on the
approaching Zulus. Mounted riflemen galloped down to join Durnford
and they succeeded in halting the inGobamakhosi below the conical
hill, where the fire of one gun temporarily dispersed them. The
gun then returned to its former position.
Pope, commanding
G Company of the 2/24th, part of the left defence was threatened
by the left horn and wheeled back onto the rocky crest facing east,
so that his left linked up with Wardell's H Companies of the 1/24th.
At 1.30pm Pulleine's line curved in an arc form the north end of
Isandhlwana to a point on the rocky crest 600 yards due east of
the centre of the camp, with Durnfords men forward on the right
holding the donga.
Isandhlwana and
a Cairn, marking the spot where British soldiers fell, and were buried.
The Zulu advance
wavered in the face of heavy musketry from the 24th. Each time the
Zulus rose from cover, the rifle fire drove them down again. Those
Zulus armed with rifles returned the fire, but more of their rounds
passed overhead. Durnford was running short on ammunition, men were
sent back but were refused ammunition from the 1/24th's wagons,
not being able to find their own. The whole impi rose for a general
advance while the two troop leaders were out of the line. The centre
was halted again some 1150 yards short of the line by the 24th companies
closing up and firing vollies. The left horn was wavering away and
cross-fire from Pope's company extended to its left to encircle
Durnford's right. Durnford abandoned
his position when he ran out of ammunition and made for the camp
to form a new line in front of the tents as the officers went in
search of ammunition. This imperilled the whole line, with ammunition
not reaching Durnfords men.
Pope had also
been forced to fall back to a new position between the big and narrow
dongas, just north of the track. Part of the Zulus' left horn was
now sweeping south under the cover of a herd of oxen at the 1/24th's
tents. Pope's move had exposed the right of the main line. This
left only Pope's ninety-odd men between the camp and the Zulu left
horn, a gap of about 700 yards between him and Wardell. Puelline
ordered the 'Retire' to be sounded as the entire 1/4th were in danger
of being outflanked. As the companies fell back the Zulus rushed
in. After a fierce flurry of hand-to-hand fighting the guns were
got away. Those of the native Horse who could, rode away, bereft
of ammunition,. Some 85 Europeans reached Helpmakaar these being
chiefly of N/5 and the Mounted Infantry. Most of the Basuto and
Edendale troops got clear and many of the NNC made their escape.
The gun detachments
of N/5 fought their way through the camp, losing fifty men in an
attempt to save the guns but further on two guns were lost, one
overturned and another was halted by a ravine. The 24th fought to
the bitter end at Isandhlwana. When their ammunition ran out they
fought with bayonets in squares until the Zulus finally overcame
them by sheer weight of numbers. Only two bandsmen and a groom of
the 24th survived. Three serving with the rocket battery and four
with the Mounted infantry had also survived.
As the Queen's
Colour of the 1/24th became imperilled, the adjutant, Melvill,
was ordered to carry it to safety. He rode off and was joined by
Lieutenant Coghill who had an
injured knee. Both were killed on the Natal bank of the Buffalo
river. The Colour was recovered some weeks
later. Both men were awarded posthumous Victoria Crosses. Private
Wassall of the 80th, serving with the Mounted Infantry also won
a Victoria Cross for saving a drowning comrade while crossing the
Buffalo under fire at Fugitive's Drift.
The last hours
of Isandhlwana were witnessed by Hamilton-Bronwe whose battalion
was 5 miles from camp when the impi was discovered. He approached
the camp but his battalion was of uncertain calibre and as such,
retired. Chelmsford was finally found
by a messenger at 2.30pm and was finally convinced of the full extent
of the disaster at 3.30pm. Chelmsford
immediately decided to retake the camp after a rider reported that
the camp was full of victorious Zulus. Glyn's column marched at
best speed and reached Chelsmford at just after 6pm. Chelmsford
ordered the advance with the 2/24th in the centre flanked by the
Volunteers and Mounted Infantry on the wings. By the time they approached
Isandhlwana it was dark. Over 1,200 men in the camp and nearly 500
of Durnfords men had been slain.
