Was Lord Chelmsford Decoyed? |
Alan
Site Admin
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Ron Lock has written an article "Was Lord Chelmsford Decoyed?".
This is to be found in the Pot Pourri section. We would appreciate your comments. http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/potpourri/Was_Lord_Chelmsford_Decoyed.pdf |
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Mel
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Mike Snook wrote:
"Ron wants to be able to argue, because it suits his hypothesis, that Nstingwayo delayed his attack until-morning, in the happy knowledge that his deception plan was working and that plodding column on the plain will soon be at a point of no return and will no longer be able to influence the battle he is planning around Isandlwana. Or as I would characterise it, that he intends to go home to the king and say: I was really clever, I allowed two in every three of the men from kwajimu's to wander off into the countryside, (yes your majesty they are still out there somewhere and will doubtless come back), but don't worry I did eat up one in three. Eating up one in three was not his mission. His mission was the destruction of the central column." This one viewpoint, alone, destroys the decoy theory. I've never understood why there is the need to bestow such a level of sophistication on the Zulu strategy used at Isandlwana. |
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_________________ Mel |
Alan
Site Admin
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Unfortunately, Ron is unable to take part in this topic at present.
He will respond when the situation allows. |
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mike snook 2
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Dear All
It will be obvious that I am implacably opposed to decoy theory. I don't want to go into the reasons why, but whatever Ron eventually replies will elicit no further response from me. I'd like to leave it there. Regards Mike |
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Ron L
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Gentlemen,
I apologise for the delay, due to circumstances beyond my control and trust the subject has not gone cold. I would also like to express my sincere regret at the passing of Mike McCabe, who takes with him a vast and unretrievable knowledge of the Anglo Zulu War. He would, I am sure, have made some pithy observations regarding the subject under discussion and this debate will be poorer for their absence. First Mike Snook. Mike, your response is rich in bluster and lead heavy in sarcasm. You have ignored the fact that Fynn unwittingly fed misinformation to Lord Chelmsford, misinformation that led to deception which in turn developed into a decoy. Instead we are treated to a lengthy discourse on British army tactics and jargon concluding with the astonishing concept that the morning long will o� the wisp decoy of Chelmsford�s column into the Pindo Hills was not a decoy at all! Were the Zulus still guarding their flank? I agree with your �Balls out� description but you have overlooked a couple of things: Stealth, Intelligence and the ability to confuse and deceive. �Balls out� they may have been but they got 20 000 men within a hop, skip and a jump of the camp without the opposition having any idea that they were there. The opposition was, in fact, searching in the wrong direction. I wonder why? As for the NNC at the crucial moment being, to quote you, �in the most terrible state of jitters�. Who trained them and was responsible for having passed them out fighting fit and fit to fight? The buck must stop with the officers of the British Army and in particular with the General Officer Commanding HM Forces Southern Africa. You have gone on at length about Zulu �Balls Out� tactics. What about the British, shall we say �Balls In tactics�? Provoke the enemy to attack, preferably when we are all behind a barricade of sorts, and then at 800 yards let them have it with the god old Martini- Henry � hoping, of course, that we can open the ammo boxes at the crucial moment (there is another good topic). Hardly as innovative as the tactics taught at the Ulundi staff college. You say there was no guarantee that the Zulu commander knew where and at what strength the NNC happened to be on the 21st. More likely the Zulu commander knew the exact progress of the NNC from the moment it �marched� out of Greytown with the band playing �The Girl I left Behind Me�. And would have been kept abreast of its whereabouts on an ongoing basis, including its movements on the 21st-22nd, by the Zulu community at large, every one a potential spy. And you still persist in pooh poohing the Zulu army�s �sophisticated communications systems�. Ryder Haggard was in Pretoria on the morning of the 24th January when his servant, by means of the Zulu communications system, heard the tale of a great battle that had taken place in Zululand leaving hundreds of redcoats dead. Twenty hours later an exhausted horseman arrived with the news of the British defeat. Pretty sophisticated, I would say and just one instance of many such accounts. Mike, is it so difficult to accept that a British General was outmanoevered by a Zulu espionage system? Even if you don�t reply, Mike, all the best, Ron. Mel � You seem to be saying that to decoy an enemy was beyond the ability and intelligence of the Zulu army? Come on, please! Decoys have been part of primitive warfare ever since and before a wooden horse was left outside the gates of Troy. Best wishes, Ron. |
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Mel
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Ron
Good to hear from you. Hope all is well. Yes, indeed, I am saying that the use of a decoy strategy as described by yourself, was beyond the ability of the Zulu army on the 22nd. Could you please point out any Zulu participant on the 22nd, who stated that decoy was part of the strategy used at Isandlwana? Please show me an example where the Zulu army used such a sophisticated level of battle strategy in any other encounter with the British in 1879. Are we talking about the same Zulu army who knew no other tactic but to make suicidal charges onto the guns of entrenched British positions? If the Zulu army had, indeed, used such a successful decoy strategy, then why did they not try similar (much needed) decoys in future encounters? Having learnt lessons at Isandlwana (and it was, even in their triumph, a very painful lesson) and Rorke's Drift (more pain for the Zulu), why do you think that the Zulu did not change tactics and, perhaps, attack the British at their most vulnerable, i.e., when on the march? Or, perhaps attack in the dead of night? Yes Ron, whilst there is no doubt about their courage, I do, indeed, question the level of sophistication the Zulu could apply in their attacks. What makes you think that Ntshingwayo would have felt the need to implement a decoy strategy? He could only guess at the effect of the fire power of the British companies and he was, after all, in control of an unstoppable juggernaught was he not? Why would he decide to lure half of them away and let them off the hook. |
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_________________ Mel |
Ron L
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Mel,
First, thanks for your kind wishes. I do not see why it is necessary to qualify an event that actually happened. The method by which it was accomplished, via unwitting Henry Francis Fynn, is recorded and explained in my first posting. As you are so adamant that the decoy never happened, disprove it. I think you are putting the Zulu ruse on a far higher level of acomplishment than it warrants. Why did the Zulu army not use similar tactics again, you ask? Isandlwana was really a one off as a person in a similar position to Fynn did not surface again. But that certainly did not prevent the Zulus from using decoy tactics. On the night of 27/28 March Colonels Wood and Buller, with a force of approximately 700 horsemen and numerous native irregulars, attacked Hlobane Mountain finding minimal resistance. They were lured onto the summit and whilst they were leisurely rounding up cattle their escape route was closed forcing the attackers into the funnel of Devil�s Pass, resulting in the second worst defeat of the war. Without going into detail, the headstrong Prince Imperial went on patrol with Buller, fell for a decoy and was only rescued in the nick of time. You ask why the Zulus did not attack in the dead of night? They did. Ntombi River on the 12 March 1879, inflicting 60 casualties, either k.i.a. or drowned, on a company of the 80th Regiment. The attackers got away with an unrecorded number of Martini Henrys and 90 000 rounds of ammunition. Why the need to implement a decoy strategy? The Zulu Army as an �unstoppable juggernaught� had previous experience of head on attacks against white men�s wagon lagers and fire power. The Battle of Blood River would not have been forgotten. Why would Ntshingwayo let them off the hook? Read the accounts of the 23rd January. Chelmsford�s demoralized column, virtually our of food and water had no desire to fight and the Zulus, having suffered perhaps 1000 casualties, was equally reluctant: lets get off home with our wounded and loot. Ron. |
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Peter Ewart
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All
Is it, perhaps, pertinent to consider what we mean by "decoy"? To lure or to entice is a common preliminary to an ambush - although in this case it was not the supposedly lured force which suffered the ambush, but the camp itself. Was Chelmsford deliberately lured away from the camp on the night of 21st/22nd? Almost certainly not. But once most of the main impi was installed in the Ngwebini valley & the rest were moving across towards it, a very successful screening process was enacted, preventing the British from realising exactly what was afoot. At some stage in this process, it will have become clear to Ntshingwayo that if Chelmsford's (now further split) forces were far enough from the camp, they could not get back in time to assist in its defence. Ntshingwayo's ability to know what was going on at various places would have depended on the quality of the Zulu communications and our understanding of this will depend on whose and which statements made afterwards by Zulus are to be accepted or weighed in the balance, as some conflict with each other. Might the Zulu high command have attempted to keep Chelmsford as far east as possible for as long as possible once his force had reached the Mangeni area? I'd think so - but unfortunately Ntshingwayo was never interviewed. Nor were some others in the high command who may have been privy to their intentions during the latter part of Lord C's presence to the south-east. Decoys? Elaborate plans? Subterfuge? Sophisticated ruses? The Zulu approach in 1879 was by no means entirely devoid of these, with the most prominent example being one not yet mentioned above - that of 3rd July, when Buller's force was extremely lucky to escape disaster by a whisker. There were at least four occasions in 1879 when the conditions and/or the topography - or just the long grass! - were used to assist the element of surprise. Although this was only an obvious, basic military approach to be employed by any attacking force, it demonstrates to us that the need for surprise was hardly unknown to the Zulu, in itself suggesting that thought was usually given to the need for it, inviting the possibility that much more sophisticated ruses were by no means impossible. Of course, there were plenty of examples of the opposite as well, either through poor leadership, disobedience, impetuosity or lack of discipline. But Zulu history - well before 1879 and even during the civil war afterwards - contains examples of surprises and ruses, sometimes involving very cunning deceit, especially against single clans, factions or individual homesteads. In fact the entire (including internal) story of the Zulu involves the routine employment of cunning against one 's foe, something they were not likely to forget or put aside when faced with such a crisis of 1879. Peter |
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Mel
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Ron,
I just knew that you would bring Hlobane and Intombi into it. Quote - Blood On The Painted Mountain page 128 "Buller had been given the task of assailing the eastern end of the mountain". How can you say that he was lured up the mountain when the whole point of his mission was to ascend said mountain? Yes, Mbelini got it right didn't he? (Well, almost). This reinforces my whole point. Why didn't the main Zulu commanders learn and follow his example? Imagine the difference if the Impi had attacked Khambula in the middle of the night instead of launching what I have previously refered to as suicidal charges which never stood a chance. The picture I have tried to paint is of an army which could not adapt to a modern enemy and was not capable of (to quote ZV chapter 6) "the game of chess" or a sophisticated decoy ruse as described by yourself. Is there any Zulu participant who actually claims to have been directly involved in the decoy? I am referring to the decoy supposedly used to lure Chelmsford from the camp in the early hours of the 22nd. |
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_________________ Mel |
Ron L
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Mel,
Buller, once on the summit was lured into believing he was safe and secure. There had been little opposition to the ascent. Thereafter his column spread out leisurely rounding up cattle. Then the trap was sprung, their escape was cut and the abaQualusi in their thousands appeared from hiding, pushing the raiders west into the funnel of Devil�s Pass. You will find a number of primary source accounts in Zulu Zanquished. A night attack by overwhelming numbers on an unentrenched camp as at Ntombi River is one thing, but I fail to see what advantage darkness would have afforded twenty thousand warriors stumbling towards Kambula in the middle of the night. I think we have exhausted whether or not Lord C. was decoyed from the camp. I have submitted the evidence and you have been unable to disprove it. Is there any known Zulu participant who was involved in the decoy? you ask. Lets start with Ntshingwayo, the Zulu commander. I cannot believe that he was not interrogated. Assuming that he was, why has his account never surfaced? I contend it would have portrayed Lord C. falling for the Zulu decoy which, for obvious reasons, would have been undesirable. Mel, thank you for the tussle, but we seem to be going around in circles. Like Mike Snook, I am going to bow out, call it a day and conclude with a report bearing the Windsor Archives stamp (RA VIC/0 33/92) dated Feb. 11/79 and headed The Isandlnana (sic) Disaster. A memorandum from the Intelligence Department. Writing of Chelmsford�s conduct, the report states He did not keep up proper communications with his camp. He was led away by the Zulus who decoyed him from the camp � ( Perhaps the Intelligence Department had interrogated Ntshingwayo, after all) The report is unsigned. Also read page 31 of John Laband and Geoff Matthews Isandlwana ISBN 0 94747 398. Finally the Duke of Cambridge had a concluding opinion. On the 11th August 79 Sir Charles Ellis wrote to Chelmsford � His Royal Highness has come to the conclusion that the primary cause of the misfortune, and that which led to all the others, was the underestimate formed of the offensive fighting power of the enemy. All best wishes, Ron |
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Julian whybra
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And the absence of Zulu testimony to support this argument means what?
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Mel
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Ron,
Thanks for the discussion. It could be seen as going round in circles but that's what discussion sometimes does. I see it as not only about the decoy theory but as an aid to evaluating other aspects of the battle such as the early movements of both sides. . |
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_________________ Mel |
Was Lord Chelmsford Decoyed? |
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