Jamie
Joined: 01 Sep 2005 |
Posts: 149 |
Location: Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia |
|
![](./templates/Morpheus/images/spacer.gif) |
Posted: Fri Sep 24, 2010 2:28 pm |
|
![](./templates/Morpheus/images/posttop_left.gif) |
![Reply with quote Reply with quote](templates/Morpheus/images/lang_english/blue/icon_quote.gif) |
![](./templates/Morpheus/images/spacer.gif) |
![](./templates/Morpheus/images/spacer.gif) |
To me, this will always be one of the 'classic' questions relating to the Isandlwana battle. If you are fortunate enough to walk the path round the position then you truely can get an idea of the terrain and the wide open access into the camp from the South East.
In respect to the firing line placement, there is no doubt that Pulleine had been presented a major problem in the form of the orders from Mangeni to break camp at Isandlwana and move it, then at around the same time have the reports of Zulu movement to the North East confirmed. I believe that Pulleine still had the words of Chelmsford in his ear and probably believed that the action was taking place 10 miles away in the East when in fact it was not. He believed at that time that the Zulu movements indicated that a minor assualt from a small force was going to be a frontal one and not on the scale it was to actual be, hence the firing line position. THE major thought is what was his thinking, particularly about the South East and West of the camp being totally unguarded, oh and trying to do two operations at once, arrrange packing of the camp yet position a firing line to the North and East of the camp. In reality Chelmsford had already pointed out the firing line to the camp command the day before.
On the other points, the firing line was over-run by a multi front offensive from the Zulu's. Gatlin Guns were not present at Isandlwana but were with the coastal column if I remember correct.
Apologies for the hasty response, on holiday!
Jamie
|
|