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scarletto7
| Joined: 07 Mar 2006 |
| Posts: 91 |
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 Posted: Sun Jul 09, 2006 8:31 pm |
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Thank you Mike, i was wondering about the 'length' of the ridge towards Durnford.
Whilst slightly going off topic, I've been playing with some numbers if a rifle company say of 80 men fired off 50 rounds, during the withdrawal, before the fighting got into the camp, that was a total of 4000 rounds, now say for misfires, fumbled shots, duckbacks and just plain misses, even at a ratio of 75% that means a 1000 rounds hit someone, and either killed or wounded them.
Rather staggering facts in my mind, just playing with figures and well i confess i watched the Real Zulu Dawn with Ian Knight, sorry  but they raised a point about firing etc.
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mike snook 2
| Joined: 04 Jan 2006 |
| Posts: 920 |
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| Posted: Mon Jul 10, 2006 4:02 pm |
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Simon
25% hits across the board may be rather high. Obviously the proportion will vary with range; 25% at very short range to point blank maybe. I tend to think most of the serious killing (of Zs) occurred after the bugles sounded retire. Prior to that they would have been damned difficult to hit (300-400 yards, skirmishing target, or down in cover of donga or long grass.) Because they were difficult to hit is the reason why the rate of fire would have been kept under strict control by the coy and section comds, and why I am so confident that ammo expenditure on the line is not an issue. The coy officers and sgts would have been only too keenly aware of the danger of turning live rounds into empty cases whilst achieving negligible target effect - hence good fire control is the order of the day.
Once the ranges shorten and the Zs are emboldened by the brit withdrawal, and leap out of cover, that's when the large scale killing and maiming with MH rifle fire really begins. And that's why quite so many redcoats made it back to the saddle across such big distances.
Didn't get the bit about the real Zulu Dawn. I had it on in the room yesterday afternoon. for want of anything else to watch, and because it was on after the movie. It was a teeny weeny bit trashy wasn't it? I liked some of the Knight-Pollard bits, but the linking commentary was pretty woeful. Watching the bloke on magic mushrooms doing judo a bit better than he did before, wore a bit thin after about ten seconds, whilst, generally, the 'experiments' of various kinds seemed to my admittedly inexpert eye to be a little bit amatuerish. However the whole package was nothing like as bad as Zulu: The [Un]True Story by BBC Timewatch, which makes my eyes water each time I watch it! I struggle to think of anything worthwhile on film since ZULU.
Regards as ever
M
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Michael Boyle
| Joined: 12 Dec 2005 |
| Posts: 595 |
| Location: Bucks County,PA,US |
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| Posted: Tue Jul 11, 2006 4:30 am |
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Mike has again done an admirable job of summing up the hit rate obstacles so I won't re-hash my arguments from earlier posts as to the difference between theory, practice and reality. (Although if one thinks about it, if one Coy managed 1,000 hits then five Coys would result in 5,000 hits and factoring in time and the colonials one could end up with more hits than Zulus!)
Bill, I've learned much from your many articles that I've read and they have afforded myself and many others much insight and food for thought. However I do have some questions about your piece in Pot Pourri. I believe you are correct in that Isandlwana was atypical of A-ZW battles but I don't believe it was atypical of Zulu tactical doctrine. The other battles you mention did not play out as planned (nor did Isandlwana for that matter), all seem to me to have been botched by premature engagement by either the left or right horn (the youngest warriors). Had the traditional Zulu doctrine been played out correctly I believe the results would have been quite different. Of course the majority of the deployed Zulu Army had little if any experience in anything more than skirmishing, the preceding quarter of a century since King Cetshwayo's war for supremacy had been fairly quiet by Dingane and Shaka standards! Nor had any Zulu Army ever faced an actual western army.
It's my understanding that from the Zulu perspective, RD began as a series of uncoordinated assaults spread out over the entire area, not just the mission station, and that at no time was the 'Beast's Horns' employed. (Nor would they have had much impact on an opponent who had planned for his own encirclement.)
Although the M-H was sighted to 1,000 yds. it was by no means 'accurate' at that range. I've only fired mine at 100 and 300 yds but have found that by moving the sights to 1,000 yds I can no longer obtain a sight picture do to the arcing tradjectory of such a low muzzle velocity round. I believe the low muzzle velocity is key to understanding why so many rounds were fired to so little effect. At anything greater than 300 yds your target would no longer be in the same position it was when you fired at him (if he was moving rather than standing still and giving you a "Bronx Cheer"!). I'm unsure if the newly implemented 'open order' deployment afforded much effect for volley fire as it seems the troops would be too spread out for an officer or NCO to be able to communicate at the necessary volumne for long. That was of course no problem at RD with their 'old fashioned' packed
ranks. I'm curious as to how you came up with a Zulu advance rate of only 100 yds per minute, although I wouldn't expect them all to break the 10 second 100 yd dash I would expect them to move at more than a 'strolling' rate when actually pressing an attack given their reputation as foot cavalry. If in fact a British Coy had fired 6 rds a minute then they would have expended all their 'on board' ammo in little more than eleven minutes. (Again, not at RD as available reserve ammo was opened and actively distributed from the start.)
Your statistics for the RD battle are fascinating and have offered much food for thought but I feel your reliance on statistics based on European warfare need some modification based on the actual estimates of Zulu casaualties that resulted in little lack of resolve. By rights the Zulu attack on Isandlwana should have been broken after the horrendous casualties they incurred from the firing line and Durnford's Donga. They should have been demoralized and forced to retreat. If they had been a European style army they most likely would have, however they were Zulus and all prior bets proved to be off. At RD they only seem to have packed it in when the remnants of 3 Column showed up and as much as I used to cringe at the thought of 'Lord Chelmford's Relief of Rorke's Drift', if he hadn't showed up when he did there may have been no survivors, no VCs and no web site! Not to mention that the negative morale effect could have resulted in an entirely different outcome where local factors could have forced a temporary cessation of hostilities (the colonials would have been less likely to care about British prestige) and quite possibly a 2nd A-ZW instead of a 1st A-BW. (Who says Rorke's Drift didn't really matter!)
[As ever fell free to adjust my mis-conceptions.]
Best
Michael
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mike snook 2
| Joined: 04 Jan 2006 |
| Posts: 920 |
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| Posted: Tue Jul 11, 2006 1:38 pm |
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Coll
Hi. Yes I'd be delighted to do something but as you rightly identify its all a matter of finding the time. Currently I am trying (in between working for a living and writing...whinge, whinge,) to lead a bit of a charge on the development and improvement of the regimental museums in Cardiff Castle and Brecon Barracks - major capital projects which require lottery bids, and one hell of a lot of diplomacy and so on. On the subject of a TV programme though, I dare say if some sharp TV producer dropped me a line we could put something substantive and worthwhile together, fairly quickly, based on the books.
I'm sure we could come up with some reasonably balanced language to cover my interpretation of Colonel Anthony's failings, which might not have you reaching for your ear muffs!! It's in the nature of TV that it will never allow for the same depth and scope that the written word does, and the most important thing about the story of 22 Jan is that the quite remarkable gallantry of both sets of participants is put across effectively, though of course its possible to have a lot of fun with the whole blame issue.... not, however, to the extent of totally misinterpreting events as Timewatch did.
Regards as ever
Mike
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Bill Cainan1
| Joined: 01 Sep 2005 |
| Posts: 107 |
| Location: Lampeter |
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| Posted: Tue Jul 11, 2006 1:49 pm |
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Michael
Oops, pressed the wrong button !
Anyway, a brief response to the points you've raised:
1. You have asked how I arrived at the Zulu advance rate of 100 yards per mnute (as indeed have a few others) . This was basically arrived at by looking at the Zulu method of attack. The Zulu companies advanced in three ranks virtually in open or extended order and would move from cover to cover, with pauses when they would crouch (if no cover was available) - Ian Knight's "Anatomy of the Zulu Army" is very good on describing their battlefield tactics. Advancing in this manner would I feel take a minute to cover a hundred yards. This is of course a far cry from the "tactics" shown in "Zulu" and "Zulu Dawn" where indeed they were advancing in bunches and probably covering the hundred yards in 20-25 seconds. The Zulu tactics were quite sophisticated and need to be appreciated as such.
2. Yes, the classic Zulu attack formation of the buffalo horn is really onlyapplicable on a flat billiard table surface, which of course rarely occurs. Nevertherless the overiding principle of the formation is to engulf, and surround your enemy so that escape is impossible and the victory becomes total. It would in practice be very difficult to co-ordinate the jump off times of the left and right horns with the movement of the head, and as you say, the AZW is full of instances when one horn or the other has advanced too fast or too slowly (or not at all). If you consider the initial attack by the iNdluyengwe regiment on Rorke's Drift, there is sufficient space on the aproach from the south-west to deploy a left horn the head and a right horn. It is of course conjecture that part of the right horn in fact went along the Shyiane Terraces and later provided the "snipers". The fire from the post obviously affected the deployment of both horns. However, you can see the attempt to engulf the mission stage straight from the moment the lead companies companies came round the foot of the Shiane.
3. Although Zulu morale might generally have been higher than most, I don't think that the difference was huge. One point, which I tried to make in the article, was to emphasise that it is important to appreciate whether you are operating in favourable or unfavourable conditions - this significantly affects the ability to sustain casualties and to keep up morale. At Isandlwana, the Zulu advance from the plateau against the firing line would have suffered sufficient casualties for the morale to waver and for the warriors to seek cover in the dead ground a few hundred yards from the firing line. The situation would then be UNFAVORABLE to the Zulu and would prevent any further advance. For the situation to change, conditions needed to change for things to become FAVOURABLE. This would have happened with the slackening of the British fire, as the Companies withdrew, and at the same time, the Indunas were exorting their men for another effort.
4. Ah volley fire ! I am one of the few that believe that once the British Companies were in position on the firing line, they CLOSED up to maximise the effect of volley fire and make command and control more effective. This would create larger gaps between the Companies, but these could easily be covered by interlocking arcs of fire, with the end platoon oblique to the line (this is in the drill manual). Yes, I know that the few sources (eg Curling) all seem to indicate extended order, but I believe that this was only used in getting the companies into position in the line, after which thdey closed up. I have, of course, NO evidence with which to argue this point !!!!
5. Effective range of the Martini-Henry ? I agree totally that firing individually 1,000 yards must be wildly optimistic. However, by firing platoon volleys with the sights set at 1,000 yards, it should be possible to drop your shots on a massed target and cause some initial damage. With the aim to accumulate casualties, and chip away at morale, it is important to commence firing as far away as is practical. So, effective fire ? Yes, in a way.
I suspect that much of this is "off topic" but it is all interesting stuff.
Bill
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