rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - Donald Morris-- Ammunition--Again.

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 2:58 pm

Even thousands mentioned, Pulleine had nothing to be concerned about, he had 6 companies of infantry 2 RA guns and numerous Native/Auxillary troops, plus the belief that ran through the army, that they could deal with any natives going.

Maybe Durnfords leaving the camp, prompted Pulleine into doing something he didn't want, and whilst its laudible to say defend the camp, again maybe Pulleine's decision to engage the enemy, was to not so much force the battle, but to stop the Zulus advancing unimpeded, what better than to use the 24ths firepower, whilst wondering what or where Durnford was doing.

There agin Durnford riding to glory, started the ball rolling in one or t'other

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 5:33 pm

Hi All,

This might not be relevent, but I came accross this some time ago, some may have seen it before.

http://www.genuki.org.uk/big/wal/Zulu.html

In particular the extract of a letter from a No. 1415 Thomas Thomas of Ystalyfera. I have never heard of him before, and personally think it's just another " I WAS THERE ". Anyway see what you think.

Regards,

Neil.

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 5:35 pm

Scarletto7,
Yes, Pulleine was possessed of overconfidence and was sure he could handle anything.You will gather that my viewpoint is that prior to Durnford's arrival, the infantry dispositions together with preparations for a full scale attack should have been made. They were not. Nothing to do with Durnford's subsequent arrival.

Dawn: Hi there from the far flung part of the misty Empire.
Milne: Ron and I have walked from the exact spot that Chelmsford breakfasted and from where he dispatched Milne, Captain W. P. Symons and a party of signallers to the hill to the north of the breakfast spot. It took us approximately 20 minutes maximum to reach the plateau from which the camp could be observed. Symons reported their arrival time at 'just before 1000hrs.'( Modern army jargon)
The camp could be plainly seen with 'two powerful telescopes.'
The camp was under observation for an hour until about 1100 hrs. They got back at about 1120 hrs. All they saw were oxen being collected, but they confirmed that no firing was noticed AND the tents were still standing.
Naturally they did not see an attack being mounted as the major assault only began shortly before noon. This they reported to Chelmsford and it is my belief that had the tents been struck, Chelmsford may have given serious consideration to returning immediately.Time to get back? At least, as said before, two to three hours.Therefore it follows he would have got back at the earliest 1320 hrs and the latest about 1420 hrs. Too late.
Peter

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 6:16 pm

Peter,
Thank you, i would agree that preparations should have been made, however the 'have' is difficult to tie down, even if Pulleine had taken up a defensive position, would Durnford which he would have had to rely on, stayed there??

Posted: Sat May 06, 2006 1:09 am

Peter

Thanks for the reply. I was only half an hour out. It's great that you're available to give your personal input into these things. Yes, if the tents had been struck, Chelmsford would have taken the message more seriously but then I don't think Pulleine knew of the threat he was under and probably didn't think there was cause for it. And too late to do anything when the attack was launched with vigor.

Dawn

Posted: Sat May 06, 2006 2:34 am

"On the order being given to strike tents, all ropes except the corner ones, will be quickly undone and hanked up close to the flies; walls will be unlaced and packed into bags.
The corner ropes will then be loosened and the tents dropped on the bugle sound �G�, Nos 1, 2, 3, 4 and 10 will remove poles, bank corner ropes, fold up flies and lace them carefully up in the hold-alls, while Nos 5, 6, 7 and 8 take out pegs, count them, and pack them in the peg bag."

Ten men per tent to do it right maybe two to do it quickly if familiar and practiced. (Any one know the drill for quickly striking tents, how often it was practiced and if the 24th had ever done it in combat?) I'm not sure how well the NNC could have accomplished the downing of over 350 tents covering the better part of a mile long and a few hundred yards deep so Imperials would have to have been told off for it. Can you imagine the chaos? Can you imagine the hazard to the firing line and horses retreating through the mangled mess of fallen canvas, tent contents, loose ropes and protruding tent pegs all scattered on a slope? How would it have affected their ability to maintain coherence?

The only accounts I've read of tent striking for combat had it done by the numbers to save camp equipment and eliminate hazardous detritus after confirming an enemy of known size was determined to be in the process of forming up for an attack on a camp and was in such numbers or in such terrain that manouvering for a meeting engagement or standing to prepared entrenchments (normally forward of the camp area) was not thought advantageous. Even then against a 'European' type opponent where sufficient time was afforded by the enemies attack preparations. None of which bears any similarity to the events of 22 Jan. 1879.

A commander in his first combat command would have to think long and hard before striking a camp that his GOC considered safe from attack in the face of an enemy who seemed to be ignoring him despite being fired upon and with very rudimentary defence orders that did not include any provision for resorting to tent striking.

The act of combat tent striking hadn't come up much in the annals of military history, at least by a force of that size. [Please correct me if I'm wrong, I'm still catching up on British Military history!]

Best

Michael

Posted: Sat May 06, 2006 12:39 pm

Dawn:
But Pulleine did know the threat he was under. He simply thought he could cope with it. And notwithstanding anything, Standing Orders made it clear that if a camp was under threat, the tents were to be dropped and, of course, the camp WAS under threat.
Michael:
The drill that you have mentioned is for dropping and packing, ready to move. The drill for action however is entirely different.
For each tent, a 'pole man' was nominated.On the alert being sounded, the pole man drops the centre pole and the tent collapses. This all takes a matter of a minute or so. This was the drill practiced and exercised by Wood at Kambula. The Zulus were astonished (at Kambula) to watch all the tents suddenly 'disappear.' Pages 116 and 117 in "The Zulu War of 1879 Through the Eyes of the Illustrated London News," and page 199 of "Zulu Vanquished" shows Melton Pror's sketch of the action at Kambula with the tents collapsed and central poles showing. It will be noted that although Wood knew of the impending Zulu advance on Kambula, he could have dismantled and removed the tents completely, but rather chose to drop them immediately before the action began, thus reinforcing the view that the dropped tents were not a hinderence, as can be seen from Melton Prior's work.
Whether Pulleine had instigated a similar system is not certain, but improbable. But this did not alter the fact that tents were 'dropable' on the centre pole being removed in a matter of ' double quick' time. Of course to repack or re-raise the tents took a considerable time.
The NNC at Isandlwana did not sleep in tents, rather huddled together. So the issue of NNC tents there did not exist.
Again, had Pulleine dropped the tents, the onus would have been on Chelmsford to make a critical decision on whether to ignore or return. Pulleine certainly could not have been faulted for acting on Standing Instructions and let there remain conjecture as to the final outcome!
Peter

Posted: Sat May 13, 2006 12:31 pm

Well, there are a number of points (and questions) that I would have liked to post, but I guess I'll just leave them unsaid. Rolling Eyes

So, my opinion in the case of Col. Durnford, will always remain 'check' but never 'checkmate' Twisted Evil

Coll

Posted: Wed Jul 12, 2006 1:23 pm

To get back to the original point 'Ammunition again' I understand that the original case were made of quite soft brass so could the failure have been anything to do with the cartridge cases jamming in the hot barrels and the extractor pulling off the rim leaving the case stuck in the chamber which would then need the ramrod to get it out?

Posted: Thu Jul 13, 2006 12:56 am

Sorry Paul we do tend to wander about!

Yes the Boxer Henry round used was manufactured of sheet brass rolled around a former and crimped to an iron base that contained the primer (hand made by the way!) The bullet was 12 parts lead to one part tin. (Four different kinds of metal, I wonder if the Navy had a problem with electrolysis from sea spray?) To push the 480 gr. bullet they used 85 grs. of black powder. In addition to the bullet and powder the cartridge also contained three glazed cardboard disks and a beeswax wad so don't let anyone tell you this round wasn't a smoker.

You are quite right that this had much to do with the casing getting stuck in the breach, but the extractor ripping off the base was not always the problem. When it was, using the cleaning rod would be a dauntless task (not to mention time consuming) as there would be no base to push against so digging it out with a knife seemed to be the most employed solution. Even when the casing stuck intact it would seem the knife was the quickest way to dig it out. The major problem seemed to be that the extractor was not strong enough to reliably remove the spent cartridge which is why the design change from Mk I to Mk II entailed a strengthened extracor and with each subsequent MK the extractor was further strengthened leading ultimately to 'long lever' Mk IV that could probably crack walnuts.

Speaking of wandering about though... about the tents, Peter are you sure that the NNC didn't have any? I'm presently wading through all the Lord C correspondence I can find and one theme he keeps coming back to is the lack of tentage for the NNC, even saying he won't deploy them unless the SA Government comes up with some (having already been turned down by H.M.'s Government). As well I can't recall seeing anything but tents in all the sketches, paintings and camp lay-outs I've seen. The fact that wood was not particulary plentiful at Isandlwana seems to have also been a mitigating reason to put in another ten miles before setting up the 'permanent' [i.e.- entrenched] camp.

I also came across this from Laband's compilation of Lord C's papers - " Had the tents been lowered as was invariably done afterwards by pulling out the tent poles, they would also have formed an entanglement at a distance from the position to be defended, which would have materially strengthened its defensive qualities -" (Of course he did write that into his notes on the findings of the Court of Enquiry...)

Best

Michael

Posted: Thu Jul 13, 2006 7:52 am

Michael

One of the NNC officer sources (probably Maori but haven't double checked) indicates that the NNC other ranks erected crude brushwood shelters for themselves at Isandlwana (which I fancy they would have cut from the Manzimyama Valley where year round water permits good growth). Inference is that there were tents for the Europeans but none for the Africans.

Regards

Mike

Posted: Sat Jul 15, 2006 9:33 am

Michael,
As previously stated stated and as MS2 has pointed out, the NNC were without tents; only the officers and NCO's were allocated tents that were erected behind(i.e. west) of the NNC shelters.
Source: Hamilton-Browne, Norris-Newman and Harford. The latter," ......Plenty of wood being close at hand behind the hill, the Natives soon set to work to run up shelters for themselves the other side of the road, clear of our camp. A queer-looking place they made of it, being packed in like sardines, the space allotted to them being limited."
The comment on wood being plentiful is also of interest, as this is a prerequisite for selecting a camp site.

Posted: Sun Jul 16, 2006 4:15 am

Mike and Peter

Thanks, I do recall the references cited but as I've recently finished "Lord Chelmsford's Zululand Campaign 1878 - 1879" where he mentions a dearth of wood at Isandlwana as a reason for not setting up a 'permanent' camp (as opposed to enough wood for a temporary camp) there and now "Historical Records of the 24th Regiment" which includes -" Major Dunbar was sent on ahead, on the 16th January, with the four left-wing companies of 2nd battalion 24th and some Native pioneers to construct a road and make a depot of firewood, the country ahead being destitute of fuel." has admitted some confusion in my thinking.

Not being one to allow confusion to slow me down I went on to think that if the NNC were forced to do without shelter in the horrid weather conditions then playing out that it would be little wonder that their morale would prove shaky. No one can go indefinitely in a cold, wet bedraggled state. If they built wooden 'tents' and assuming they would hold a comparable amount of individuals, then based on the NNC proportion of the column there would have been nearly as many little wooden igloos in their allotted area as issue tents through-out the rest of the camp area, which would seem to belie the grand parade-ground layout that seems to have been affected with the hope of aweing the Zulus with it's magnificence. Besides which unless they'd worked out a 'strike wooden igloo' drill then they'd be leaving an awful lot of enemy cover right inside the camplines (not that that eventuality had yet occurred to anyone). As well all that stacked wood would have been a terrific fire hazard in dry weather.

I can only assume that Lord C's abortive attempts at providing tents had something to do with his experiences in the last CFW. (Or perhaps knowing how unkempt they would appear in his camp!)

Best

Michael

Posted: Sun Jul 16, 2006 9:32 am

Neil

Going back to your post of 5th May (which possibly may have done better on another thread?) I note that Julian Whybra deals with this man in section "L" (Frauds, Erroneous Inclusions, Misspellings & Conundra) of his England's Sons.

It appears Thomas was out with Chelmsford's reconnaisance and was not necessarily claiming to have taken part in the battle itself. His use of the third person plural enables the reader to suppose that he was speaking of his own experiences, whereas JW points out - and I agree - that the text of his letter is sufficiently vague (perhaps deliberately, perhaps not) to be taken either way.

Peter

Posted: Sun Jul 16, 2006 12:16 pm

Mike boyle
Your question re Henderson seems to have gone unanswered.
Yes, Henderson did put in anappearance (with R Hall) at RD. He seems to have stayed long enough to fire a few shots at the Zulus as they approached and then being unable to break through to the post (perhaps, or more likely, not desiring to do so) galloped off.