rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - Donald Morris-- Ammunition--Again.

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 8:57 am

Peter,

First things first - I still owe you a reply on the other means - Haven't forgotten. Should find out this weekend.

Now then, to matters in hand you devil. Twisted Evil

One thing's for sure Evelyn Wood would have sat us down and told us all at great length how clever he'd been.

I know of three people who think that the Battle of Isandlwana started before midday. You, Ron and 'Elizabeth Hogan').

Take that. Don't blame me - you started it!! Laughing

[Don't respond with a list of subscribers to Lock/Quantrill theory because I'm sure its a much longer one and I'm only teasing you. ]

'The blandness of the despatch is remarkable' was what I wrote about the 8.05 note. So we agree. He didn't have the confidence in the NC vedettes to repeat verbatim what they said to him - but what they reported was probably animated and probably garbled. So he was right to use measured language - but the critical failing was not to amplify the expression 'in force'.

How you judge remaining stood to on the defensive to be pathetic I cannot imagine. I judge it to be exaclty the right response to the information available.

I can't remember what it is you think he should have been doing - was it build a laager? Because (forgive me Jon - I will never say this to you) we've done that to death. No laager ever made would have protected the ridiculously sited camp at Isandlwana (Clery's share in the blame game but only in so far as Lord C should have countermanded his layout, and in turn, Richard G should have confronted the GOC if he did not).

If Durnford had not become over excited at the prospect of the action being elsewhere (Higginson: the enemy is retiring everywhere) and taking off to get stuck in, there is a fair to middling chance that Pulleine, left to his own devices, would have got away with the Battle of Isandlwana - although as I have argued logistic disaster (but not necessarily wholesale disaster) must have figured in the outcome.

Michael,

The weeping face was not for the officer corps who I am sure will have been called far worse things (!) but for your sadly abandoned mother- tongue!! I think if they could come back even those rebel-dogs of 1776 would be somewhat taken aback by today's language!! Very Happy

Regards to all

Mike

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 10:50 am

Hi Mike,
Am absolutely sure your right that Wood would be telling us how clever he was as he surveyed the scene of a catostrophic Zulu defeat! Action man he, unlike the encumbant.
Please, please do not mention 'Elizabeth Hogan' in any connection with us, (even in jest) 'cos she 'aint. and in any event, you know our confidential views on the subject!
What do I think Pulleine should have been doing? Sure as hell not sitting on his backside watching events unfold. And I consider "Standing to" to be just that.
A laager, we know was impossible. The 0805 note should and could have been termed in strong language on the lines:
" A major Zulu advance in progress on camp. Request immediate assistance."
Then at least strike tents; increase the ammo carried per soldier from 70 to 100 in accordance with standing instructions; ensure that the ammo boxes were removed from ammo wagons and placed adjacent to Coys with screws removed; and finally deploy the Coys in tight formation ready for action.
This is the scene that should have greeted Durnford on his arrival.
Had this been the case I am pretty sure that Durnford would not have sallied forth and we may even seen a British victory.
Your argument that Pulleine did not have confidence in the vedette reports does not hold water. And the reports were not 'animated and probably garbled.' If you thinking of Ardendorff,yes, he was garbled. But he is not to be confused with Scott et al who were both precise and concise that a major Zulu advance was happening and duly reported such to Pulleine. And if you are not to trust what your vedettes are telling you, what is the point in deploying them?
"Sir, thousands of Zulus are advancing."
" Don't disturb my breakfast with frivilous reports.! Get back to your posts."
The above is facetious, but illustrates the point.
And in my view, a fair bet that Durnford on arrival could have stood on his head and scratched his you know whats, but alas Pulleine's relative inactivity had already decided the issue; the battle was already lost. Again, the War Office also thought so. Wonder why?
And bye the bye, there are now a quite a few battlefield-tour guides of standing in this part of the world who hold the view that the battle started before midday. Isolated Ron and I we are not. Merely in the business of converting!
Bur we fear that you are perhaps beyond conversion!
As ever,
Peter

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 11:58 am

Peter,

All your precautionary measures pre-suppose that the 24th ran out of ammunition and the boxes were un-openable or inaccessible. Not so.

Drop the tents - the tents are behind them - why on earth would they do that? They are not in the fields of fire. There is no attack in progress. Drop the tents and reduce the camp to chaos because the enemy have been seen five miles away. Positively 'windy' bit of soldiering if you ask me.

The troops were concentrated between 0730 and 10-30 - it was Durnford who is responsible for their subsequent scattering to the four winds. It really is quite extraordinary that you make these kind of mental leaps. It was Pulleine who had the troops stood to in a concentrated defensive position ready for a major action at the camp - and he jolly well kept them there all morning. Only when Durnford arrives does it all start to turn into some kind of jolly skirmish in the hills.

Scott didn't make the report to Pulleine. The first time he returned to camp after taking post at first light was when he galloped up the slope with half of Africa hot on his tail.

Where do you get this line about the WO blaming inactivity by Pulleine? That's complete do-doo. The WO blamed Lord C, much to his chagrin. AG's directed letter on behalf of C-In-C refers. This is a misinterpretation on your part I'm afraid.

Oh heck!! Laughing

I'm going to have to come and sink a few glasses with you guys until you can see the light!!

Keep my seat at the bar warm.

Regards

Mike

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 3:38 pm

Mike,
The24th DID run out of ammo and the boxes were inaccessable. Read ZV1. In addition stacks of primary and secondary to support this statement. ( Bickley, John Williams,Essex,Higginson,Molife, Symons et al.)
Drop the tents, " why on earth do that?" Simple my dear Watson. 'Cos those were the standing orders, TO BE OBEYED. Sure there was no attack in progress, but there soon would be! The threat was apparent. And yes, the tents would be in the field of fire --right horn!
Your interpretation of the troops being "concentrated" and mine differ. I mean deployed for action, not sitting whistling in the wind in front of the 2/24th and NNC tents, bored to tears, waiting for the breakfast call.
War office Memorandum (RE Museum A 31/4901-31/7) not signed BUT on a WO letterhead (page 282 ZV1,) clearly places the blame on Pulleine.
" This (Durnford's arrival) was now too late a period to remedy the FATAL ERRORS OF POSITION SELECTED before his arrival."
No misinterpretation on my part, mon ami.
If we persevere we may even pursuade you without sinking the first glass!
Peter

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 4:23 pm

Peter,

Precisely the point - that's not a reference to Pulleine and the troops, it's a reference to the siting of the camp.

And an unsigned piece of headed paper - you well know that an unsigned mil document means that is not authorised for release - that the drafter never got it past his principal. So even if it did mean what you say it means, which it doesn't, nobody agreed with what it said anyway.

Not admissible in the context in which you are using it.

Going home.

Mike

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 5:15 pm

Lord Derby gives a very succinct answer in his diary in August 1880 to what happened that fateful day, after hearing Chelmsford's account.

�He had left in camp a force quite sufficient to defend the position, naturally a strong one: but that contrary to his orders, the officer in command chose to go out and fight the Zulus in the open, where they beat him, the disparity of numbers being too great.�

Anyone like to try summing up in fewer words?
Damian

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 6:02 pm

Mike,
Disagree. My interpretation of 'errors of position ' is troop deployment, not camp siting. You will note the plural in 'errors.' If it was the camp site it would read 'error.'
As for the 'unsigned,' the report was a hot potato, and naturally no one would wish to publicly implicate Pulleine. This would contradict the move to place the debacle ( from a British viewpoint) on Durnford.
More strength to the contents of the report.
Mike, with all your experience, I doubt very much that if you were in Pulleine's shoes, you would behave exactly as did Pulleine. Come on now, bite the bullet and admit it!
Methinks we may pursuade you before the first noggin. After the fifth you are gone.
Totsiens,
Peter

Posted: Thu May 04, 2006 6:16 pm

Peter,
Why should Pulleine have worded his 0805 message to request assistance from Chelmsford? That, surely, can only be said with hindsight? Chelmsford left the camp confident that there was sufficient force to defend it. Indeed, an attack on the camp was welcomed. He did not instruct Pulleine to request assistance at the first sign of any large enemy activity.
Imagine the predicament for Pulleine had he requested assistance at 0805 and an hour later the attack had still not materialised.

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 1:02 am

May I jump in with just a small question?

I have always wondered about that 'blue note' written by Pulleine. The time written in the original is 8.5 and is taken as 8.05, but could it not have been 8.50? Leaving off the 0 at the end seems more logical that leaving it off in the middle (esp a note scribbled in a hurry). Was this the normal way of writing it in the field or was there a military standard that tells us it is 8.05, and not 8.50?

I'm sorry if this has been resolved before but it really intrigues me. I'm hoping someone has the logical explanation for this.

I always seem to ask the stupid questions! Confused

Dawn

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 7:10 am

Mel,
The point that I was trying to make, was that Pulleine was well aware that the Zulus were advancing in great numbers. This info he would have received from the vedettes.His actual blue note states:
"Zulus are advancing in force."
This implies that he believed the reports sent in by the vedettes.
Now it is well recorded that both overconfidence, possibly mixed with a degree of disdain, allowed his thought process to think he could handle the situation. (See ZV1.)
Chelmsford, on leaving the camp, had left no direct instructions whatsoever with Pulleine. Indeed not even a "goodbye." (I'm ignoring Clery's supposed written instructions.) Thus, misplacedly, Pulleine found himself in a situation he thought he could handle, but in reality was a bridge too far in view of his relative inactivity. (Points mentioned in previous postings with which MS disagrees.)
" Imagine the predicament for Pulleine etc."
Agreed, but what would have occurred is the return of Chelmsford and, in my opinion. an attack that would in any event have commenced that day. Chelmsford would have been in command, and if victorious, Pulleine given a "Shabash."
However, in my estimation, the time taken to concentrate his force and return could not have been under two to three hours at best. This could have caused him considerable embarrassment, for had the attack commenced he would have found himself on the march and short of the camp. All hypothesis of course.
To placate those who do not think an attack was on the cards that day, Chelmsford, on his return, would have sent a strong recce to the plateau and beyond to check Pulleine's report, thus ensuring the attack took place in any event, on the 22nd.
Either way, Pulleine would not have become the laughing stock for his actions.

Dawn:The actual timing on the note read:
"8.5.A.M."
It could not have meant 8.50 as it was acknowledged by Hallam Parr, in his writing, as " Received 9.30"
To find the General the messenger would have set out initially to Mangeni Falls area and then be redirected to where the General was enjoying breakfast, a couple of miles away. Not possible in the time span you suggest. Had it been "8.50" it would have been recorded as such. That was the military terminology of the day.
Peter

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 8:28 am

Just a few things.

Mike, did Lt. Henderson put in a brief appearance at Rorke's Drift that afternoon? Was that quote subsequent to that day and if so, subsequent to the start of the 'blame game'? Were there any supporting statements from other colonial survivors? [Wanted to ask this earlier but didn't have the time.]

No one seems to be buying my argument that if you don't know what you're looking for you're not going to find it. The tone of the campaign was set by the GOC. Lord Chelmsford ignored Standing Orders so should we be suprised that his commanders followed his lead? No one seemed to give the Zulus much consideration. Example, the following - [Lord please don't let this be another part of Julian's teaching exercise!]

"For The Consideration of Officers Comdg Columns when entering Zululand
...
16) The possible tactics of the Zulus are as follows-
A) Avoid the Troops and attack our line of communications.
B) Attack the Column when on the line of march.
C) Attack the camp at night & charge into it with all their numbers.
D) Await attack in position between White, & Black Umvelosi Rivers.
17) Whatever tactics are adopted, it may be looked upon as a certainty � that when Zulus attack, they will threaten one or both flanks, as well as the front.
[ Seems to indicate that a daylight attack on the camp was not considered a possibility and a very fuzzy reference to impondo zankomo that could as easily apply to any enemy in any encounter.]
...
21) In case of attack by day, clear instructions should be given, as to how the wagons & then other transport are to be placed."
[Seems to refer to attack on a column in transit and that coy. wagons received different consideration than 'other transport'.]

Some other alleged Chelmsford quotes relating to the Zulus (if anyone can help me with their context I'd appreciate it) -

"masters of the ambuscade and other ruses"
"in going through bush, remember that natives will often lie down to let you pass and then rise to fire on you".
"A common ruse with the natives is to hide a large force in the bush and then show a few solitary individuals to invite an attack. When the troops enter the bush in pursuit of the latter the hidden men rise and attack them".

[Which could lead one to believe that only sneak attacks should be expected and if you see a large body of Zulus then they must be up to something else, which did appear to be the case that morning.] [That last bit could even seem to support the decoy theory in a broad way and was used just before Ulundi.]

The following is a brief excerpt from an Ian Knight article that seems to address other considerations sometimes talked around and provide another Chelmsford lead that his column commanders may have felt compelled to follow ( 'Zulus moving on the camp in force'. 'Says who?' 'The colonials.' 'Bosh!')

"...Moreover, although the irregular units, who were attached to Wood�s column, had fought on the Cape frontier, most of the Natal Volunteer Corps had no direct experience of battle beyond the dismal Langalibalele campaign of 1873, while the Boers and NNC remained an unknown quantity. Under such circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that Chelmsford preferred to have the observations of his auxiliaries confirmed by reports from regular troops before he acted upon them.
Yet this reluctance to take colonial capabilities seriously was also symptomatic of a wider failure to grasp the importance of the need to systematically process intelligence. Lord Chelmsford began the campaign with no intelligence officer on his staff, nor did he think one necessary. In this, he followed conventional army thinking which expected all staff officers to process such information that came within their orbit. Although the Staff College at Camberley had been training officers in systematic staff duties since 1858, there were many in the army establishment, headed by the Commander-in-Chief himself, the Duke of Cambridge, who considered such training no more than a fad."

All in all it seems that Lord C went out of his way to discount any chance of a serious Zulu threat, even in transit (which in fact proved accurate earlier that morning for Col. Pearson ), thus his senior officers were lulled into a false sense of security. There seems to me to have been entirely too much confusion in the command structure, tactical structure and logistical goals.

[Eating my words here would only be fair since I gave up my lunch hour to post this! By the way Mike have you ever read any 18th century American colonial correspondence? Doesn't seem much was left to posterity to butcher!]

Best

Michael

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 8:40 am

I'm interested in this, now Peter are you saying saying that because he advanced his troops away from the camp, and in one way i suppose 'offered' battle to the Zulus, that he is at fault?

The wording Zulus advancing in force, could mean 500, what is a 'force'? there is nothing in that word that means anything, force doesn't actually imply strength of enemy, when we were attacked by a large force of insurgents (as it was reported) that large force was 14 men, so thats why i don't see pullienes words as noting that he was worried about the supposed strength It in no way conveys size.

Maybe he wanted to keep the zulus away from camp, maybe he sent out a 2nd messenger (enough survivors unaccounted for) who never made it, or thought sod this I'm off.

Maybe the Zulus preempted him, easy to blame Pulleine, maybe though the zulus need even more credit for forcing him into an action, anyway I'm not so well versed and learned as to have read what most are on about, so this is just a laymans pov

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 8:52 am

Dawn

It's a very fair question. I've seen other orders from this era that follow the same convention. It does look odd to the modern eye I agree. We would write 8.05 I am sure.

However, as Peter points out, the time of receipt assuredly fixes it at five minutes past eight. I presume you have crossed the plain.

Mel

You are quite right. If a battalion commander had written what Peter said he should, when he was not even sure what the enemy was about, he could have expected to have been at least labelled as 'windy' and unreliable, and would almost certainly have to face being relieved of his command. It was an unforgiving age as Lord C's famous rebuke to Durnford shows. You are quite right about hindsight - an advantage Peter enjoys but HBP did not.

Peter,

Besides - Pulleine wanted the Zulus to come on - remember - he wanted to give them a 'good thrashing' (though I accept this is a hearsay source). Remember in confirmation of the notion, however, that Curling tells us that at the 'stand to' the officers were amused at the idea that Lord C had shot off chasing shadows. Pulleine was as excited as anybody else by the notion that the Zulus might attack the camp - however he did not lose control of his emotions or his judgement like another gentleman I could name, who the minute he thought there was not going to be an attack (the enemy is retiring everywhere) decided to go sallying into the hills, in contravention of what was intended for him (though intent was not very scientifically relayed to him as I have written about at length), and worse, tries to incite HPB to disobey his orders. Pray what do you think would have been the outcome if Pulleine had given him two companies. I'll tell you. The entire force would have been slaughtered - but instead of the Zulu loss being in the thousands, it would have been a few hundred, and instead of us Brits discussing Isandlwana in the context we do, we would regard it as another Majuba and shift uneasily in our seats each time the name was mentioned.

And yes I would have done exactly as HBP did - only Cochrane would be rather more fulsome about the explosion that occurred in my tent when Durnford asked me for two companies.

Of course he would not then have had the gall to demand that I support him and I could have left my troops at the top of the glacis slope instead of down on the rocky ridge.

But I would still have been stuffed by the right horn. I might have stood a good chance of getting most of my blokes into a battalion square around Bloomfield's wagons and the guns, when Melvill rode in from the spur to tell me that the game was up on my left and that I must expect in due course to be attacked through the saddle. A lot of my NNC blokes would have been killed, my oxen would have been lost and the camp looted four ways from Sunday, but I would have killed a lot of the enemy, kept my guns and my colours and probably would have 400-500 men of the 24th uninjured, most of the N Bty men and some of the mounted men depending on whether they dismounted along side my square or legged it on their nags.

There is one possible alternative - with my battalion on the top of the glacis slope instead of the rocky ridge - Durnford would almost certainly have ridden hard for the camp (as opposed to stopping at the donga) - then with his two troops of NNMC and the three that had come in from the left, I would have had a credible reserve with which to hold the nek against the threat from the right horn. Then we would have won hands down with only minimal casualties from rifle fire. There would have been no Rorke's Drift, no Hlobane, Kambula or Gingindlovu, just an Ulundi and a whole lot less nasty and bloody a war.

As I wrote in LWOTF Pulleine does have a share in the blame - but his offence is one of being too acquiescent towards a man who at the end of the day was only a marginal superior. In other words he was too polite to AWD. It was AWD's over flighty temperament and poor military judgement which was responsible for the over-extended nature of the defence.

Over to others now - you've worn me out as usual Peter!! You'll owe me a drink the next time we meet. I'm going to have to have my fingertips replaced. Typing is hard enough for me as it is. Exclamation

Regards,

Mike

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 10:22 am

Thanks Mike and Peter for the clarification. I'm not disputing it and like most, have taken that it was 8.05am but it always made me wonder. I shall wonder no more.

Mike, no, I didn't cross the plain but I do remember how vast it was and seemed to roll away into the distance. I think it is one thing to see it on a map and another to see it in the flesh, so to speak. So yes, I'd have to agree, it definitely is 8.05 as 8.50 would just not have done it in that time frame.

Which leads me to the next question, which I think is posted in a cursory form on another thread (and forgive me is this is distracting from the current debate) i.e.. the timing of Milne with his telescope. The message arrives at 9.30, Milne is sent to the top of the lookout, reaching it, I estimate, at about 10.30 - allowing for the message to be sent, received, acted upon, Milne to gather himself+telescope and climb the hill. (Any idea of the steepness or distance anyone?) So I reckon he was observing the camp between 10.30 and 11.30. I seem to remember it written somewhere that he was there for an hour. He returned, only to report that all seemed OK, apart from the cattle being moved into the camp.

If only he lingered another half hour perhaps??

But then would Lord C have made it back in time? I think not.

It actually does segue into this debate a bit as it shows that Lord C was not completely unmoved by the blue note and, as per some of the discussion above, wanting to get some confirmation before he went rounded up the troops to send them back. Assured by Milne's report, he sauntered off for an after breakfast stroll while the camp was being annihilated. But I digress, this debate was about Durnford, not Chelmsford. I'll let you guys get on with it.

Dawn

Posted: Fri May 05, 2006 10:43 am

Whitelaw reported "thousands" approaching the camp. One presumes it was on that basis that Pulleine used the terminology, " in force."
Mike: Sorry to say that if you were to do exactly as Pulleine had done, you would not be on the forum discussion today. Now there's a thing!
Of course our major difference of opinion is that, in your view, it was Durnford who fought the tactical battle, whereas in my view it was Pulleine. Never alas, shall the twain meet.
An interesting aside to Pulleine's character is that Durnford's request for two companies was rejected by Melvill. Why not Pulleine himself giving the heave-ho to Durnford? Too gentle a character perchance?
In Gurkhali we have a word in common military useage, namely " josh" (Pronounce joesh) translated as "drive." My view is that poor old Pulleine decideley lacked "josh."
Equally exhausted,
Peter