rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - Earlier Than TMFH

Posted: Tue Feb 14, 2012 1:50 pm

Considering events prior to crossing into Zululand - the reasons real or imagined to conduct an invasion into their territory - I found a book which appears to cover this concept solely in detail, though not in the justification used in 1879, but I think is still relevant.

It is called 'Why Not Pre-empt ?'.

The first 3 chapters are titled -

What are Anticipatory Military Activities ?

Anticipatory Military Activities and Imminent Threat.

Anticipatory Military Activities and Distant Threat.

(The italics are my emphasis)

Now these appear to incorporate the saying 'The best defence is offence' (or words similar).

This is interesting, as it gives the impression that this is, perhaps always been, a common method used when thought to be threatened.

I've not yet purchased this book, but wondered about any opinions on this subject.

Coll

PS. As before, this is meant as a debating subject only, not as a direct comparison, though I feel is relevant to the events pre-Zulu War 1879.

Posted: Tue Feb 14, 2012 5:10 pm

Try another book instead.

G

Posted: Tue Feb 14, 2012 5:35 pm

Galloglas

With respect, but the book is a personal choice, as is the rest of my own library. It is the subject matter that is meant for discussion on this topic.

Coll

Posted: Tue Feb 14, 2012 7:34 pm

I can't help but think that the terms "offense" and "defense" have no objective meaning in military matters (and little enough in the game of Life) and their use simply depends upon which side of the river one is standing (and who fancies that they own the river and perhaps fancy they own the other side of it as well). I think that it was Bill Cosby who explained that the difference between a half-full and a half-empty glass depends entirely on whether you're pouring or drinking. I imagine that Chelmsford and company would have justified the crossing into Zululand as a "defensive" move-- as would the Japanese when planning the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Certainly the Israeli's felt they were defending themselves when they started shooting first in the Six Day War. Has anyone actually ever admitted to fighting an "offensive war"? Everyone knows that the advantage in any fist fight, uneven or even, goes to the guy who takes and lands the first swing-- always has been so and always will be so and there's no formal doctrine needed to learn that.

Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2012 9:19 am

Coll,
Since we do not know what book you are talking about it is all a bit opaque to the site readership. Nor are title headings necessarily ideas or themes in their own right.

So, what do you expect?

G

Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2012 9:37 am

M'Learned Friend, tells me that you refer to a book by Rachel Bzostek (at �60, already discounting to �54).

Try instead "The Utility of Force" by General Sir Rupert Smith. He writes in modern times and does not particularly draw lessons from the Zulu War. However, he has visited Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift.
It's also now in paperback and not at 'Ouch' prices!

G

Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2012 12:13 pm

Sawubona

Thanks for replying.

Yes. It appears to be the case of striking first in case the other side gets stronger, whilst you remain sort of at a standstill (strength-wise) or worse case scenario, before you get even weaker.

Galloglas

I understand what you are saying. I did mention the title of the book - 'Why Not Preempt ?' - but was using its title and chapter headings as the source for the topic, rather than the contents of the book itself, which might not haved suited the purpose of this debate very well.

I'll look for the book you suggest.

Thanks

Coll

Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2012 1:07 pm

Everyone knows that the advantage in any fist fight, uneven or even, goes to the guy who takes and lands the first swing-- always has been so and always will be so and there's no formal doctrine needed to learn that.

I could see that. Though I think there's some other thinking where if you do give a 'first strike' you better make sure you can annihilate or really severely weaken your opponent. I'd think in war psychology the fact that you entertain and conduct the inital outbreak of battle implies that you think you can win. I guess it's good thinking but as we can see in the AZW you've got to continually press your advantage or you can hit some difficult times.

Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2012 2:29 pm

Coll,

Those who advise me suggest that the following books are very worthwhile for somebody who might wish to develop a better understanding of the 19thC British military context and experience:

[url] http://www.abebooks.co.uk/book-search/title/britain-and-her-army/author/barnett-correlli/sortby/3/[/url]
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Victorian-1868-1902-Manchester-History-British/dp/0719026598

And, if still very keen, though awaiting a very much cheaper deal:

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Victorian-Army-Staff-College-1854-1914/dp/0413276309

G[/url]

Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2012 3:06 pm

Rich

Yes, Jackie Fisher's mantra: "Hit first, hit hard & keep on hitting." Basic (like Fisher!), simple but true. When used in a "pre-emptive" manner as discussed above, the need to be successful is not only paramount but so is, usually, the ability to be able to demonstrate that it was the right policy morally & politically as well as strategically - especially so in more modern times, when the pre-emptive striker will be seen as the aggressor. Not only did Frere & Chelmsford not succeed in their pre-emptive strike, but in their case it was pre-emptive not only against the Zulu but also against their own government. Hit first, hit hard and succeed before the government discovers we've started a war they've just categorically told us not to embark upon. If we win we should be OK - if not, we won't, but that won't happen. But it did happen, and they were left not only exposed militarily but also morally - a severe embarrassment to the British government, which had to embark upon costly damage limitation for the next few months and messy politics in Natal & Zululand for years.

I suppose the Schlieffen Plan was the biggest pre-emptive strike of all. The military requirements involving the violation of neutrality were deemed to over-ride the moral ones - might had to be right. Inevitably, that case was lost morally and militarily.

Peter

Posted: Wed Feb 15, 2012 3:40 pm

The 1879 war was seemingly capable of being described retrospectively as a 'pre-emptive war' though not really as a 'pre-emptive strike' within the conventionally accepted terms and principles. Wikipedia is (unusually) clear and concise on the terminology.

Similarly, the implementation of the modified Schlieffen Plan is also an exmaple of a pre-emptive war, or a 'war of aggression.'

G

PS Might I be dyslexic, Lord I hepo not!

Posted: Thu Feb 16, 2012 1:09 am

G

Dyslexia lures, K.O.

Wink

Posted: Thu Feb 16, 2012 9:56 am

Though the book is still well worth buying, Rupert Simth only makes a single reference to Isandlwana in his Utility of Force book. Howver, he quotes it as an example of a notable defeat in the context of a wise and interesting paragraph whose main theme is that the British were nevertheless generally able to draw upon their industrial and technological advantage to 'win their wars'.

So it was in the Zulu War once sufficient Zulus stood up long enough to be shot flat or dispersed by sufficient Imperial troops, in a war where their manly and courageous form of fighting meant that ultimately they could not possibly hope to defend their country.

G

Posted: Thu Feb 16, 2012 1:16 pm

I've been reading the section 'Command and Precedence In The Colonies' of the Queens Regs 1873.

In it, for all the Governor has certain powers over the colony and the forces within, though working in unison with the officer commanding these forces, doesn't it mean, that if he/they chose to invade Zululand without getting the green light from the British Government, it could be termed illegal, therefore a criminal act ? Confused

Coll

Posted: Thu Feb 16, 2012 1:23 pm

So it was in the Zulu War once sufficient Zulus stood up long enough to be shot flat or dispersed by sufficient Imperial troops, in a war where their manly and courageous form of fighting meant that ultimately they could not possibly hope to defend their country.

And when you put it like that it has just made me realize the awful after math of the unsuccessful Zulu attack on RD with great casualties. I'm sure the Zulu mentality towards defending their country got a big boost at Isandhlwana but a defeat like what they experienced at RD had to do a bad thing to the their psyche in prosecuting the war after that. The Zulu eagerness for battle at RD arguably wasn't the right strategic move at the time. It surely didn't give much time to take in the result of Isandhlwana and gauge the consequences of that win for them as well as Chelmsford's army.