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Barbara Grant
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Galloglas wrote:

�Even today, and provided with many other collateral sources that provide better means of evaluation amnd assessment, these original 'blames' tend to underpin the broad framework of later narratives.
�By mid March, there is therefore a 'presentational' character to the detail published in the London Gazette��

If I understand G�s point correctly, it is a very important one. A �presentational� character seems to me to denote a particular conclusion to the evidence of an event that has been accepted as fact by the press, and then relayed in that manner to the public, who generally accept it as fact, as well.

No knowledge on my part of this event and its specifics: I am looking only at process. It seems to me that when a particular interpretation of the data has been put out as �fact� that any further investigation has not only to weigh the evidence of the case, but has also to overcome the inertia of the explanation first presented of the matter. It reminds me of the �lone gunman theory� of the JFK assassination in my country, offered by the Warren Commission, the first investigative body. While subsequent investigations mentioned �conspiracy,� the first official narrative still holds because no �conspirators,� to my knowledge, have ever been formally charged. Hence, the importance of a good first story.
Galloglas
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There are two main elements to the point I made.
Firstly, by convening his original Court of Inquiry, which was within his own prerogatives and authorities, Lord Chelmsford met what would inevitably have become a later requirement though perhaps one then directed top-down either by the Commander in Chief or the Secretary of State, with no influence by Chelmsford over its scope and tasks.
By conducting his own Inquiry, Chelmsford both met the conventional process requirement and made it a much more difficult step for the Horse Guiards or Government to direct that there should be a further inquiry. But, we also need to be realistic and pragmatic, in recognising that neither military nor governmental good purpose would have been served by launching further, possibly sensational, enquiries. The Field Force had yet to reconstitute itself for whatever might occur next and it was not yet certainly the case that the intent or wherewithal to launch a second invasion would follow.
Secondly, the difference between what could or should reasonably be disclosed in public and what was already known (by March 1879) in official circles as deeper background. Here the NAM CONFIDENTIAL briefing paper is fascinating since even now we would probably accept that at least 80% of its contents remained supportable in terms of factual content and the key judgements made. There was also a supporting series of schematic sketch maps that provided shrewd though not fully accurate or comprehensive insights to the use of ground by both forces engaged. This information was synthesised in London using an 'all sources' approach, and by the Intelligence Branch for purely internal consumption, but it is still a fairly remarkable piece of work; parts of which also correlate with The Narrative published much later and supposedly by then capable of being even better informed whilst also intended being intended for public consumption by a public and Parliament sensitised by the defeats of the Afghan War and the Transvaal Rebellion. The area deserves more exploration and analysis and would tend to support the existence and accumulation of much more information at the War Department, little of which we commonly suppose can now be traced in the surviving archives. But, is that truly the case or might it be that people just haven't looked hard enough.

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Galloglas/Barbara

Thankyou for your very interesting posts.

Barbara

I've not long since downloaded the Warren Commission Report. I really always wanted to acquire the actual 26 Volume Set, but they are rare, expensive and less likely to be available in the U.K. Sad

In a way, Isandlwana could be considered the 'lone officer theory', with the way the investigation (or lack of) went back then.

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This is another interesting paragraph from Pennington's book -

'Robert Nightengale has asked an Army Board to find that Lieutenant George Armstrong Custer was not negligent at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, that he followed accepted military practice, and that he did not violate orders. Nightengale also wants the Board to find Marcus Reno and Captain Benteen guilty of presenting wrongful testimony at the Reno Court of Inquiry'.

Now, although this aspect was partly covered in a topic suggesting a re-evaluation of Isandlwana by a professional military body, such an inquiry would probably be too late, with 100+ years having passed, that to overturn or find an alternative result, could actually be done only when a shorter period of time has lapsed.

This happened recently, in a (second?) official inquiry investigating two pilots, who were finally cleared of any error on their part.

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Additionally, this is from a modern case study in the book 'A Guide to Military Criminal Law' by Michael J. Davidson -

'Dereliction of Duty'

'In June 1994 a B-52 at Fairchild Air Force Base crashed, due to the unsafe flying of a pilot with a reputation for reckless and daredevil antics. The colonel commanding the group was court-martialed, and convicted, of dereliction of duty for allowing a pilot to fly after receiving information that he was reckless and for failing to inquire into the pilot's reckless reputation'.

Now, this is interesting as it could relate to Chelmsford's selection of Durnford to command No.2 Column and his entering into hostile territory, knowing his reputation.

Much negative info has been presented of Durnford's abilities and previous experiences before his participation at Isandlwana, so it was known what kind of man he was.

Therefore, if this modern case study rule applied in this scenario, then shouldn't Chelmsford have been court-martialed, for dereliction of duty, due to his being aware of Durnford's reputation beforehand ?

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Galloglas
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The principle of 'direliction' of duty - usually deemed to be the failure to carry out a duty - largely depends upon being able to demonstrate that a duty capable of being defined in some specific sense has not been carried out by somebody whose designated or directed duty it was and ostensibly having the opportunity to do so in broadly routine circumstances, and failing to carry out the duty as a matter of choice or neglect rather than due to some force of circumstance.

No doubt, had Lord Chelmsford been a B52 pilot then we might have been able to analyse the extent to which this might have been so. However, he was the Commander of the South African Field Force without such prescriptive direction being in place.

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Galloglas
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I am, of course, making the potentially regrettable assertion that Lord Chelmsford was not indeed a B52 pilot and stand ready to be corrected.

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Galloglas
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These words do come from the modern Manual of Service Law but one does wonder how both Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Durnford (and others) might have got on with:

"3 Obstructing operations
(1) A person subject to service law commits an offence if�
(a) he does an act that is likely to put at risk the success of an action or operation of any of Her Majesty�s forces; and
(b) he intends to prevent, or is reckless as to whether he prevents, the success of the action or operation."

As the old exam papers used to say "Discuss".

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Galloglas

Thanks for your reply.

The book you mention 'Manual Of Service Law', does it differ from 'The Manual Of The Law Of Armed Conflict' by the U.K. Ministry Of Defence ?

Or are they the same book ?

I ask because I bought the latter last year.

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Galloglas
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The Manual of Service Law articulates the implications of the most recent Armed Forces Act and its associated statutory and procedural requirements across a very broad range of headings, including taking account of how the UK Armed Forces addresses its obligations under international amnd national law whilst engaged in armed conflict. It is a different thing, except where the overlap necessarily occurs.

Current practice is influenced by many more factors and rerquirements than would have applied in 1879, which is why you should not exercise yourself in seeking parallels. For example, the fundamental principle of the 'lawful command' and its consequent legal obligations on chains of command was not recognised or articulated in the same way in those times. Your money is undoubtedly better spent on fresh fruit and claret than on MOD publications.

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Galloglas
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If you are that keen, then try this open site link:

http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/CorporatePublications/LegalPublications/ManualOfServiceLaw/

But, without being aware of the trends and recurring themes in single service and service law and practice since the middle of the 19th C you will get nowhere fast. So, best not too.

G
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Galloglas

Thanks for answering my question.

Yes. I do understand there is much in these areas that are well beyond my capabilities, but I'd rather get an inkling of what they entail, when talking about the investigation post-Isandlwana, as in, what did happen and what should have happened.

With a great deal about the battle being discussed at length on the forum, and Peter Q. & Ron L.'s paper TMFH, dealing with the time prior to the battle, I try to concentrate more on the aftermath.

As stated in the earlier post about the re-evaluating of the Little Bighorn by an Army Board, transferred to a similar idea about Isandlwana, nothing can or will change after all this time has elapsed, but it still interests me greatly.

Thanks again

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Galloglas
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I'm not comenting on your general capabilities, I'm simply providing very heavy hints that quite a lot of things cannot really be deemed comparable, other than in concluding that they are indeed very different.

So, not much point exploring the MSL if the case in study is events in 1879, because the world has moved mightily on and the Army and Law with it.

G
Galloglas
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Ever thought that what 'did' happen is merely what 'could' happen given the limitations of circumstance.

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Galloglas

Regarding your last post.

Yes. As with the studying of the battle using different approaches in order to understand all aspects about the how and the why events unfolded as they did, I realise, when looking at the aftermath, the same method needs to be applied, instead of following a solitary notion.

I know that I'll never find an answer that will satisfy my curiosity, but you know the old saying - 'God loves a trier'.

At least this way I'll know somebody does like me after all ! Rolling Eyes

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Pre-Emptive Strike ? - Isandlwana C.O.I. Fast-Tracked
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