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Pre-Emptive Strike ? - Isandlwana C.O.I. Fast-Tracked
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It has come to my attention lately, the C.O.I. that was held by Chelmsford, may have had another purpose, that needed to be completed, before another type of trial was considered.

Apparently, by conducting this C.O.I. so quickly, may have served to cancel the possibility of a Court-Martial being considered at a later date, though who's I know not.

With this rapid investigation being put forth, which included some manipulation of panel member choice, etc., with the possibility of sending written accounts by witnesses, it could have prevented a Court-Martial, which appears might have been more thorough, due to the fact someone would be held to account, needing a defence counsel, with a Judge Advocate as the prosecution on behalf of the Government.

A Court-Martial would have demanded that witnesses appear to give evidence, for and against, not by written accounts. Therefore, could be questioned in detail and cross-examined.

Yes, the Government would have needed some answers fast, but could this have been the underlying reason ?

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Peter Ewart


Joined: 31 Aug 2005
Posts: 1797
Location: Near Canterbury, Kent, England.
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Or it may just be that an accomplished and comparatively experienced General with a successful track record and a reputation for organisational efficiency and admired by many under his command, keen to do his duty by furnishing his superiors at Horse Guards & Whitehall with as much relevant & urgent information as possible, simply acted promptly rather than in a dilatory way.

His initial despatch to England was soon followed by the results of some of the C o I and further explanations from himself, partly cobbled together by his Staff, together with his own request for some urgent high-ranking assistance to lighten his heavy load - a request which was mistakenly taken for a virtual resignation by some in London at first. He was only repeating what he had said before Isandlwana, however. Far from thinking that Lord C had acted precipitately in either the speed of the C o I or the content and turnround times of his answers to Ellice, the Duke considered he had been slow to come up with all that was required.

Chelmsford was certainly a difficult man to deal with after Isandlwana. After all, he believed (or thought he did) that he had left a well armed & well manned camp in an ideal situation, with clear orders (if not necessarily all his own) to those in charge. He had (presumably reluctantly) already split his force as a direct result of disobedience by one of his officers, then discovered almost half a battalion & most of his mounted force from the camp had been spread all over Zululand in presumed disobedience to more of his orders. He must have wondered what on earth was going on, especially after having had to give Durnford a severe dressing down only a few days beforehand. And now he couldn't ask Durnford, Pulleine, Degacher, Melvill or even a single company commander even roughly what had happened. His bosses in London would want answers. And all he had was a subaltern here and a colonist there, all in shock & not one of them privy to the full intentions or orders of the dead commanders. Which of these could possibly have testified with any credence at a future Court Martial?

It's true he protected his back as best he could. He dissembled & prevaricated, Clery played fun & games, Crealock lied, Gossett may have done all of these, Hassard's hands were tied, much of the C of I material was ignored or destroyed, and the Duke and Ellice never did get satisfactory answers. But that's a long, long way from working out that a hastily convened Q & A session would successfully prevent a future CM.

Wot? You'll be saying there was a conspiracy to blame Durnford next.

Peter
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Peter E.

Yes. There is much in your post that would make such a pre-emptive strike unlikely.

This question really stems, yet again, from my 'Custer Vindicated' book, which mentions 'the 7th Cavalry officers' attempt to keep Maj.Reno from being court-martialled and Capt. Benteen indicted'. There was a C.O.I. that was insisted on by Reno, but why would they be more apprehensive of his court-martial. In what way do these two types of trial differ, if about the same subject ?

Obviously, I don't know who would be tried by court-martial in the aftermath, apart from maybe Chelmsford himself, which is very doubtful, but I was wondering if there was a vast difference in the method of investigating between a C.O.I. and a Court-Martial.

Thanks for replying.

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Peter Ewart


Joined: 31 Aug 2005
Posts: 1797
Location: Near Canterbury, Kent, England.
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Lord C wasn't at the battle of Isandlwana. He knew what went on there before & after, because he was there. He knew what went on around the Mangeni/Malakatha at the same time as he was there. He knew what happened at RD because the survivors told him. He just didn't know what had happened at the camp in his absence.

No senior figures survived, which made the job worse, but a few junior officers & some colonists did, & they'd have to do. He wasn't interested in anything else other than what happened at the camp in his absence - because he already "knew" the rest. So - "What did Durnford & Pulleine do to lose the camp when I left them for 5 minutes? All you lucky survivors, just pop in there & see Hassard in his tent & tell him what you know, so that I've got something, if only a few statements, to send to London." Much (most?) of what they told Hassard was binned or not even noted down on paper, being dismissed as irrelevant to the actual loss of the camp or mere duplication of what had already said by others. Very little survived the cut, as you know. "Court of Enquiry/Inquiry" was a very grand expression for the proceedings which actually took place.

"These two types of trial"? The C of I was not a trial in any sense at all, nor intended to be. I don't know if Hassard's C of I can be compared with a US military C of I of the same period if there was any such thing as far as a laid down formal procedure was concerned. Can't comment on Little Big Horn I'm afraid as, other than watching Tonka well over 50 years ago and forgotten all of that, I have no knowledge. (All mixed up in the memory now with my Kit Carson, Roy Rogers, Buck Jones, Wagon Train, Man from Laramie & Davey Crockett comics).

Peter
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Peter E.

Having read Colonel William Winthrop's biography, who was one of the first to help put together a U.S. Military Law independent of civilian law, it appears that the British Military Law of the time was used by him as a basis for its beginnings, which led me to believe the U.S. Military Law of the 19th Century did work in a similar fashion.

Obviously, the C.O.I. that was held into Isandlwana wasn't exactly as it says on the tin.

I'm getting the idea that if a C.O.I. did find failings in one or more of those present guilty of some wrongdoing, then it could progress on to their Court-Martial.

However, Military Law is a difficult subject to study, even though I've got a couple of manuals on it now. Confused

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Rob D


Joined: 01 Sep 2005
Posts: 93
Location: Melbourne Australia
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Hi,
A year or more ago I came across a web site which contained the proceedings of the C-o-I into the Custer - Little Big Horn incident.
I read through it but didn't save the address (if you're interested I'm sure Google would be your friend!)
From memory the C-o-I appeared to be a much fuller and more formal affair than the one into Isandlwana, with testimony being taken from a number of officers, NCOs and other ranks, and several of the witnesses being questioned extensively.
The officer assisting the C-o-I was apparently pushing hard for Reno and Benteen in particular to explain satisfactorily their failure to assist Custer or to follow his orders to the letter, and there was much mention of Reno's condition - had he been drinking, was he in a fit state for duty that day, and so on - as well as his and Benteen's attitudes to Custer.
While I know next to nothing about military law I would guess that the aim of that C-o-I was to determine whether any of the surviving officers should be court-martialled (or to clear them of any blame) rather than to establish the facts of what had happened to Custer's command.
So I wouldn't be drawing any parallels between the C-o-Is into Isandlwana and Little Big Horn.
Rob
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Rob

Yes. I managed to buy the 'Reno Court Of Inquiry' book last year, and it made very interesting reading, including the fact it is a necessary book to have before acquiring 'Custer Vindicated'.

It is the detail of this LBH C.O.I. that convinced me that what we saw of the Isandlwana C.O.I. wasn't exactly thorough, but as has been said, most are aware of its failings.

I've been hoping that the transcript of the Maiwand C.O.I. is eventually discovered, to see what it entailed.

Thanks

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Harold Raugh


Joined: 25 May 2008
Posts: 211
Location: Heidelberg, Germany (U.S. Army)
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Hi Coll,

There are some references to a Maiwand COI (reportedly conducted by Phayre) in the Warre and Haines papers at the National Army Museum and the National Archives:

NAM 8112/54 - Papers of General Sir Henry Warre, 57th Regiment of Foot, c1845-81 including service in Canada and India, and Command of the Bombay Army 1878-81, during the Second Afghan War (1878-81).
-8112/54-620 - Draft letter from Warre to AG Simla, 23 Oct 1880, on the Court of Enquiry into the conduct at Maiwand of Col Malcolmson and Major Currie, with two pages of notes on it.
-8112/54-702 - Commenting upon Maiwand and the likely causes of the disaster.

NA 8108/9 - Papers of Field Marshal Sir Frederick Haines as Commander-in-Chief in India 1875-81, including Russian threats to the North-West Frontier and the Second Afghan War (1878-81).
-8108/9-31 No.22 - Ripon to Haines 12 Sep 1880, asking for his views on an enquiry and or Courts Martial into Maiwand.
-8108/9-31 No.30 - Haines to Ripon (copy) 18 Sep 1880, forwarding the Maiwand dispatch - "a sad picture of military disaster.
-8108/9-31 No.31 - Ripon to Haines 19 Sep 1880, advocating the early publication of the Maiwand dispatches, and commenting upon some of the language used by Burrows in it.
-8108/9-31 No.32 - Haines to Ripon (copy) 19 Sep 1880, agreeing to prepare the dispatches for publication, and reporting that Primrose had appointed a court of enquiry.
-8108/9-31 No.33 - Haines to Ripon (copy) 21 Sep 1880, enclosing rough proofs of the Maiwand dispatch, and reporting that Col Malcolmson and Major Currie were under arrest on Roberts's instructions awaiting trial by court martial.
-8108/9-31 No.46 - Ripon to Haines 29 Sep 1880, asking to see Roberts's report on the state of affairs at Kandahar on his arrival there, and for details of the Court of Enquiry.
-8108/9-31 No.48 - Ripon to Haines 30 Sep 1880, thanking him for Roberts's report, and stating that they must "come to an early decision about Genl Primrose."
-8108/9-40-13 - 19 Oct 1880, covering letter to papers on Maiwand, and Roberts's march to Kandahar.

In an earlier posting you asked, now that my AZW bibliography had been published, what I would write next. My first project is to prepare my first book (Wavell in the Middle East, 1939-1941: A Study in Generalship, published by Brassey's UK in London in 1993) for republication by the University of Oklahoma Press. I will then continue working on my Indian Mutiny bibliography. I also have a number of sets of original letters and diaries to try to transcript, including a set from an RA major in the 2nd Afghan War, and this week I acquired 72 letters from a British Army RA colonel from the Indian Mutiny.

Thanks. Too many projects -- too little time!

Cheers,
Harold
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Many thanks Harold. Wink

Once again the info you supply is fantastic.

This should then confirm there was such a thing as a Maiwand C.O.I., which for a while didn't appear to be the case, that gave me cause to think the aftermath of this disaster followed the same lines as the Isandlwana C.O.I., or I should say, a lack of a decent investigation.

However, I'm also aware there was a Court-Martial brought about (by Gen. Burrows?) related to Maiwand, though the two officers involved were acquitted. Not seen the transcript of this either, but as with the aforementioned C.O.I., might not be available to view, if recorded at all. Confused

Thanks again

Coll

PS. Thanks also for replying to my other question, that I think I deleted. I wasn't sure if you had seen it beforehand.
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Further to my original topic question - though not sure of the part it could play in my study of this area -

I finally acquired the following manual -

Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Army 1873.

However, if someone can indicate any sections that I should pay particular attention to, then please let me know.

Thankyou.

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Harold Raugh


Joined: 25 May 2008
Posts: 211
Location: Heidelberg, Germany (U.S. Army)
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Hi Coll,
Thanks; always glad to help.
As a result of the Battle of Maiwand, both Malcolmson and Currie were charged with cowardice and misconduct. They were court-martialed but acquitted. See "Courts Martial proceedings on Major Currie and Colonel Malcolmson, 1881." India Office Library L/Mil/3/915, now in the British Library.
Another invaluable source (which I have not seen) would be Reports and narratives of officers . . . engaged at Battle of Maiwand. Simla: India Intelligence Branch, 1881.
Further research would probably turn up a copy of the Maiwand COI.
Good luck!
Harold
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Harold

I seem to recall being informed by the author of the (recent-ish) book 'Maiwand' a couple of years ago, that he had acquired papers belonging to Burrows(?), but can't be sure if that is right.

However, he was hoping that said papers may contain or lead on to finding the elusive Maiwand C.O.I.

I'm not sure how close he has managed to getting the C.O.I., but I find myself listening out for word of any success, though have no direct contact with him.

Fingers crossed he finds it and it becomes available to us.

Thanks again

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Harold Raugh


Joined: 25 May 2008
Posts: 211
Location: Heidelberg, Germany (U.S. Army)
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Hi Coll,
Burrows' papers are located at:

Hampshire Record Office
Sussex Street
Winchester
SO23 8TH
England

Tel: 01962 846154
Fax: 01962 878681

Email: [email protected]

Website: http://www.hants.gov.uk/archives

Why don't you do the research and make the discovery first, rather than wait for someone else to get the glory?!

Cheers,
Harold
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Harold

Being based in Scotland and my circumstances limit what sort of practical research I'm able to accomplish, and prevents me pursuing various aspects by visiting places where archives are stored.

Regarding the Maiwand C.O.I., I think, would need someone to really delve in to all papers related to the events of 1880, which I imagine can't really be done by me over the phone or through the net, which I reckon the author I referred to has probably already tried, and is now seeking by other methods involving travel and personally searching through the necessary documents, etc.

You are correct, anyone who finds the C.O.I. first would get the 'glory', but I don't think it'll be me any time soon.

I'd like to play the part of Sherlock Holmes as I do like studying/seeking answers, however this is beyond my abilities.

I appreciate the further info you've supplied, which I will make a note of
in my contacts.

Thanks for all your help ! Wink

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Though familiar to many here, it's still instructive to revisit that part of the outcome of the Isandlwana "Court of Inquiry" published in the London Gazette of Saturday March 15th, the introduction to which is reproduced in full at the end (below G).
Much more information had arrived in London at around the same time, enabling the Intelligence Branch of the QMG's Department to prepare its CONFIDENTIAL briefing paper dated 21 March 1879 titled "The Isandlana Disaster"(sic) now archived within the Chelmsford Papers at the National Army Museum (NAM � 6807 � 386 � 8 � 611). This is surprising detailed and really quite well informed in the working circumstances but it does launch a particular interpretation of the events on 22nd January and, almost by itself and its own influences, delineates the respective responsibilities for the outcome of the day in such a way as to project Colonel Durnford as if culpable or blameworthy in several important respects.
Even today, and provided with many other collateral sources that provide better means of evaluation amnd assessment, these original 'blames' tend to underpin the broad framework of later narratives.
By mid March, there is therefore a 'presentational' character to the detail published in the London Gazette given that official London' clearly already knew much more over and above what it chose to disclose publicly. As, indeed, did Lord Chelmsford, and whoever else was able to communicate detail back to London.

Sensibly assuming that Lord Chelmsford, commanding the South African Field Force, was instrumental in convening this Court of Inquiry, influenced its detailed terms of reference, and was also by convention well able to require more detail and other witness sources to be probed once he was provided with its findings, we might reasonably wonder how such a constrained and almost token process was accepted as if somehow definitive.

G

Durban, Natal, February 8, 1879.

Sir, I have the honour to forward herewith the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held to take evidence regarding the disastrous affair of Isandlana.
The Court has very properly abstained from giving an opinion, and I myself refrain also from making any observation or from drawing any
conclusions from the evidence therein recorded.
I regret very much that more evidence has not been taken, and I have given instructions that all those who escaped, and who are able to throw
any light whatever upon the occurrences of the day, should be at once called upon for a statement of what they saw.
I deem it better, however, not to delay the transmission of the proceedings, which will no doubt be awaited with anxiety.
I have directed my Military Secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock, to append a statement of the facts which came under his cognisance on
the day in question, which may possibly serve to throw some additional light on what, I fear, will still be considered very obscure.
Pre-Emptive Strike ? - Isandlwana C.O.I. Fast-Tracked
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