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Posted: Sat Oct 16, 2010 11:47 am

I have kept off this topic till now largely because I felt I had lent my support to The Missing Five Hours in terms of agreeing that Raw discovered the impi at �X�. In the course of the article and the subsequent postings some other questions have arisen which I feel need addressing � there are a lot of them � so I�ll take them as they occur.

Way back, when David Jackson and I found the Durnford Papers we were worried by that �X� on the map and what it actually signified and I feel Ron and Peter have done a good job in establishing its significance and its origin. Mike S has a point though. The impi or a portion of it may well have been discovered at �X� but that doesn�t mean that all of it was not out of the Ngwebeni. Several Zulus stated that the amabutho became mixed up in the process of the general advance and were not where they should have been; the disorderly nature of the attack precludes the notion of an orderly prescribed advance. There is no evidence to suggest that the impi was discovered �already configured for a deliberate attack�.

I do not support the notion that the impi were attacking on the 22nd (though I do feel that they were discovered whilst manouevring). Manoeuvring in full view of the enemy for a day or two does not seem to have put the Zulus off at Ulundi � why should it have bothered them at Isandhlwana?

First, there�s the question of exactly where Wood got his information from for the annotations on the maps. My problem is setting various bits of information I�m aware of side by side and making sense of them. The maps at Chatham were received in the same incoming parcel of docs as Brickhill�s article which was annotated and initialled by Henderson (it is also in Henderson�s handwriting). The entry showing receipt into the RE Museum shows both maps and Brickhill article as being annotated by Henderson. The maps� annotations may well have been proved to be in Wood�s hand BUT beneath those annotations are pencilled and erased annotations in another hand. Henderson�s? I don�t know. And this requires further research. But Wood got his information from someone that was in close proximity to him in the aftermath of Isandhlwana. It could have been Raw; it could have been Henderson; it could have been Mehlokazulu; it could have been a 4th person whose name I won�t reveal just yet as I�m still �digging� (but he is a genuine possibility); it could have been a Wood�s-own mixture of all these sources. As for the RSA maps I have not seen the originals but on the photocopies I have in my possession (c/o Paul Bryant-Quinn) there are faint pencilled and erased annotations on those too � and they have the appearance of a different hand. Whose hand that is needs to be settled and I don�t believe that they were included in Peter�s graphological investigation. That discovery would have a bearing on who precisely was the source for that �X� � Raw would speak from first-hand eye-witness knowledge; Henderson would know second-hand.

As for the decoy theory I can have no truck with it. The Zulus did not have second sight. They could not know that Chelmsford would respond as he did early on the morning of the 22nd. Matshana�s own (and he was on the Mangeni) and others� evidence indicate that the Mangeni Zulus were not part of a decoy programme. British references to the apparent decoying of Chelmsford are just that � apparent decoying; and they were made by those not in a position to know. Inadvertently, the idea of a decoy takes some of the blame/guilt away from Chelmsford, which I�m sure he was not averse to.
Ron made the point clear in his own post that he does not believe this either. His idea that the Mangeni Zulus then led Chelmsford away requires that they would know what was going on at Isandhlwana at the time and I can�t necessarily go along with that.

Mike S is wrong that it is Ian Knight and John Laband that have to be convinced by Peter�s paper. These two do not have a monopoly on the truth, nor on what is valid research; they are not gatekeepers of knowledge or guardians of the accepted truth; neither of them would admit same either. When you use the phrase �above us sit serious professional historians�, this is not so either. There is probably no-one on the planet who has a more encyclopaedic knowledge of Isandhlwana than David Jackson � this is something Ian would freely admit � and he�s not a professional historian. No-one has to be convinced for something to become accepted. Historical facts simply have to be proven; historical theories simply have to be demonstrated. As a basis for further research they can then be taken further.

Last point � a general one - the landscape of 2010 is not the same as the landscape of 1879. The impact of time has a tremendous effect on landscape � much more than people realize. Compare OS maps from the Victorian period with contemporary ones � the changes are incredible. I�m speaking here of valley slopes, elevations, escarpments, contour lines, even measurable distances, such that trying to superimpose the 1879 maps on to modern ones doesn�t not easily work. Some of the precise measurements and routes given in the postings cannot be taken as given.

Posted: Mon Oct 18, 2010 8:19 am

Julian whybra wrote:

Last point � a general one -
the landscape of 2010 is not the same as the landscape of 1879.
I�m speaking here of valley slopes, elevations, escarpments, contour lines, even measurable distances
Some of the precise measurements and routes given in the postings cannot be taken as given.

Julian ,

I would be most grateful if you could indicate ( precisely) where these changes have taken place -- exact co-ords if you can.

Here is an historical occurence where the eye witness reporters are few and far between ( and sometimes provide contradictory information )
The official accounts are obfuscatory ( perhaps by design )
What relics of interest were left have been looted by "custodians"
and
now the landscape lies to us as well.

Do we need "Dan Brown" Question

Posted: Mon Oct 18, 2010 9:18 am

Chris
The reason I wrote the passage about the landscape changing derives from two separate conversations on the subject which I've always kept in mind. One was with a colleague - a lecturer in geology at Essex Univ. - when I was comparing the 1879 contour map with a modern map. The second was with an R.E. officer acquaintance who'd come back from an Isandhlwana visit and was describing to me the difference in what he'd seen with his eyes and what was on the 1879 map I'd shown him.
I recall both referred in general to the gradient of the slope from Isandhlwana down to the dongas and in particular to the gradient and the shape of the spur.
Neither were particularly surprised at this (they expected it) - the surprise was all on my part. I just hadn't realized that landscape can change over relatively short periods of geological time. I recently read an article about the same thing regarding Hastings - longer ago admittedly and with an even more dramatic change.

Posted: Mon Oct 18, 2010 11:59 am

Julian

"Way back, when David Jackson and I found the Durnford Papers ..."

Sounds rather proprietorial, especially when the RE Library would appear not to have lost them.

It is (surely) the KCL maps that would matter most by virtue of probably being better informed under some influence of Wood's, and, that there are added details on both maps that would appear to be identical whilst others in ink manuscript or pencil plainly differ. The maps in the Durnford Papers reaching Durnford from Henderson, yet still including much detail also on those of Wood (at KCL) now surely requires more explanation of the genesis of both sets of map marking, not withstanding work already done.

Another factor is the 'Wood' maps largely having become more recently available by the KCL purchase of Wood's Papers. Also, their presence and contents being fairly unexpected within that overall context. Perhaps why they did not receive immediate attention by leading writers.

G

Posted: Mon Oct 18, 2010 12:00 pm

Julian

"Way back, when David Jackson and I found the Durnford Papers ..."

Sounds rather proprietorial, especially when the RE Library would appear not to have lost them.

It is (surely) the KCL maps that would matter most by virtue of probably being better informed under some influence of Wood's, and, that there are added details on both maps that would appear to be identical whilst others in ink manuscript or pencil plainly differ. The maps in the Durnford Papers reaching Durnford from Henderson, yet still including much detail also on those of Wood (at KCL) now surely requires more explanation of the genesis of both sets of map marking, not withstanding work already done.

Another factor is the 'Wood' maps largely having become more recently available by the KCL purchase of Wood's Papers. Also, their presence and contents being fairly unexpected within that overall context. Perhaps why they did not receive immediate attention by leading writers.

G

Posted: Tue Oct 19, 2010 7:16 am

Galloglas

The RE Museum may never have lost them but they certainly didn't know that they had them. David and I gave them the title 'Durnford Papers'. They were stuffed in two folders at the back of a large map chest drawer with dozens of other docs and covered in dust. As for 'proprietorial' how else would you like me to have worded it? Political correctness does not require me to mollify the feelings of those people who DIDN'T find them.

Re your 2nd para., the handwriting in ink on the KCL/Chatham maps is the same, i.e. Wood's. It is the pencil markings that differ and may give information leading to Wood's informant(s).

I can't quite make sense of this sentence: '"The maps in the Durnford Papers reaching Durnford from Henderson, yet still including much detail also on those of Wood (at KCL) now surely requires more explanation of the genesis of both sets of map marking, not withstanding work already done." ...but if you mean that we need to discover through whose hands the maps passed before reaching their present home, then the answer is yes.

Re "Another factor is the 'Wood' maps largely having become more recently available by the KCL purchase of Wood's Papers. Also, their presence and contents being fairly unexpected within that overall context. Perhaps why they did not receive immediate attention by leading writers."
Although a certain amount of navel gazing might be due, the answer is people are only human and they miss things. It's why those who say that there is nothing left to discover in the AZW are wrong. L&Q first mentioned the KCL maps in 'Blood on the PM' almost as a footnote - I believe they missed the immediate relevance themselves and thus X marks the spot lay dormant for another decade. David and I first queried the X on the Chatham maps in the late eighties and assumed, because of the Henderson attribution, that this was an estimate on his part (as opposed to the accuracy of the DH) and therefore wrong because he wasn't on that part of the battlefield or he was referring to the direction the Zulus had come from when they were first seen on the skyline from the camp. The consistency of belief in the Ngwebeni was such that no-one had ever thought to question it.

Posted: Tue Oct 19, 2010 11:04 am

The discussion has now entered an interesting stage. Julian has already addressed a particular issue, and I have to agree entirely with him, namely that Mike S. is far off the mark with his comments that 'above us sit serious professional historians ........that Peter would have to convince with his paper [ and RL's] before it became accepted as history and not hypothesis.'
The background to TMFH is that prior to placing the document into the public domain, all those mentioned in the acknowledgements received a copy in which comments were made and issues addressed. In addition we sent John Laband (now located in Canada) a copy together with a copy to Ken Gillings who, on my request, forwarded it to Ian Knight. This when Zulu Rising was probably in the hands of the publishers. John has acknowledged receipt and will revert in due course. I have not heard Ian's views. And of course my friendly adversary Mike S was also sent a copy.
I believe that there are others who equally deserve the accolades mentioned by Mike S.
For example, the works of Keith Smith in the field of research take some beating. In particular 'Selected Documents: A Zulu War Sourcebook' is an absolute essential for anyone whose interest lies in the AZW. It will save a mountain of research.
Julian Whybra's painstaking workwork, ' England's Sons. A Casualty and Survivors' Roll of British Combatants' is a remarkable labour of love and a dictionary of Whose Who. And Julian spends time continually updating.
Colonel Mike McCabe's knowledge of AZW detail is remarkable and he is without doubt the ultimate authority on the Corps of Royal Engineers, AZW.His knowledge of the Chatham maps and help on detailed analysis was immeasurable.
John Young is an AZW expert in many areas. He can dot any 'i's and cross any 't's. Have a question? Ask John.
And there are others.
These comments in no way reflect adversely on the exceptional works of both John and Ian
Mike, if I may say, perhaps you should relect on your words and think again.
How many of those mentioned above now agree, in whole or in part with our thesis that the Zulu army was not discovered in the Ngwebeni valley?
Both Julian and Mike McC support that view as does Keith Smith who gave his views in the Pot Pourie section a couple of years ago from his own research.
The significance of the Raw and NNH discovery as evidenced, show that major elements of the Zulu regiments, all named, were already deployed on the northern edge of the Nqutu plateau as well as south and south east of Mabaso shortly after first light; far removed from the deep Ngwebeni valley.
From a South African viewpoint, tour guide heavyweights such as the three times award-winning Nicki von der Heyde's Campaign Trails, together with the prestigeous Isandlwana Lodge and Paul Naish, who will shortly be conducting a tour for The International Guild Of Battelfield Guides that will include the battlefield of Isandlwana, are now adopting the two major aspects of TMFH (following the result of the forensic evidence) that first, x is the point of discovery and second, confirmation of Zulu intent to attack on the 22nd. Not all, as already indicated on the forum, will agree or partially agree. But important mindsets have been changed.
Ian Knight's views, (as quoted by Peter Ewart,) in that Ian is firmly of the view that the encounter was behind Mabaso ' and that Raw's men, pursuing foragers, had ridden onto the south-western slopes of the hill.(Mabaso) before spotting the army below them.'
This view was written before TMFH was available and it would be interesting to obtain his current thoughts in view of both our forensic report revealing Wood's hand and of Wood's almost certain meeting with Raw at Isandlwana, as has been evidenced. To our knowledge this is the first time that the latter points have been historically disclosed and analysed.
It is also of interest to note that contrary to all that has historically been written about the NNH encounter at Mabaso, there is no hill to climb! At least not from west to east, Raw's approach. The spot height on the modern survey map is 1308 metres. The outer western ring contour, the supposed approach that Raw would have made is 1,300 metres. In other words, Mabaso is a plateau when approached from west to east.
The question must also be asked, is how many of those who rebut Wood's spot x that marks the discovery of the Umcityu, some two miles distance from Mabaso, have actually traversed the ground and made an on site anaylsis?
Hands up please.

Posted: Fri Nov 11, 2011 2:54 pm

Peter Q,
Rob took us to "x" a couple of weeks ago and I have to say that the location matches the primary source descriptions. Eg, "crest of a ridge" etc,.
I have no doubt that the location is dead ground that could easily hide many thousands of Zulu.

However, I still find it difficult to accept that the attack was planned for the 22nd. and launched from first light.
Why did it take "five hours" for the appearance on the Nyoni Ridge? The head and chest would have moved into the large dongas at "x" within thirty minutes of leaving the Valley.The left horn could have positioned near Qwabe Valley in even less time. The right horn was probably in position north of Magaga before 9.00am? How do you account for the next three hours? If the attack was already launched, why didn't the Impi appear on the Nyoni ridge much earlier, say at 9.00am?

Posted: Wed Nov 16, 2011 3:45 pm

On behalf of Peter Quantrill

Mel,
Glad you had the opportunity of being shown the general area of X as annotated by Wood in map 2 (Appendix B �The Missing Five Hours�) - �TMFH.� The handwriting in the margin of Appendix B describes the area of Raw�s contact with the Umcityu regiment, and also shows the disposition of all or most of the Zulu regiments.
TMFH has proved, beyond reasonable doubt, that the handwriting is that of Colonel Wood.
You have acknowledged that the � location is dead ground that could easily hide many thousands of Zulu.� Four Zulu regiments to be precise, namely the Umcityu, the Nonkenke, the Umbonambi and the Ngobamakosi. East of the latter were the Uve and Undi. So yes, thousands already out of the �deep� Ngwebeni Valley (Raw�s supposed discovery point of the Zulus) and already deployed in the early hours of 22nd January, on the northern edge of the Nqutu Plateau. This dead ground cannot be seen from either iThusi or Magaga Knoll.
TMFH, is of course, based on refreshed primary and secondary source examination. The TMFH nomenclature is based on the five hours from approximate first light 22nd January to the estimated time of arrival at the camp of Colonel Anthony Durnford at 1030 hrs. Five critical hours in which much Zulu activity took place, sufficient for Ron & I to believe that it was Zulu intent to attack the camp (vacated by Glyn and Chelmsford and commanded by Pulleine,) not on the 23rd, rather on the 22nd.
Wood�s detail is such that we have advanced evidence in TMFH that such information could only have been obtained with the help of senior Zulu commanders such as Mehlokazulu and, on the colonial side, Charlie Raw himself who was present at Isandlwana when Wood camped there with Empress Eugenie in June 1880. (TMFH.)
It is clear, based on all available evidence, including that of Wood, that the Zulu regiments entered the �deep� Ngwebeni Valley on the 21st. from the Isipizi Hill area where they had camped on the 20th. Stragglers and elements may have arrived, some early some late. It is logical to conclude that for Ntshingwayo to plan his attack for the 23rd, having entered the �deep� Ngwebeni Valley on the night of the 21st, he would remain, silent and concealed, until the 23rd. This was simply was not the case and did not happen. The force that exposed itself early morning of the 22nd was far too strong to be termed a �reconnaissance� force. And to deploy prematurely onto the Nqutu Plateau on the 22nd with the intent to attack on the 23rd would be a direct violation of a leading Principle of War, namely �Surprise.�
Instead, in the very early hours or the 22nd or the night of the 21st, he deployed all estimated eight regiments out of the �deep� valley. These, recorded by Wood, were deployed as follows:
Nodwengu and Nonkenke regiments already sighted at 0600 hrs 22nd opposite Magaga Knoll. (Primary source TMFH.)
Umcityu regiment already located in the area of Wood�s X and engaged by Raw�s NNC. (This at least two miles west of the �deep� Ngwebeni Valley.)
Umbonambi regiment � located east of the Umcityu and shown as possibly responsible for the destruction of the Rocket Battery.
Ngobamakosi, Uve and Undi regiments � all located south of Mabaso and out of the �deep� valley and who probably engaged Durnford.
Udhloke regiment � south east of Mabaso.
TMFH has already established, through Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, that no further �doctoring� was required by the regiments, post their departure from Ulundi, to fight.
Now let us examine primary source reports of early 22nd Zulu activity.
Trooper Barker, (Yes the Zulus did show themselves in force on Nyoni Ridge) Whitelaw,( �Large army, thousands advancing � time 0800 hrs) together confirmatory evidence from Brickhill, Essex, Hillier, Vause and Pope�s Diary.
Primary source shows that British vedettes were driven back and Durnford had not even made an appearance!
Mehlokazulus second interrogation report (TMFH) indicates clearly Ntshingwayos order to attack, on the 22nd not the 23rd.
Further evidence that an attack was already being mounted was provided by Chard. Four hours into TMFH Chard, (impeccable primary source) personally sights Zulus in force making their way behind Isandlwana. Thinking that they were perhaps on their way to attack the punts at RD, Chard makes his way back to RD. In reality Chard had seen the right horn advancing on a conjectured plan of attack to take the camp from the rear. This before the arrival of Durnford or the dispatch of Raw onto the Nqutu Plateau. Nothing in our view was going to stop the right horn in completing its mission, thus indicative of an attack in progress on the 22nd.
Finally, (and with some exhaustion) may I quote from the Intelligence Branch of a War Office publication published in 1881, titled �Narrative Of The Field Operations Connected With The Zulu War Of 1879.�
� It appears that Lt. Raw�s troop of Basutos which had been sent out to reconnoitre on the high ground north of the camp, had, after going some 3-4 miles [ Mabaso is further]
came across a herd of cattle which they had followed over a small rising ground. From the top of this [ Conjectured as Wood�s X] they had seen the Zulu army a mile off, advancing in line and extending towards its left.�
Nothing could be clearer, the attack was in progress prior to any evidence of Raw�s actual contact. [And not in the deep Ngwebeni Valley.]

Let us now finally examine the wording of camp commander Pulleine's �blue� note to �Staff Officer� Clery ( for Glyn & Chelmsford�s attention.)

� Staff Officer � Report just come in that the Zulus are advancing in force from left front of the camp. (8.5 a.m.)
H.B. Pulleine, Lt Col.�

The language is plain. Various reports collated from the eastern and western areas of the Nqutu Plateau and reflected in TMFH together with evidence in this post indicate a general Zulu advance of some determination and aggression. Clearly in military terminology an �Advance to Contact� was in progress rather than a reconnaissance in force. Most Zulu movement out of the �deep� Ngwebeni Valley took place on the night or early hours of the 22nd as evidenced. To argue that the movement out of the Ngwebeni Valley and onto the Nqutu Plateau was with the intent of �bedding down� for an attack on the 23rd is, in our view, untenable.
Finally, conclusions that may arrive from TMFH, raise the question of Durnford�s supposed culpability, seeing that his e.t.a. at Isandlwana was 1030 hrs.
Perhaps attention should by centred on Pulleine�s tactical response to his direct knowledge that he was under attack from � Zulus advancing in force.� This knowledge being evidenced before 0800 hrs 22nd.
Perhaps a tad too controversial?
With best wishes,
Peter

Posted: Thu Nov 17, 2011 7:25 pm

PeterQ,
I'm aware that you are presently recovering from your Bypass operation so many thanks for taking the time (and effort) in replying to my question.

I have several more questions if you are up for it.

You wrote:
"Finally, conclusions that may arrive from TMFH, raise the question of Durnford�s supposed culpability, seeing that his e.t.a. at Isandlwana was 1030 hrs."

I'm wondering if you could expand on that statement?

Posted: Fri Nov 18, 2011 1:24 pm

Mel,
The subject of Durnford's culpability or otherwise is an old chestnut. His actions following his arrival at the camp have received justifiable criticism.
TMFH seeks, apart from the analysis of the Chatham and Campbell Collection maps,to reflect exactly what Zulu movements were occurring between first light and the arrival of Durnford.
A plethora of primary source material is recorded that from first light massive Zulu movements had or were taking place, all of which were brought to the attention of camp commander, Lt Col Pulleine.
Eastern front via Barker, Whitelaw,Brickhill,Essex and Scott. Here Pulleine was at first light or thereabouts aware of considerable Zulu deployment on the Nqutu Plateau.
The western front report of 5,000 Zulus seen at 0600 hrs north of Magaga Knoll was made to Pulleine by Vereker and Barry, who reported that Zulus were advaancing in large numbers on the camp. This report to Pulleine was made at 0730 hrs.
Thus in all probability both the eastern and western reports resulted in Pulleine's 'blue' note to Clery in which the former used the words 'Zulus are advancing in force.' Clearly an advance to contact.
Durnford was still some three hours away from the camp.

(Part 1. Will continue.)

Posted: Fri Nov 18, 2011 1:29 pm

Mel,
The subject of Durnford's culpability or otherwise is an old chestnut. His actions following his arrival at the camp have received justifiable criticism.
TMFH seeks, apart from the analysis of the Chatham and Campbell Collection maps,to reflect exactly what Zulu movements were occurring between first light and the arrival of Durnford.
A plethora of primary source material is recorded that from first light massive Zulu movements had or were taking place, all of which were brought to the attention of camp commander, Lt Col Pulleine.
Eastern front via Barker, Whitelaw,Brickhill,Essex and Scott. Here Pulleine was at first light or thereabouts aware of considerable Zulu deployment on the Nqutu Plateau.
The western front report of 5,000 Zulus seen at 0600 hrs north of Magaga Knoll was made to Pulleine by Vereker and Barry, who reported that Zulus were advaancing in large numbers on the camp. This report to Pulleine was made at 0730 hrs.
Thus in all probability both the eastern and western reports resulted in Pulleine's 'blue' note to Clery in which the former used the words 'Zulus are advancing in force.' Clearly an advance to contact.
Durnford was still some three hours away from the camp.

(Part 1. Will continue.)

Posted: Fri Nov 18, 2011 1:30 pm

Mel,
The subject of Durnford's culpability or otherwise is an old chestnut. His actions following his arrival at the camp have received justifiable criticism.
TMFH seeks, apart from the analysis of the Chatham and Campbell Collection maps,to reflect exactly what Zulu movements were occurring between first light and the arrival of Durnford.
A plethora of primary source material is recorded that from first light massive Zulu movements had or were taking place, all of which were brought to the attention of camp commander, Lt Col Pulleine.
Eastern front via Barker, Whitelaw,Brickhill,Essex and Scott. Here Pulleine was at first light or thereabouts aware of considerable Zulu deployment on the Nqutu Plateau.
The western front report of 5,000 Zulus seen at 0600 hrs north of Magaga Knoll was made to Pulleine by Vereker and Barry, who reported that Zulus were advaancing in large numbers on the camp. This report to Pulleine was made at 0730 hrs.
Thus in all probability both the eastern and western reports resulted in Pulleine's 'blue' note to Clery in which the former used the words 'Zulus are advancing in force.' Clearly an advance to contact.
Durnford was still some three hours away from the camp.

(Part 1. Will continue.)

Posted: Fri Nov 18, 2011 8:18 pm

PeterQ,
You, not I, raised the issue of Durnfords culpability in your post above. Here, for the first time, you describe "the Durnford/TMFH connection".

"Finally, conclusions that may arrive from TMFH, raise the question of Durnford�s supposed culpability, seeing that his e.t.a. at Isandlwana was 1030 hrs."

Please forgive me and do correct me if I am barking up the wrong tree here, but you seem to be suggesting that if the impi had already launched the attack prior to Durnford's arrival in camp, then that would, somehow, remove, negate, reduce, any/all culpability. Aah, now does that also explain a previous (not yours) triumphal but puzzling exclamation "Durnford is vindicated!"?

There has been much debate on the forum regarding the Zulu movements and, consequently, Zulu sightings prior to the contact. The primary sources are not clear and are open to interpretation. Mike Snook explains the reasons for these movements and sightings in HCMDB (including the sightings by Chard and others) without postulating a long drawn out attack. Even Zulu sources account for the early movements of the umCijo as they left their place of concealment and then returned. (More reported Zulu sightings!!)

You describe an attack that was launched at first light but you have not successfully explained why that attack took so much time. The head and chest could have been in position at X by, say,6/7.00am. Why were they still at X at 11.30?

Even if they were allowing time for the right horn to position at the Ngedla Heights, (before 9.00am?) the appearance of the impi on the Nyoni Ridge should have been no later than, say, 9.30/10.00am.

Who knows? Maybe the cavalry, sorry, Durnford, would then have arrived in time to actually save the day? Wink

Posted: Sat Nov 19, 2011 4:10 pm

Mel,
Apolgies for the triple entry.
Will respond next week either directly or through the kind help of Alan.
I will specifically address the issue of the tactical response by Pulleine from first light to the time of the Durnford's arrival.
Too late for the cavalry?
Best wishes,
Peter