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Posted: Mon Sep 20, 2010 7:29 pm

Gentlemen, I think I posted this in the wrong forum!
Just been watching a DVD entitled Isandwlana Zulu Battlefield that was released in the late 1990's (I think). It shows some excellent arial views of the battlefield as gives a quite interesting commentry on the battle. the inference is that the firing line appears to be quite some distance from the camp/ammunition waggons etc. What puzzles me is why Pulleine did not pull all his available men into a square around the ammo wagons (even though he did not have time to larger all of them) as Chelmsford did in later battles. In your opinions, which I value greatly, would this have made any appreciable difference to the end result, or were there just too many Zulu attackers for them to cope with? Also, what in your expert eyes would have happened if Chelmsford had not left camp and had his full force available, bearing in mind that the Zulus were also at full strength and full of confidence and had not faced the fearsome volley fire from the British ranks before? Would he still have been surrounded and overwhelmed? Also, did Chelmsford have Gatling guns and if so did he take them with him?
Am about a third of the way through Zulu Rising and enjoying it very much as it seems to put a more human edge on Durnford.

Posted: Tue Sep 21, 2010 2:00 pm

The answer lies in what Pulleine (or Durnford come to that) believed was the best strategic defence to be adopted. And that was pre-determined by Lord Chelmsford in his 'Instructions to Column Commanders'. It was Chelmsford's dispostion of troops that was adopted at Isandhlwana. And it didn't work. Wasn't Chelmsford lucky to have missed the party!

Posted: Fri Sep 24, 2010 2:28 pm

To me, this will always be one of the 'classic' questions relating to the Isandlwana battle. If you are fortunate enough to walk the path round the position then you truely can get an idea of the terrain and the wide open access into the camp from the South East.

In respect to the firing line placement, there is no doubt that Pulleine had been presented a major problem in the form of the orders from Mangeni to break camp at Isandlwana and move it, then at around the same time have the reports of Zulu movement to the North East confirmed. I believe that Pulleine still had the words of Chelmsford in his ear and probably believed that the action was taking place 10 miles away in the East when in fact it was not. He believed at that time that the Zulu movements indicated that a minor assualt from a small force was going to be a frontal one and not on the scale it was to actual be, hence the firing line position. THE major thought is what was his thinking, particularly about the South East and West of the camp being totally unguarded, oh and trying to do two operations at once, arrrange packing of the camp yet position a firing line to the North and East of the camp. In reality Chelmsford had already pointed out the firing line to the camp command the day before.

On the other points, the firing line was over-run by a multi front offensive from the Zulu's. Gatlin Guns were not present at Isandlwana but were with the coastal column if I remember correct.

Apologies for the hasty response, on holiday!

Jamie