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Posted: Thu Jan 26, 2006 8:49 pm

Back to 'Body Counts' and 'Kill Rates'.

A pointer to what could happen under pressure and the 'fog of battle' can be found in a SAMHS paper on the Battle of Bronkhorstspruit, barely a year after Isandhlwana.

At the first engagement of 1880-81, at Bronkhorstspruit, the 94th Rgt present were either all killed, wounded or captured,

Their Commanders again underestimated their enemy, and were ill prepared for the attack. (where have we heard that before !)

Again there was speculation about the 'Tommies' shooting and aiming prowess;
I quote from GR Duxbury's article in Vol 5 2
"Several Boers were emphatic that the British had set their sights to 400 yards and that, when they (the Boers) moved forward, the British failed to re-sight their rifles and that their shots, for the most part, went high over the heads of the Boers. These statements are based on inspection of the rifles captured, and are borne out by Egerton who stated, 'The 94th fought remarkably well, but their fire did not seem to take effect; they did not seem to know the range, and all the officers were down.'
In the circumstances it seems to be a reasonable assumption that they failed to adjust their sights."

Shades of Isandhlwana perhaps ?

The Boers suffered 1 killed and 5 wounded.
The British 78 killed and 76 wounded.
All in the space of approx 20 minutes !

The British went on to be humiliated at Laingsnek, Schuinshoogte, and Majuba.

'When would they ever learn' !

The paper makes very interesting reading about the British Officers' mindset regarding their superiority, and the contempt they showed towards their supposed inferior enemy.

http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol052gd.html

Sean

Posted: Fri Jan 27, 2006 10:04 am

Sean

The use of Bronkhorstspruit may not be the best example to demonstrate poor British marksmanship.
Firstly, remember that the Boers and British were not even at war. The troops were marching along a flat straight road with absolutely no cover available. When the column stopped, Major Anstruther was told to go back from where he had come from. While he hesitated, the Boers opened fire without warning. Within minutes all the officers bar one were casualties. The troops had nobody to give them orders, tell them where to fire or at what range. With no protection, anyone who moved was quickly shot down.
It was nothing like an equal contest, the 94th must have wondered what had hit them and where the fire was coming from. The regiment suffered 58 % casualties and had no option but to surrender.
Without doubt the British did have to complete a quick learning curve in the 1st A.B.W and also in the 2nd, but they did learn. It was their musketry and fieldcraft which hammered the German juggernaut during the early days of the 1st World war.

Graham

Posted: Fri Jan 27, 2006 10:09 pm

I'm trying to curb any hint of nationalism here, but since the suggestion has already be entered, I'll go with it and play the Devil's Advocate (hey, somebody has got to do it). Am I to understand that the average British private couldn't figure out which direction to aim without an officer telling him? And what were the non-coms about or were they all dead too? Maybe "it's a class thing and I'll never understand it".
Perchance the average British private was just a miserable shot and depended for his survival on industrial production and faith in the training and "better" judgement of his moral and intellectual superiors?
Back to the thread: the British were notorious for dropping ammuntion during the Boer War (the Boers could follow a Britiish column and resupply their captured Enfields for months according to Packenham). What percentage of the MH rounds expended at Isandlwana simply fell out of pouches in the confusion? Anyone?

Posted: Fri Jan 27, 2006 11:23 pm

Sawubona

Well, the possible/probable ball bag losses at Isandlwana have been discussed in detail here in the past at some length, so you may have a point.

However, if you are relying on Longford with regard to the 2ABW, it might be worth widening your reading a bit. I don't think the British Army or its politicians were (perhaps not surprisingly!!!) ever intended to come out of that particular book smelling of roses and a number of his claims have been shot to pieces by other historians. Even a S African I spoke with who had no particular love of the British considered the work faulty.

I'm not sure whether those who know the 2ABW inside out are aware of how highly the book is regarded these days, but it would be interesting to know, and hopefully - given the relevant points you've raised - this wouldn't be considered too far off-topic.

Peter

Posted: Sat Jan 28, 2006 2:47 am

I've no idea who or what Longford is, but I have "widened" my reading to include Colenso, Spion Kop and The Cowpens (possibly a cheap shot, but germain). And although I can't recall the casualties for each side right now, I do seem to recall that marksman prevailed against firepower at each? And rather dramatically at that? Am I missing something here?

Posted: Sat Jan 28, 2006 3:09 am

This seems to have veered towards points unknown! The fact remains that throughout the history of ranged warfare the overwhelming majority of missles loosed never found their target. This has nothing to due with the weapons or the weaponeers directly. It has everything to do with trying to hit consciously moving human beings with a mechanical device that in concert with a human mind produces a lag time between target acquisition, firing and the missle hitting or missing the space previously occupied by one's target. One born and bred to hunting or trap shooting can achieve a much better shot-to-hit ratio, it cannot however be taught on a range and can only be accomplished through vast experience, your average soldier did not fit this bill. Although the British Army as a whole had much experience in combat the individual soldiers of the many British Regiments had much less so in the realm of combat firing experience. Lord Chelmsford commented rather disappointedly that many of the troops who accompanied him to SA had never even fired a round before their departure so we're not talking frontiersmen or buffalo hunters here.

This fact was of course not lost on the commanders of the British Army in particular. Accurately judging distance is a difficult endeavour, the mind plays tricks, and it would seem that officers and NCOs only were offered training in this regard and this with the aid of range markers (which, as compelling as the scene in Zulu Dawn was, didn't seem to be the case in reality!). British Army power lay in disciplined 'limited field of fire' doctrine (thus no actual "fire" command). The new skirmishing order deployments coupled with the M-H may have led to less 'fire by company' than 'fire by section' with perhaps one section told off to 'independant fire' under the auspices of officers and NCOs pointing out targets. The whole concept had worked splendidly until 22 Jan. 1879.

Perhaps we can all agree that the defenders of Rorke's Drift capped more rounds than their brethren at Isandlwana thus a direct comparison yields little.

Despite the fact that the troops at Isandlwana fired no better or worse than those in any other similar engagement in history (actually better than many) I'm still amazed that so many seem to feel that this one day was unique and that something fishy was going on. I'd share a foxhole with any of them.

Best

Michael

Posted: Sat Jan 28, 2006 9:42 am

Sawubona
The point that I was trying to make was that the column of troops were taken completely unawares. Image the situation when you are fired upon without warning, from directions unknown and by assailants who had not declared that hostilities had commenced.
The troops at Bronkhorstspruit had received training in mainly volley firing, instructed by their officers or senior N.C.O.s.
Up to this time, this was the sort of riflefire that had been required of them.
The shock and suprise of the attack upon them must have left the majority of men totally confused. Undoubtably some N.C.O.s did try to give directions etc but the Boers had the upper hand from the beginning.
Once a regiment started to suffer losses on the scale that the Boers inflicted, then it begins to affect how that regiment functions.
Confusion and disbelief caused the problem and not poor musketry.

Graham

Posted: Sun Jan 29, 2006 9:54 am

I've having a problem with this one. Perhaps its because I'm a girl and never been into battle, but, when you're marched against someone who has been making aggresive noises about fighting, should you be surprised when they start shooting at you? I didn't know there had to be an announcement that hostilities had commenced, or was that the done thing in those days. "Right, chaps, lets have a war and let's start in, let's say, 5 minutes?"

Dawn

Posted: Sun Jan 29, 2006 7:56 pm

Dawn

You are quite correct. ColonelAnstruther had been warned about the possibility of a surprise attack by the Boers. He probably wanted to be not the first person to fire the first shot in a war between Europeans. He also had women and children in his column.
However forwarned he had been, his column was simply just not ready for an attack upon it. Jolly unsporting but all's fair in love and war they say.

Graham

Posted: Sun Jan 29, 2006 8:50 pm

Bit late in on this chaps but a few questions answered
The intimated comments about the 24th being poor shots is not founded, the 24th had been in action in the cape since '77, the Khosa found to their cost the steay, accurate fire on the regiment.

Peter, A Martini fired with a live round has a differnet muzzle / smoke blast than a blank fired, as, due to the compression of the gasses behind the bullet the force on exit is enhanced. The smoke is a dense grey white, the muzzle flash often extends to 2-3 feet in a flame. At close range the concussion of this would incapacitate or severely burn those close by. At RD the flash in the dark would be a) quite something, b) taking away night vision for some time. As I mentioned earlier, every time I hjave been to Isandlwana the wind is quite strong, this would dissipate the smoke quite quickly.

Eduardo
An interesting note on the BP fouling, I have just checked with my calipers the size on an original boxer round, it is exactly .450", with patch .464". The patch would act as a cleaning agent, We fire patched / or lubed .468" round nowadays 30-50 rounds, with no real percieved kick.

With respect to Hooks comment about jamming, I aggree, normally it is due to expansion of the boxer round in a fouled hot breech, the normal cure is a sharp yank on the lever (The mark 4 Martini had a longer lever to assist this, check out my website www.martinihenry.co.uk for images). The other cure is the cleaning rod, dropped down the barrel. (the end of the rod has a cup cut out so it doesn't damage the firing pin). Where the problem becomes a BIG problem is the delamination of the round, where the base rippes off the case, I did read some time back about the men stealing local corkscrews as makeshit pocket tools to use as a tool to remove these.
If the breech was sufficiently hot,and the round was not instantly ejected the round would loosen, that said the chamber is not subjected to a) the heat of burning propellant or B) the friction of a round.

One of these days when I am feeling flush, we will have to experiment with 100 rounds fired rapidly, (that would cost an arm and a leg in BP and time) but it might be worth it to see the effects.

Posted: Sun Jan 29, 2006 9:55 pm

Neil,
It's always a pleasure to read input from a "been there, done that (and got the tee-shirt)" perspective. When you do decide to do the 100 rounds thing, you've got to do it with vintage rolled case cartridges too, not drawn case reloads -- otherwise it's just going to be a waste of time and ammunition like that which was done on that flawed documentary! Ka-ching! And don't forget the death-threats from the collectors who view with dismay the diminishing availability of the real deals!
Seriously, if the meters and gauges and cameras were in place, I'd contribute a half a pouch full of broad arrow stamped cartridges just to say I was a part of this very expensive research project. Ninety to go, but I'd be satisfied with the 70 rounds maximum they'd be likely to carry at any given time. So we're down to only 60 rounds needed! Only white patches though-- no carbine rounds in the mix.
Incidently, it was a Pvt. Dunbar at Rorke's Drift who reportedly scored eight out of eight , not at Ulundi! Was he a particularly good shot, just lucky, or a convincing liar? Any information on his prowess with a Martini?

Posted: Sun Jan 29, 2006 10:27 pm

Sawubona

I hadn't realised I'd typed Longford when referring to Pakenham - same chap of course, Pakenham being the family surname and Longford the name of their title. Sorry for the confusion (I always think of him as a Longford, like the rest of this extremely literary family!)

Neil

Many thanks - I agree that there are unlikely to be that many completely breezeless days at Isandlwana, and out on the firing line they were even further still out in the open and therefore quite exposed to any wind.

Peter

Posted: Sun Jan 29, 2006 10:56 pm

Pakenham I know well, but as to "Longford", I've no clue. I suspect this is a Gordon/Byron, Theisiger (sp?)/Chelmsford, Brudendell/Cardigan kind of thing?
Isandlwana does have days without the slightest rustle of breeze! I believe Adrian Greaves reiterates from primary sources that the fateful day in question was still, but I'd like to check the chapter and verse before I'm held to that.

Posted: Mon Jan 30, 2006 12:27 pm

Sawubona

Yes, that sort of thing. The Longford title and family seat were Irish, and Thomas Pakenham's father, Frank, was the 6th Earl of Longford, dying in recent years in his 90s. The author's grandfather, the 5th Earl, was captured in the 2ABW and killed at Gallipoli in 1915, perhaps the genesis for the author's original interest in the topic? His father, the 6th Earl, was an extremely well known figure in UK political life in the 20th century & served in Churchill's National wartime government & several post-war Labour cabinets. Despite his background he was a lifelong socialist and also converted to Roman Catholicism; he was a bit of a maverick & often a thorn in the "establishment's" side; unorthodox, perhaps na�ve and an absolute gift to the "popular" press - but with a superb brain.

All Thomas Pakenham's many brothers and sisters have become writers in one way or another, including a couple of historians among them, with perhaps Antonia Fraser being the most well known & prolific. Her second husband has long been one of the UK's foremost playwrights and won the Nobel Prize for Literature last year - you may have read the coruscating public demolition of post-war US foreign policy which marked his acceptance speech a few weeks ago & which was heavily reported worldwide.

So Thomas Pakenham is part of a very literary lot! You may be familiar with his "The Scramble for Africa" which I thought very good, but both that and his "Boer War" are (perhaps because of their very scope and length?) rather "broad-brush." Or have we become too used to so many present-day specialised works dealing with more specific topics? I'm not at all qualified to criticise his work but several who are, have. Have a look at Tim Jeal's biography of Baden Powell for a re-appraisal of some aspects, for example.

Peter

Posted: Mon Jan 30, 2006 3:50 pm

Neil.

I have to agree with Sawubona that your test would be flawed, unless you do it with the original ammo, using the coiled brass, which was easily damaged creating thus extraction problems. Unfortunately, it si not possible in this forum to upload images, otherwise I could show one depicting coiled brass MH ammo, and you would see what I mean.
The cook offs is not my way of explaining the problem; it is indeed the designation of the probelm. It happened in earlier times and it of course happens today with modern assault rifles when the firing is intense, and the chamber overheats.
Cheers!