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Sean Sweeney
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Very interesting gentleman, for a fellow shooter.
Good shooting Eduardo. I know what 500mtr Rams are all about, but using modern rifles/sights/loads, ........and they're not easy. I concur that the average 'Tommy' wasn't much of a sharpshooter. Lack of inbred/acquired ability and training and practice for one thing, and mostly city-bred, for another, but also speaking as a shooter and hunter, and ex-military, one becomes more relaxed as one becomes more accustomed to the pressures involved, in any application with firearms, be it Training, International Competition on the range, or in the bush, and no doubt the same with screaming hordes advancing on you intent on doing you no good. In the modern era, WWI and II showed how accustomed troops could become towards repeated engagement. I think also that history has shown that recruiting from rural populations helps create a soldier with better shooting and killing skills, i.e. Australian, New Zealand and S.African/Boer volunteers, and the Highland regiments. I doubt also whether any of the British troops at Isandhlwana were battle hardened enough to apply their 'acquired' shooting skills in a reasonably calm and deliberate manner, and I assume, other influences on the battlefield that day would have also led to some form of increased stress, which would no doubt have affected their aiming and shooting prowess. My bet is that the Boers, pre AZW and then in ABW I and II would have had the highest rate of kill per shots fired. They were mostly true marksmen, in tune with their weapons, used to a life of hardship, hunting and shooting, and survival, and most important, were very aware that their very lives depended on their own individual shooting skills, to collectively defeat a vastly superior numerical force, as they proved time and again. I wonder if we have any statistical information on their kill rates ? Sean |
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Peter Ewart
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As someone who knows absolutely nothing about firearms (but who always enjoys following the threads discussed on this site by those who do) I hesitate to dip my toe in here, but:
Has the smoke question at Isandlwana been cleared up yet? I read in this thread that the smoke would eventually have caused considerable difficulty with the 24th companies' vision and this topic has, now & again, been aired in published debates in recent years. The experience of our modern M-H users is obviously very helpful but can someone tell a layman like me: (a) how much smoke issues from the rifle when it is (or was) fired? (b) does it rise fairly quickly above the soldier's head? (assuming no breeze is present at all) and (c) is it white, black or grey? (I did say I was a layman!!!) The reason I ask is that surely we must remember that, at the outset of the battle, when the companies were drawn up on the original firing lines, each soldier was standing some distance from the other - quite a few feet, if not a few yards. So the smoke is much less likely to "join up" thickly and cause visibility problems. If there is a breeze, you may get your neighbour's smoke in your face, but your own smoke has drifted into your neighbour's on the other side! Surely, the smoke was far too thin at this stage too cause problems, unless it stays exactly where it is and doesn't move anywhere - along or up. Also at this stage of the battle, the companies were not blazing away madly, or even firing rapidly. Most sound authorities (and there's a controversial term, as far as this battle is concerned!) explain that the firing was done volley by careful volley, not only with intervals in between but with companies taking turns (possibly with the potential smoke in mind?). So, with quite an interval - several minutes at least? - between rounds by any given soldier, surely the smoke dissipated quickly enough to be able to see OK next time? Eduardo mentions the results of the rifles being used to shoot rapidly a few hundred times (possibly not referring to Isandlwana?) but surely this was impossible. Would it not be true to say that there was probably not a single 24th soldier who is likely to have fired off even ONE hundred rounds? Or, at least, not much more. I understand entirely that during the period of the retirement of most of the companies towards the camp and/or the nek, the firing may have been slightly less in controlled volleys and perhaps faster, and especially so during the separate last stands on or close to the nek, but with some soldiers being out of (or low on) ammunition by then & perhaps cut off from any supply, then the patchy nature of the firing would again suggest no banks of thick smoke (notwithstanding the Zulu account about smoke obscuring the sun - there will have been plenty of cattle dust too). One might also just suggest that although rapid firing would cause the barrel to heat up, the difficulties in holding the M-H as a result might then suggest a slower firing rate for practical reasons (all things being equal!) I've come across a couple of accounts of overheating rifles at Isandlwana (whereas they were very common after RD) and also one newspaper account which reported them being dipped into the spruit during the fighting to cool the barrels. (However, this might suggest NNC or mounted troops in the donga rather than the 24th, partly because it came from a colonist survivor & also because they were the ones with the water available - so no doubt the M-H carbines overheated in the same way). Having strayed into matters I know nothing about, I shall now beat a hasty retreat! Peter |
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Eduardo
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Sean,
Yes, people from rural extraction are more easily trained to kill than city dwellers. Actually, Adolf Hitler encouraged the recruitment of germans from the countryside, which would also withstand hardship much easier. Peter, Smoke is indeed a problem with black powder. When we shoot at the range each has a spotter to inform the shooter were he hit with his shot, as the smoke clouds often gets in the way. I would estimate that during the battle, between each volley, 15 seconds elapsed. That means each soldier could theoretically fire his gun about 4 times per minute, or 240 times per hour. I understand, the battle lasted for over five hours. Further, I believe it was not long before the "independent fire at will " order was uttered, which would have accelerated the firing. I do not know about the "careful volleys "or companies taking time to shoot. This sounds quite improbable, considering that it was clear to officers and soldiers that the Zulus were not going away, and the possibility of being overwhelmed was pretty clear from the outset. They absolutely had to prevent the Zulus reaching their lines, as it would then turn into a hand to hand combat, and there were probably 20 assegais for each bayonet (not very good odds...). The only way to keep them at a distance was with firepower. After 100 -200 or more rounds, the barrels would be so full of powder residue and the chambers so hot, that probably many rifles simply gave up. According to some reports, the lack of ammunition has been debunked as a myth, as aparently, they had about 400,000 rounds in total and the ammo was distributed to the soldiers. Essentially, the British were overwhelmed and lost the batttle, due to sheer determination from the part of the zulu impis. During the Sudan war, at the battle of Abu Klea, the British battle square was temporarily broken by the mahdi fanatics. It was not broken with cavalry charges, or artillery, but it was the sheer, fanatic determinmation of the "fuzzy- wuzzies" who simply threw themselves at the bayonets, hacking their way through. Incidentally, at the battle of Abu Klea was where the colourfull and quintessential Victorian hero, Col. Frederick Burnaby was killed, but that is of course, another story.... Cheers ! |
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diagralex
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Sean
Statistics on Boer marksman during the 1st Anglo Boer war - Incidently prepared by our own Major Essex, who was a Staff officer at this time. Laings Nek - (for the 58th regiment who carried out the main infantry assault) consisting of 15 officers and 479 men. Killed 74 and wounded 101. Ingogo river - 24 officers and 369 men present Officers 5 killed and 4 wounded. Men 61 killed and 73 wounded. Majuba - 20 officers and 627 men present. Officers 5 killed and 8 wounded. Men 87 killed and 123 wounded. I shall leave you to work out the percentages, but it certainly reflects the accuracy of the Boer riflemen ! Graham |
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Peter Ewart
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Eduardo
Many thanks for your explanation about the smoke. I think any thick smoke can only have been a problem at the climax of the battle, when the companies were finally surrounded and were firing back to back and obviously shoulder to shoulder & therefore much closer to each other. To a lesser degree it might also have affected visibility during the steady retreat of the companies from the firing line to their final positions behind the camp, but as they were slowly retreating at that time they would not have been standing in the same position as when they last fired - although I accept the smoke was more likely to be in front of them than behind them, and so between them and their enemy. While out on the original firing line, they were (according to most modern authorities) several yards from each other - that's quite a space between each man - so only one's own smoke was likely to get in the way, and only then if it remained exactly where it was for some time. Of course, if in two ranks, as I understand most were, then the wind direction, if any, might be pertinent. You mention the battle lasting about five hours whereas, of course, it was only about half of that, perhaps much less than half (timed from the first volleys on the firing line to the end of the final last stand). A much smaller and slower rate of fire than you suggest is also assumed by modern historians (and on the many discussions on this forum in the past). On this point (and with the smoke in mind rather than any ammunition discussion, which has been aired more than adequately in all quarters), I've just had a look at Mike Snook's views in his recent book and I see he considers it highly unlikely that the men in most companies had expended even 35 rounds each by the time they received the order to retire (but heavier expenditure by Mostyn & Cavaye's companies). He calculates a rate of fire (strictly controlled by volleys at first) of two to three per minute for the initial three or four minutes, followed by about only one per minute by independent fire (because of the concealed targets the enemy presented); the whole of this period being half an hour maximum. Unless the day was particularly breezeless, I think the smoke would have thinned out at least, if not blown away. I rather agree with the view that the grass and the rocks would have concealed the enemy rather more than the 24th's own smoke. I think the idea that the 24th were blazing away at a "dense black mass" for ages until faced with an unstoppable rush has somehow grown up over the years. The rate of fire does not appear to have increased much more than that (if at all) during the retirement, although obviously would have been as rapid as was practicable during the final, separate last stands, and would have depended also on which groups had received any further replenishment by delaying the cutting off from their supplies. For this reason, I can't see smoke causing much of a problem until the denouement. I'm more than happy to be corrected here, but it does seem to me that the space between the men during the first half-hour and the rate of fire during this period are crucial - and this also assumes a windless day. Back at the camp, I would expect more smoke. Peter |
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mike snook 2
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Eduardo
Don't agree with many of your comments about rate of fire at Isandlwana. My HCMDB refers - so I won't trot out a counter argument now for fear of boring people. Secondly, the square at Abu Klea was broken into because the Heavy Camel Regiment wheeled two companies out of the rear face to fire in defilade along the left side of the square. Bad idea. HCR was found by the Heavy Cavalry Regiments. They did something no infantryman would ever have done. It is believed to have taken place at Burnaby's instigation (also a cavalryman). It was of course to cost dear. Regards Mike |
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John Young
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Picking up on an earlier point of the Martini-Henry's barrel heating up, I thought it best to seek the opinion of one who used one in action - I could think of no-one better than Alfred Henry Hook V.C.
The author, Walter Wood, recorded a series of interviews which he published in his 1906 work Survivors' Tales of Great Events, he was fortunate to meet with Hook on a number of occasions, their last meeting was just prior to Hook's death in 1905. Wood records the following statement from Hook:-
John Y. |
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Eduardo
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diagralex
No question, the Boers were excellent marksmen. Just in case, we should perhaps add that the Boers were at the time using the Mauser 98 which was the most modern and probably the most accurate rifle in the world, chambering very modern ammunition loaded with smokeless gun powder. Peter, I do not think the smoke was a huge problem. I only mentioned to you that it may get in the way, as I have experienced with black powder, and sometimes it can be a problem, but certainly not decisive in a battle. Regarding the duration of the battle, I just repeated what I have read. I would like to know your sources (Always happy to learn something). I certainly do not know for sure exactly (does anybody?), how many shots were fired by each soldier. However, common sense (agree, not always prevalent) and the survival instinct (very strong, always) would seem to dictate the convenience of generating a �lead wall� against the Zulus advancing in overwhelming numbers. I agree that when they found cover, it was necessary to find your target before firing. However, that could have hardly been an issue when they were relatively near. Mike, I am sorry, but as you do not specify which comments are those you do not agree with, I cannot offer any reply on this matter. Regarding Abu Klea, some sources offer your explanation as to why was the square broken, others state that some wounded camels in the rear of the square could not keep up and a gap developed, or that the reason was that the Gardner machinegun jammed; still others offer a combination of these arguments. It does not matter. There are always reasons when these types of events happen. My only point in this case, is that sheer determination and fanaticism goes a long way, even when mere double edge swords and/or spears are opposed to firearms, sometimes, the former prevailing over the latter, as in Isandlhwana. The Fuzzi-Wuzzies were extremely brave warriors. Actually, Rudyard Kipling wrote a poem about them and Abu Klea: "Fuzzy-Wuzzy" We've fought with many men acrost the seas, ..........And some of 'em was brave an' some was not: The Paythan an' the Zulu an' Burmese; ..........But the Fuzzy was the finest o' the lot, etc. John, The 577-450 MH ammunition was based on the 577 Snyder necked down to .45, and the brass was made of rolled brass, which according to reports, created extraction problems during the battle, when the chambers heated up. Only in 1885, the drawn brass case was adopted, which is used until this day. This probably added to the problems of gun powder residue and heated up barrels and chambers. I was not aware of Hook�s comments, but they would seem to confirm my own previous comments on the matter, which were just a theory derived from what I have read about the battle, and the experience I have a with guns and ammunition. Cheers! |
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Peter Ewart
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Eduardo
Well, the battle which began on the plateau and continued in front of the camp occupied the equivalent of a rather longish lunch break, with resistance - other than the poor chap up on the crag - over by mid-afternoon (although estimates of the end can differ either way by about an hour). There are those who include Zulu movements earlier in the morning as being part of the battle, in which case it lasted for around 8 hours or more. (Both the above versions exclude time spent on the "fugitives' trail", although most of that "action" appears to have been contemporaneous with the last stages of the battle anyway). I'm sure whatever you've read will very roughly concur with this. Obviously no-one knows how many shots each man fired, as you say; but you may be surprised at how much detail had been researched and discussed by contributors to this forum alone in recent times, so that, for example, the initial allocation of rounds (whether complete or not & whether supplemented or not); the rate of fire; time on the firing line; possible loss from ball bags; replenishment possibilities, etc etc., have all been gone into quite deeply. There remain many "unknowns" and some of these "unknowns" affect other "unknown" factors, so little is conclusive, but I believe the picture is a lot less vague than you suggest. Although Kipling is always assumed to have been referring to Abu Klea, I suppose he may also have been thinking of Tamai. Another poet, Newbolt, wrote in much more detail of the "wreck of the square" in his "Vitae Lamparda" but I won't go any further on that one or you'll set John Young and me off again on little schoolboys, cricket & Burnaby! Finally(!) as Boer marksmanship is being mentioned, I remember discussing this with Paul Marais (whom many here will know) in RSA a few years ago, and he emphasised strongly the difference in marksmanship (and their other praiseworthy attributes such as horsemanship, mobility, concealment skills etc) between the 1880/1 Boers and the 1899-1902 lot. The fact that large numbers of the latter forces were from urban backgrounds is sometimes overlooked and apparently these skills were not as high (across the board) as they had been a generation earlier. Of course, the number of combatants on both sides was huge the second time round, so this "decline" may not have been apparent to the British, and they may have disagreed strongly with this theory after Black Week and beyond! Peter |
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diagralex
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Peter
I agree entirely with you about Boer horsemanship, concealment etc etc. Don't forget another important factor as well, in the reason for declining marksmanship. In 1880 the British still wore good old scarlet and white. Anyone with a rifle must have been able to choose his target with ease. Percy Marling of the Rifles complained continually that although his men wore rifle green, they still were ordered to wear nice white helmets ! Khaki by 1900 had made the troops far less conspicuous and therefore presented a harder target to fire at. Graham |
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Keith Smith
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Eduardo
The battle did not last five hours. The Zulu were discovered shortly before noon and the camp was taken about 2.00 pm. The last survivor in or around the camp was dead by 2.30 pm. The flight down the Fugitives Trail, of course, lasted much longer but could not be described as 'organised resistance' except during its earliest stage. KIS |
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Sawubona
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My apologies, Chiba, for my helping this thread stray a bit from your original topic, but there's more Martini-Henry-in-theory-and-practice information going down here than one could ever hope for and so I'm going to continue to run with it! So "cookoffs" were a problem, Eduardo! But I've seen mention of barrels glowing dull red at Rorke's Drift and even MH's discarded because of barrel-deformation! Apocryphal? Could enough heat be generated in a fouled barrel to render it FUBAR? Burned hands are one thing, but warping Birmingham steel is quite another!
All one needs to do is handle a single MH round and one suddenly realizes the death and destruction that's the soul of this thing. They're freaking heavy! A WWII vintage M-1 carbine round has a 180 grain slug (I think it's something like that). The Garand slug was something like 220 (or 260, I don't remember and I'm too lazy to look it up) and they were both encased in jackets-- they both look like toys (although I wouldn't want to be hit with either) The MH is 480 grains of pure unjacketed lead and I can well imagine that if it hit bone in an arm or leg, it would most probably take the appendage right off. And if it hit somewhere more vital? Awful wounds is right! I've seen vintage surgeon sketches of wounds inflicted by a MH bullet and the bone damage looks like some kid made random scratches with the pen. And those were only wounds! |
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Sawubona
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Can anyone more savvy than I reconstruct a theoretical program of Isandlwhana? I'm pretty clueless here, but volley fire probably began at something like 800-1000 yards, but were they "volley by rank" or "volley by section" (I think that's equivalent to a "platoon" in The States) ? And how many rounds were expended before company massed volley or "independent fire at will"? Certainly the two companies on the spur never devolved to IFW, since they must have fallen back with alternate line volleys (i.e.: whoever's ahead in the fall-back (closer to the camp) turns and fires to cover the fall back of those lagging as they pass through a firing line with some defensive integrity! All this time, Younghusbands company must have put up a calm and conservative fire to support the fall back and that might help to account for why they still had ammunition at the end. Pope's company? I picture it as firing a long range and VERY economical fire in support of Durnford's fall back (after all, they weren't immediately threatened and Durnford was a long way out)-- almost a sniping mode in the onset, but devolving to volley by sections eventually. The other two companies in the middle are just marking time with whatever seems to be doing the job (supported by the artillery). Thoughts?
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Sean Sweeney
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No need to apologise to Chiba, Sawubona, I'm sure.
Threads appear to have a mind of their own, and make life a bit more interesting, as they wander hither and thither. Certainly for me that is. Eduardo, I notice your comment on the Boers modern rifles and smokeless powders. In 1880-81, this wasn't the case, as both sides were using the same or similar weapons as used in the AZW. Here's an interesting brace of articles published by the South African Military History Society. The 2nd piece on Artillery shows some good pictures of the 9pdr RML's and Rockets, and HMS Boadicea's AZW Gatling. N/5 and 10/7 Batteries had participated in the AZW, and used the same 9pdr RML's that N/6 had used at Ulundi et al. What I found quite extraordinary, was the fact that due to the shortage of trained artillerymen, 2/21st Bandsmen were trained up to man the 7pdrs and Rockets. They must have had a lot of faith in their musicians 'kill rates' !!! A reflection on their music, perhaps ? http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol052fm.html http://rapidttp.com/milhist/vol052dh.html Sean |
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Eduardo
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Peter,
The information regarding how many shots were fired is relatively irrelevant, as we were trying to determine (at least I) whether gun powder residue, heated up chambers causing cook offs and difficulty extracting cases, could have caused serious problems (as I suspected), ending up affecting firepower, and thus aiding the enemy. As we can see by Hook�s comments, they did indeed.. I understand that Kipling was referring to Abu Klea when he wrote the poem, but it could also be Tamai. In any event, he was referring to the Fuzzy-Wuzzies as the braves of all who as you know where not one tribe, but the collection of many such as the Dinka, Hadendowa, Amarer and Bisharin, most of which fought in the battles of the Sudan War. Regarding Tamai itself, it is another case (earlier than Abu Klea) where a British battle square was broken, when a battalion charged, detaching itself a bit from the square. This small gap provoked a rush by the Mahdist who almost succeeded in disintegrating the whole formation. Help from an adjacent square saved the day. Cheers ! Keith, According to one survivor�s account, the Zulus were discovered in great force at the south end of Ingutu Mountain, between six and seven o�clock on the morning of the 22nd January. I do agree however, that the real �shooting time� was probably less than five hours. Cheers! Sawubona, I have not read anything about �barrels glowing dull red� but I have read about reports of the bayonets made of soft steel bending due to the continuous fire of the rifle. I cannot tell with any certainty how true these reports were, however they sound somehow outlandish. About the cook offs, most likely, they did happen. Regarding the lethality of the MH bullet, I concur with you, having already mentioned this in a previous post. The 45-120 cartridges (4�+ overall length) I shoot are loaded with lead bullets weighing 535g and more, which make a mess of any soft target they hit. Sean, I certainly was not referring to the 1880-81 war, but to the 1899-1902 conflict. The Gewehr 98 was developed in 1898. Cheers! |
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