rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - An Official Re-Evaluation Of Isandlwana ?

Posted: Sat Oct 17, 2009 11:59 am

tony.ashford.@ntlworld,co wrote:

Dodgermuk,

Hi.

I have to say that I find your defence of Durnford, or rather your denunciation of Pulleine to be wholly misjudged. Durnford was the senior officer and should have taken charge of the camp. Perhaps, had he stayed, with his "vastly superior military experience" (!) the troops might have then been deployed more effectively! Instead he had impetuously rushed out not knowing the truth of the enemy strength or deployment. And he left without even knowing where his ammunition supplies were; and they were, as we know, to be sorely needed later - a staggering error in my view! How you then cast the blame on Pulleine, who had no combat experience, is beyond me!

Tony.

Firstly let me point out that i am not in the 'defense group' of Col Durnford. I am just trying to explain that i can see Coll's point in all of this based on evidence i have read from many of the posts throught the years in this forum. As for the comment i made 'vastly superior military experience' i based this on the fact that Pulleine had NO combat experience at all. I used this reason for making my comment, maybe it was ill judged and i apologise if it is so.

As for blaming Pulleine, whether he liked it or not, he was the man in charge of the camp, should Durnford have taken over when he arrived, maybe so but that is not a reason to blame him for the fallings on the day. It was down to Pulleine to provide a defence of the camp and he failed to do so. Would we even be having this discussion if Durnford had not been there and in his place was some lower ranking officer? If Pulleine was not the right man for the job then it should have been made clear that upon Durnfords arrival he would assume command. Should Pulleine have forced the issue that Durnford take command, maybe, we'll never know. Just because Durnford did not take overall command does not mean he should take the high majority of the blame for the battles failure.

Take a look at the events at Rorke's Drift, both the officers wanted to retreat but it was Dalton who advised them otherwise. It has also been written and commented on numerous times that Dalton should have been the one to take the praise for saving the camp because it was him that came up with the defensive ideas. Does this mean then that the camp at the drift would have failed and become another tradegy if Dalton had not of been there? It just goes to show that when things fail they look to others to blame but when things work, the commanding officers take all the praise.

Rog

Posted: Sat Oct 17, 2009 12:10 pm

Roger

I feel that I should take issue with you concerning your remark that Pulleine had NO combat experience at all. He was a man who had served with the 24th for many years, and being both a captain and a major (for a total of some 16 years) he would have led one or more companies during this time. Moreover, he was the fellow who recruited and trained Pulleine's Rangers in the Eastern Cape only a little more than a year before his death. Although he also served in administrative roles during his career, one cannot serve in an infantry regiment for that length of time with no combat experience.

KIS

Posted: Sat Oct 17, 2009 12:25 pm

Keith Smith wrote:

Roger

I feel that I should take issue with you concerning your remark that Pulleine had NO combat experience at all. He was a man who had served with the 24th for many years, and being both a captain and a major (for a total of some 16 years) he would have led one or more companies during this time. Moreover, he was the fellow who recruited and trained Pulleine's Rangers in the Eastern Cape only a little more than a year before his death. Although he also served in administrative roles during his career, one cannot serve in an infantry regiment for that length of time with no combat experience.

KIS

Keith, maybe the use of 'at all' was totaly unjustified but the rest of my comment still stands because i have read the same use of the line in books on the battle and used in this forum and in the previous carnation of this forum. I am only stating what i have read that others have posted. I am not baising my comments on my opinions but on facts that i have read here in the forum and elsewhere.

Rog

Posted: Sat Oct 17, 2009 11:29 pm

Roger

Sorry, no excuse. It is exactly this repetition of unsupported claims which lead to false conclusions. I do not claim that Pulleine was a military genius, simply that he did have more combat experience than that with which he was credited.

Nevertheless, there was almost certainly an element of the 'Peter Principle' at work at Isandlwana, where Pulleine was out of his depth against such a numerous, and clever, enemy. (For those who are not aware, the 'Principle' states that people are often promoted beyond their ability; viz. Redvers Buller. This was common in an army which promoted according to seniority and not ability.)

KIS

Posted: Sun Oct 18, 2009 7:31 am

When a tragedy happens - there begins the search for a scapegoat(s). We feel that we better understand what has gone wrong.

Over number of years now, those who have written about the AZW have poured over previous publications to come up with their own theories. Colonel Pulleine's experience and Colonel Durford's actions have been constantly analysed in detail. But had Colonel Glyn, the Commanding Officer 1/24th, been present at Isandlwana would the result been different.

Will any present day enquiry be unbias? Where is the base line of truth?

Posted: Sun Oct 18, 2009 4:18 pm

Peter
Before it disappears from memory - well played on the cricket front!
Roger
Keith is correct. Pulleine was an experienced officer and no fool. He certainly had no intention of meeting his maker on the 22nd.
Coll
As I've said recently, I have no wish to enter this debate at the moment but I do believe (and therefore agree with you) that the question of Durnford's 'status', his actual orders, what-he-perceived-to-be-his orders, and his intentions on the 22nd is a vital one when apportioning 'blame'. It is by no means as clear cut as others would have us believe.
I recently gave the after-dinner lecture at the RE's Rorke's Drift Evening. The officer in command on the evening was a lieut.-col. in the RE. However there happened to be present on the top table a colonel (as garrison commander) from a cavalry unit. Seniority was his, but command and responsibility was in the hands of his junior in rank. He was just passing through, one might say. It wasn't Isandhlwana of course, a rather different sort of occasion, but the fight went on till 4 a.m.!

Posted: Sun Oct 18, 2009 6:06 pm

Julian
I appreciate that you do not wish to enter this debate but I cannot let your post go without further comment.

I see your analogy, but Durnford did not just "pass through" did he? He also influenced Troop dispositions which meant that Pulleine could not comply with the order to "act on the defensive".
(I assume that your RE Lieut-Col didn't interfere with the seating plan?) Smile

Totally blameless? Sorry Coll, can't agree unless you can come up with some new information.

Posted: Sun Oct 18, 2009 7:51 pm

This would seem to be a good opportunity for me to ask for some clarification on something that has puzzled me. In "Historical Records of the 24th Regiment...", in the paragraph immediately preceding the chapter on Isandhlwana, it states -

"...As the drift was blocked, they [Mostyn's Coy.] pitched their camp with the rear guard for the night, and marched into Isandhlwana camp with it next morning, 21st January. The number of companies of the 1st battalion with No. 3 column was thus raised to five. Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, who had joined the column from Pietermaritzburg a few days previously, took over the command of the 1st battalion from Captain Degacher."

Perhaps I'm simply misinterpreting that last sentence (my bold, by the way) but it seems to indicate that Pulleine had only recently been back and only re-assumed command of the regiment the day before the battle. If true he certainly would have had a bit of catching up to do at the most inopportune time!

As far as the blame game goes I break it up into two categories; tactical and strategic. I place the tactical blame on Maj. Dartnell and Commandant Lonsdale, both of whom seem to have been itching for a fight (although, to be fair, they were certainly not the only soldiers in the invasion force to share that attribute!). True, it had been a frustrating two weeks trying to find the enemy and the minor skirmishing they had encountered would tend to get one's blood up, still the orders were to return to camp. True as well that once a force contacts the enemy then contact must be maintained. However, contact could have been maintained with a portion of the mounted troops furnishing continual intel updates whilst the rest returned to camp pending appraisal of the intel and the development of a plan of battle. The most telling example of the encompassing disregard of Zulu prowess was that Dartnell felt that his mounted volunteers and two battalions of the NNC would have been sufficient to either halt a night time Zulu advance or even more in-congruently, to attack them in the morning. In the event he later decided that a few coys. of regulars in support would suffice. Also, in the event, he did lose contact with them anyway. (Ignorance of the Zulu martial intent cannot be attributed to Dartnell because he witnessed a mere couple of "companies" deploy the Horns of the Buffalo in response to his mounted recce so he knew they were not there to simply observe.) Had he returned to camp, leaving a small, mobile, vedette then Lord C would not have been presented with the dilema that he subsequently went overboard on and the column would have remained cohesive (if in fact that would have altered the outcome...?).

Strategically I feel the blame rests entirely with Sir B-F for continuing to beat the dead horse of confederation just then simply because he knew he would never have as many troops at his disposal again. Lord C, I feel confident, would have forgone the "glory" of a victory over the Zulu as he had only just successfully won the final, in a long string, of Cape Frontier Wars and his star was rising.

[Just one enthusiast's opinion of course!]

Best

Michael

Posted: Sun Oct 18, 2009 8:02 pm

Mel wrote:

Julian
I appreciate that you do not wish to enter this debate but I cannot let your post go without further comment.

I see your analogy, but Durnford did not just "pass through" did he? He also influenced Troop dispositions which meant that Pulleine could not comply with the order to "act on the defensive".
(I assume that your RE Lieut-Col didn't interfere with the seating plan?) Smile

Totally blameless? Sorry Coll, can't agree unless you can come up with some new information.

Mel, do you not contend that where a senior officer is in the presence of a lower ranked officer who has the command, the senior only takes over command if he exercises his right of seniority or do you contented that the senior officer by his sheer presence automaticaly takes over command regardless of current orders?

It is my belief from reading other posts here http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=165&postdays=0&postorder=asc
that the commander on the day was Pulleine. As senior officer Durnford could have exercised his right to take over command but he didn't. At worst he interfered with some commands which according to posts in the other thread I've linked to he was put right by Melville. If this interference was seen to cause Pulleine problems then shouldnt he have stood his ground and say no at which point Durnford could have pulled rank on him and assumed overall command or do we take it that Pulleine was too weak to stand his ground and allowed Durnford to interfere in the way some of you say he did.

In the other thread linked to, some of you have also pointed out that the buck stops with the commander and that the camp commander on that day was Pulleine even though a senior officer was present.

Those of you cant have it both ways, saying the buck stops with the commander and that commander being Pulleine but then say it was mainly Durnfords fault.

Rog

Posted: Mon Oct 19, 2009 9:34 am

'ere we go again. Blame is not something that can be passed about like a football.

A wide range of circumstances, and some errors, led to the Isandhlwana collapse but it also appears unlikely that even a carefully conducted and coordinated defence carried out with the closest possible collaboration between Pulleine and Durnford would have led to a different result. A longer defence might well have resulted and even more casualties might have been imposed upon the attackers. But, by the force in camp setting out to defend itself rather than to defend the camp.

I cannot see that flinging blame about is a sensible exercise here.

G

Posted: Mon Oct 19, 2009 12:44 pm

Julian

It was excellent to read your last posting ! Very Happy

Mel

As I said, it is your right to be convinced/unconvinced, with conclusions put forward by myself, especially being that we are equals in this mutual interest of ours - Isandlwana. Wink

However, as a man who seeks an answer(s) from me, you haven't responded to my previous posting and the questions within.

My views are widely known, but yours are not.

Kindly, oblige me, by presenting your opinion on this matter, to at least give me an idea where you stand - and why.

Coll

Posted: Mon Oct 19, 2009 1:10 pm

Been offline (again!) since just after my last post on Friday, so have only just seen the subsequent posts, with only time for a cursory glance from another computer - and don't know when I'll be able to rejoin the fray.

I really can't see what new ground can be gone over yet again, but don't let me stop anyone! Thanks to Keith for highlighting the many instances in published works which still attempt to portray Pulleine as nothing less than an administrator with no experience in the field. His comparison with Durnford's active experience can only be considered positive, as Durnford's only active service before Isandlwana involved the disaster up on the Berg (not necessarily blaming him for all of that) and his blatant disregard of Lord C's orders at M/Drift, which almost got him sacked. Where I do think there may be some slack allowed is in the possible ambiguity of his orders on 21/22 Jan., and the lingering doubts surrounding Crealock's dishonesty afterwards.

Peter

Posted: Mon Oct 19, 2009 9:21 pm

G
I really don't think that anyone is passing blame around like a football. We are all here to discuss all things Zulu. That's what a forum is for. If we start to exclude certain topics, then we may as well pack up and go home. No one is allocating blame for blame sake. There is a whole chapter on the "blame game" in LWOTF. (Very enlightening it is too.) Are you suggesting that the chapter should not have been included in the book? There are several lengthy threads on this forum (with contributions from experts and enthusiasts alike) that have already covered this topic. As far as I am concerned they have helped us to have a better understanding of the events of the 22nd.
Peter may well be correct in that nothing new will be discussed in this particular thread but nevertheless, if contributors wish to participate and their knowledge increases because of it, then why not?

My particular interest in this thread has been to try and determine why Durnford could be deemed totally blameless. As I've always considered him to be at least partly to blame, I thought that I would, indeed, be learning something new.

BTW, your second paragraph deserves to be discussed in a new thread.

Posted: Mon Oct 19, 2009 10:11 pm

Rog,
I'm no expert on military protocol but I think that if Durnford, as Senior Officer, had stayed in camp then he would have had no choice but to take command/assume responsibility.

However, he didn't stay in camp and he had made that intention clear from the start. Unfortunately, from the "blame game" point of view, he just didn't "pass through". He used his Seniority to influence the strategic (therein lies the problem) defence of the camp.

Posted: Tue Oct 20, 2009 8:24 am

Mel,

Unilateral assertion or attribution of 'blame' is hardly discussion or analysis. Nor is anything that seeks to calibrate comparative blame. Why blame?

We also frequently see examples here, and under various published authorships, of what might be termed 'polarised blame'. In other words, blaming one or more persons as particularly culpable (of something) as if to divert other or further blame from other possible candidates for blame. That book HCMDB is conspicuous in blaming Chelmsford and Durnford as if to divert its readership from any thoughts that Pulleine and others might also be somehow deserving of at least some blame or be criticisable in at least some respects.

Being generally against hurling 'blame' from our distant perspectives of those times I am not saying that Pulleine is blameworthy, but neither is he blameless. Depends what people think you mean by blame; a very broad word and heading.

It would also do those who are so keen to criticise and apportion blame considerable good to reflect upon another idea as they blame Chelmsford, Durnford, or Pulleine, or whoever. That is, "I know what I think of Durnford (say), but what would Durnford have thought of me?". A bit more humility might result from that. Reputations are serious things, as is their demolition by those who empower themselves to do so.

G