rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - If Not For Durnford's Actions, Would Anyone Have Survived?

Posted: Mon Dec 12, 2005 10:50 pm

Much ink has been let over the last 126 years blaming Col. Durnford RE (abetted by Lord Chelmsford) for the demise of the 1/24th. We have even let much 'virtual' ink in this forum. However my question deals not with his historical actions or even with what he could have done better, but with the historical outcome. Fifty-five(?)"Europeans" and some three to four hundred(?) levies, perhaps a quarter of the force present, did in fact survive. Zulu impis were not known to leave survivors, their "Horns of the Buffalo" tactic actively mitigating against it.

In my understanding izimpondo zankomo was more than a simple double-flanking manoeuvre attempted when opportunity presented itself (a rare occurence in 'classical' military history aside from siege warfare) but the 'be all, end all' tactical doctrine that had well served the amaZulu for three-quarters of a century. The job of the 'chest' being to fix the enemy line, without charging (not unlike Frederick The Great), with the 'horns' effecting the encirclement while refusing combat until they met, at which point the actual attack would begin. Admittedly the actions that led to the battle at Isandlwana seem to have thrown both sides off their game but the deployment of the Zulu right 'horn'to the Manzimyama valley, ignoring British fire, seems to support their attempt at 'doing it right'. On the other hand (or flank) the left 'horn' seems to have been distracted when Durnford showed up unexpectedly so far from the camp and rather than refusing combat jumped right in (not unlike Kambula) and seem to only have attempted to complete their part of the encirclement after being temporarily stymied at Durnford's last 'donga defence'.

The result being the right 'horn' closed the RD track escape route and in effect herded the survivors down the 'fugitives trail' which could have been sealed had not the left 'horn' deployment been disrupted by "Mad Anthony" Durnford. (Sorry, I'm almost finished Mike Snook's excellent book and must admit I'm tempted to leave off there because at the current point it looks like Col. Pulleine may just win the battle this time!)

Thus my suggestion is we cut the "cowboy" a little slack here (Mike, that's not a dig [ala Elisabeth Hogan], I quite appreciate the analogy and in fact concur) for if the left 'horn' had been allowed to complete their half of the encirclement unmolested there may well have been no survivors at all. In which case we'd have precious little to speculate on now!

Best

Michael

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 5:08 am

Mike

In my humble opinion Col.Durnford hurt the camp at Isandhlwana by taking his men out of the camp.I know his intent was to protect the GOC 's rear,however I think he very much hoped to clear his name from Bushman's River Pass.

He was a lose cannon,he moved from the middle drift with no orders.My feeling is that perhaps he never put enough thought into his actions.

I know my thoughts are very simplistic and not as deep as many here are but thought I'd through in my two cents.

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 6:01 am

Andrew,

I can appreciate your position, you are certainly not alone in that opinion, and I'm not arguing your points (yet!). However, I do feel that if Durnford hadn't stumbled into the left 'horn' (at a point where it was still undetected from the camp) then the encirclement could have been completed and we would now have only Zulu accounts of the battle. (And quite possibly a different history of the Great War if a certain future general had instead been laid beneath a cairn.)

Best

Michael

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 10:04 am

Who is Elizabeth Hogan?

Mike

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 12:06 pm

Hooray ! The reinforcements have arrived !

Nice to see you Michael.

Judging by this topic you've brought some fresh ammunition.

Coll

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 3:37 pm

Mike

Elizabeth Hogan is she of the `book reviews' topic (cf. old discussion forum, 26th July 2005).

Paul

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 4:58 pm

Here you are Coll - here's a challenge for you. Can you tell me a single thing about Colonel Durnford that rebounds to his credit? Let's see what you come up with. Try as I might I can't see even one. Here's a few thing s to be going on with:

Gambler (literally as well as militarily)
Abandonment of wife
No campaign service
Argumentative and obstructive
Hate-figure in the society of which he was a member
Not respected by his officers
Threatened with sacking by GOC
His one minor operational command is a fiasco
After HIS fiasco (remember the buck stops with the commander) he blames his troops and accuses them of cowardice - real issue is his mismanagement - men die as a consequence
Wilfully exceeds his orders at Isandlwana
Henderson: He lost his head altogether. He didn't know what to do.
Shepstone: I knew George was a gonner the minute I heard he'd been appointed to D's staff
I am Colonel Pulleine's senior - you will please tell Lt Scott to do as I tell him (but Scott is under P's command not D's)
The enemy can't surround us...oh really
My idea is wherever the Zulus appear we should attack (Hello - dogma or what)
Major Russell is dead - I will never survive the disgrace (and what pray about poor Major Russell?)
Abandonment of Pte Johnson
I am down because I am left behind....but we shall see
Loses control of withdrawing NNMC

On and on and on and on and on, it goes....

You will need a strong case my friend because the counter argument is exceptionally strong.

Regards as ever

Mike

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 5:48 pm

Mike

Thats sounds about right to me[sorry Coll]. Col. Pullenie must have felt between a rock and a hard place.He knew his orders where to simply defend the camp,can you think just how bad it would have been for the camp if he had of given Col.Durnford 2 coy.of the 1/24 like he wanted. Just 2 coy of the 24th dead a mile away from the camp,no use to anyone.Perhaps no one would have gotten out at all.Seeing that the firing line would have had less men.It was bad enough that Col.Pullenie weakend himself by sending Capts.Cavaye and Mostyn up the Tahelane Spur in support of Col.Durnford.Correct me if I have mixed anything up.And Durnford left poor Lt.Pope and G coy to their death by leaving the donga,as soon as Lt.Pope and G coy. got in place to support them.Also I agree with Mike in the sense that a good officer should'nt be stopping to help his men eject jammed cartridges form their carbines.If only Sgt.Kambula and others had of only tied up Col Durnford before the battle and carried him off the field.

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 8:29 pm

Paul,

You are of course correct, that would be Liza with a "Z".

Mike,

Ms. Hogan apparently has her new AZW book critiques web site close to posting. I read her review of your book on another AZW site however and feel that, although she made a couple of good points, the review in it's entirety was far to dismissive to constitute constructive criticism (which is what I at least look for in a good critique).

Now if I may take up the challenge?

Gambler- Literally; yes "gaming" seems to have been ubiquitous among the officer corps (with many humourous anectdotes recorded as to the strange objects bet on, one of which was a certain future VC who bet he could jump his pony over the mess table). Granted Durnford seems to have taken to it rather hardily as did many other officers with the forlorn hope that, without a wealthy family, they could augment their meager income. Not in my mind a disqualifying charachteristic unless it leads to betrayal of one's honour. Militarily; again, yes, as were many of the most
famous officers in history, RE Lee springing readily to mind. I am not of course including the Col. in that august pantheon but far more military victories have ensued from those willing to take risks than from those standing 'pat'. Naturally luck plays heavily in the equation and that is a commodity which Durnford seemed always short of.

Abandonment of wife- It's my understanding that after the trauma of the death of their only child both parties failed to overcome their grief and his wife in effect left him (not to put too fine a point on it). As I'm sure you know not all military spouses can manage the hardships of extended deployments. Again, I feel, not a disqualifying incident.

No campaign service- Surely not for lack of trying! He nearly died while attempting to join Gordon in his "Ever Victorious Army". It is my understanding that campaign postings were the 'luck of the draw' for sub-alterns and based more upon political connections for more senior officers. Durnford as so many other officers seems to have had little political 'pull'. To my knowledge he never shirked an assignment.

Argumentative and obstructive- Are we perhaps talking about Crealock here? Actually I don't know that Durnford was more argumentative than many other officers of the time and I feel that a good commander solicits 'arguments' from his subordinates in order to balance his own thinking. As you point out in your book Lord Chelmsford didn't often appreciate this and it does seem to have coloured his thinking on Durnford. Obstructive- I'm not sure I follow you here, it's rather a broad term open to interpretation.

Hate-figure- Certainly not amongst his own troops and the Colenso faction and apparently not with the colonials and regulars who fought and died with him at the end. Societally to a degree perhaps but having read through the "Red Book" I didn't come away with the impression that that was much of an issue by the time of the A-ZW.

Not respected by his officers- Perhaps I need to search out additional information here but again, that's not the over-all impression I've come away with thus far in my reading.

Threatened with sacking by the GOC- Certainly not the first (or last) officer to exerience that! However after reading his proposed disposition on the Zulu bank with his back to the river I must concede this one.

His fiasco- Again, not for lack of trying and severe perserverence given a hobbled together mission with a ham-stringing order not to shoot first.

The 'blame game'- As I recall the ensuing libel suit came back with a virtual exoneration for him (given the sensitivities of Imperial/Colonial politics). If the fiasco had involved Imperial troops I feel confident that the army would have corrected the inadequecies quietly with further training, as it was colonial troops perhaps Durnford, lacking other recourse, felt it necessary to publically point out those inadequecies in the hope of improving their training. I feel the buck only stops with the commander when he has personally or through the auspices of his own military establishment taken responsibility for the training of his troops.

Willfully exceeds his orders at Isandlwana- Couldn't possibly paragraph that one!

Henderson quote- How about Simeon Khambula quotes or quotes from the Zulus who faced him.

Shepstone quote- Rather a convenient remark after the fact, when the official 'blame game' was in progress, perhaps?

Durnford quote 1- Who was in command at the time? I'm still puzzling over this one but in your book you make a compelling case that Durnford was.

Durnford quote 2- I'm not sure of the entire context of that one. Inflection would be everything ("THEY can't surround US!" (arrogantly) or "They CAN'T surround us."(beseechingly).

Durnford quote 3- What was Chelmsford doing at the time? A subordinate takes his cue from his commander.

Durnford quote 4- Was he quoted as "I will"? the most recent version of that quote I recall is "...never survive the shame". Perhaps another context issue.

Abandonment of Pte. Johnson- Conceded, barring any more illuminating evidence.

Loses control of withdrawing NNMC- I'm still out on that one but tending toward attributing it to the difficulty in controlling mounted troops in countless other campaigns, particularly under the circumstances of that day.

Having said all that I'm still hoping I can garner some support for my position that Durnford's actions that day (however misguided) none the less prevented complete encirclement and in fact allowed so many to survive.

Best

Michael

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 8:58 pm

Mike

There is an unfairness about throwing down such a challenge, a sort of David versus Goliath type confrontation, but unlike David, I have no surprise to knock down any opposition.

I'll use a line from 'Zulu' (I think) " You're the professional. I'm the amateur."

It is possible to admire someone, flaws and all, without being selective of specific characteristics or events.

Not a satisfactory answer, I know, but with my limitations of knowledge and putting thoughts and opinions into words, it is about all I can give.

Coll

PS. Unfortunately, as you can tell, my 'stand' is almost at an end.

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 9:26 pm

Hello Michael...good to see you posting again!

Well I'll tell you if I was Charlie Pope I'd think we both would have been staring into the Zulu abyss regardless if ole Durnford was up there fighting in the donga or not. From the looks of the dispositions, that right flank was shaky shaky and just hanging in mid-air...prime pickings for the Zulu left. Pulleine had a sure problem in protecting that right. It was an extremely tenuous situation from the get-go and I'd think it was just a matter of time that Pope was going to get rolled up pretty fast. (I don't think he even had any tactical maneuver at all to deflect the onslaught of the Zulu left) It looks to me a foregone conclusion that regardless of Durnford's presence that the right would have folded anyway. Durnford's retreat I think kind of speeded up the time/space equations of the battle.

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 9:41 pm

Coll and Rich,

Thanks, it good to be able to talk to you (and everyone else!) again, however I'm afraid I don't have any 'fresh' ammunition' only a (hopefully) improved attempt to encourage 'fresh' thinking. "Don't give up the ship!"

Andrew,

I agree with Rich, I think Lord Chelmsford left the lot of them between a rock and a hard place, his conviction that the camp couldn't be attacked by a large impi resulted in too few troops all around. You're right about the two cos. requested, it beggars the imagination to think what might have happened in that case but, again, I feel it was Durnford rather than the firing line that really left open the escape route. Of course the firing line did prevent the Zulus from over-running the camp from their direction for a heroically long time (realtively speaking), Mike Snook's account leaves little doubt in my mind on that score. However, I feel that there were just too few men there to maintain even a forlorn hope of a fighting retreat let alone a successful defence of the camp. It should also be remembered that Durnford only left the donga when his force had expended their ammunition. Even if his men had been issued with bayonets and tried to continue on it wouldn't have saved G coy regardless of there position on the right. As for Durnford personally clearing the jammed carbines, it would seem that someone had to and they were not issued an armourer or apparently were well versed in doing it themselves.

Best

Michael

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 9:44 pm

Richus

I can find nothing in Mike's post that mentions Lt.Pope,however if you look at my post you will see that I made mention of Lt.Pope and G coy 2/24th.Col.Durnford went right past Lt.Pope after leaving the donga,like a bat out of hell.And at that point what was left for for Lts.Pope and Godwen-Austen but to fight it out.Col.Durnford left them to their fate.I really don't think they could have made it back to the camp in a 100 yrs.

Coll

I know Col.Durnford his a hero of yours,and I feel kinda bad that I'm letting him have it.

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 9:52 pm

I'm sorry to not have made mention of which Mike I was addressing.I should have said either Mike S. or Mike B. And in my reply to Richus I was refering to Mike S. post.As I did not see Mike S. making mention of Lt.Pope.

Posted: Tue Dec 13, 2005 10:32 pm

Andrew

A small ball of yours has passed through to the wicket keeper. You observed (13th Dec.) that Durnford left the Middle Drift to go to Isandlwana without orders. Sorry but he probably had too many orders! The last of three as to his disposiitons ordered him to Rorke's Drift and a note taken by Smith-Dorrien in the early hours of the 22nd ordered him up from there to the Isandlwana camp. The last two were as follows:

On January 14th, Lord Chelmsford wrote 'Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column met me on my return to camp (11th January), as he wished personally to report on certain matters connected with his command. I directed this officer to move one of his three battalions to watch, and eventually to cross at the Gates of Natal, between Rorke's Drift and the Umsinga mountain, while he and the mounted men and rocket battery were to join me with No. 3. Column.'

On the 19th of January he said, 'one of Colonel Durnford's regiments [Bengough's battalion NNC] will cross the river from the Sandspruit Valley, whilst his mounted natives will co-operate with us from Rorke's Drift, where they will be to-morrow (20th).'

That is, I think, pretty clear.
KIS