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 | Colonel in command shot himself because he knew he had done |  |
| Re: Colonel in command shot himself because he knew he had d | |
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Paul Bryant-Quinn
| Joined: 14 Oct 2007 |
| Posts: 551 |
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 Posted: Sun Aug 24, 2008 10:32 pm |
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| HARMAN wrote: | | �Thomas' statement that 'the colonel in command shot himself ' (referring probably to Durnford but possibly to Pulleine) is hard to credit; at the same time it is difficult to understand why he should have made such a statement had he not believed that such was the case� |
Hi Peter H
You got this quote, I think, from Alan Conway's article 'Welsh Soldiers in the Zulu War', Journal of the National Library of Wales vol XI/1 (see http://www.genuki.org.uk/big/wal/Zulu.html).
The days following Isandlwana were rife with all sorts of rumours and speculation. But one thing is certain: Thomas himself was not present at the battle. His letter is a mish-mash of various types of misinformation, and his statement "we struck the tents and formed square around the ammunition, and we kept them back for three hours" should be sufficient guide to the 'quality' of the information about Isandlwana to which poor old 1415 was privy.
Interestingly, though, this letter is actually quoted as a source document in at least one of John Laband's publications, and one can only imagine that this was as a result of a bad day at the office on that fine scholar's part. Also, it has to be said, the textual history of many soldiers' letters published in the press in Wales is complex: I have come across all sorts of complications ranging from simple typos, to misreading the writer's hand, to fairly blatant instances of editing. There are examples of some pretty garbled documents out there, to say the least.
Now, Thomas's letter is dated 19 February; I have sometimes wondered whether he was not conflating details which would make more sense in the context of a second-hand description of the battle of Rorke's Drift rather than Isandlwana; for example:
| [T]hey came about us so thick that we could not handle our guns and then we knocked them down with the butt of the gun ... we ourselves killed some of the volunteers because they were running away ... |
To my knowledge, there is no corroborating evidence whatsoever that Pulleine (or any other officer) shot himself during the battle of Isandlwana, and we know from a number of sources about the circumstances of Durnford's death.
In short, soldiers' letters, though frequently illuminating, can also on occasion be a dangerous guide to the facts!
Regards,
Paul |
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Peter Ewart
| Joined: 31 Aug 2005 |
| Posts: 1797 |
| Location: Near Canterbury, Kent, England. |
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| Posted: Tue Aug 26, 2008 8:16 am |
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Peter
Paul's caveats are certainly worth bearing in mind. On reading a soldier's letter in the local press, one never knows which "version" has been published or how much it has been "tidied up."
Even worse, perhaps, are the attempts on the part of the press to paraphrase or precis the correspondence of officers and ORs handed to them. If you look at the reports of the war in the South African or British newspapers of the time, you'll see countless examples of "a letter from an officer tells us that ..." followed by what may be a faithful attempt to convey a particular point, but one has no idea whether the writer is being quoted verbatim, or whether the newspaper has mixed its own views with the letter writer's, or whether it is an amalgam of the latest rumours, or what. Reported speech and editorial comment are simply intermingled, often with no indication of which is which - and one looks for inverted commas in vain! This renders the text much less reliable than it might otherwise have been.
I agree that the account used here certainly appears to be describing Rorke's Drift, at least in parts, such as in the shooting of volunteers who were running away. Thomas appears to have picked up some of the inaccurate rumours circulating among the men, and one must remember that during Jan and Feb the newspapers in S Africa (& in GB in Feb & perhaps March) confused the actions of Isandlwana and R/Drift repeatedly.
Peter
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mike snook 2
| Joined: 04 Jan 2006 |
| Posts: 920 |
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| Posted: Thu Aug 28, 2008 9:23 pm |
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Paul
I'm trying to stay out of the everyday fray here but it might inform your current research project to know that Thomas is reflecting a rumour which was abroad at RD as early as 25 Jan to the effect that Durnford shot himself [which he did not of course]. We know this because Harness wrote it in a letter to his brother on that date, which from memory is recorded in Sonia Clarke - I think the original Harness letters are in RSA but could be wrong -sadly I don't own a Clarke of my own to check for you.
This sort of 'outhouse' rumour is a pretty common phenomenon in the wake of a particularly bad bit of juju. For example, a similar rumour took hold in the wake of Sir George Colley's death at Majuba. Evelyn Wood felt moved to send his helmet, which bore a hole pretty much 'between the eyes' to Lady Edith, to show that her late husband had died 'with his face to the foe'. It was, I fancy, an act of questionable taste on Wood's part. It is pretty outrageous when such stories take off, especially if the subject of the rumour actually died particulalry bravely - Durnford scorning flight and joining the carbineers and police, and Sir George, literally the last man to offer any resistance to brother Boer on the mountain top.
Evidently Conway was unaware of the intelligence I have just imparted to you about Harness or he would not have conjectured in such a way as to include HBP. At least he had the good taste and judgement having done so to reject the story in both cases, though he does not appear to have had the depth of knowledge to have done so quite as definitively as such an unworthy story warrants.
The subject of the death of the two colonels is fascinating in its own right of course. As you so rightly say there is no evidence to say that a single suicide occurred on the British side, least of all amongst the most senior officers who would have had more than enough to occupy them - I would estimate that more than half of HBP's battalion was still alive when he fell. We know he was shot down - as Coghill was overheard to report it to Melvill on the FT and also said it directly to one of the survivors. I would speculate that Pulleine was probably still mounted at the time and hence more exposed to the many 'overs' flying high over the body of the troops, [massed in something that passed for rallying squares], due to the poor standard of musketry on the Zulu side, and the sort of improvised projectiles they frequently used with black powder weapons. He didn't get back to the saddle/nek or anywhere near it, as Brickhill rode through the closest camps looking for him with a message from QM Pullen to send help to the right - but was unable to find him. This was before the Zulus really got in amongst the tents (juxtaposition of QM Pullen's attempted defence of the right in time and space, coupled with the fact that Brickhill obviously would have met his end had they been). This indicates that the main element of the 24th's retreat was still to the front left corner of the tents at this time. Maori Browne saw Pulleine's body on the morning of the 23rd as he rode back from his wrecked tent in the NNC camp to the saddle - which gives you a line along which Pulleine fell. Brickhill rode along the same line as far as the 2nd/24th tents looking for Pulleine unsuccessfully which leads me to conclude that Pulleine died somewhere between the 2nd/24th camp and the NNC camps.
There is a single stray source (can't immediately remember the details) which talks about Pulleine's body more towards the saddle, but it is very vague and refers to the period of the later battlefield returns when bodies were difficult to identify, for obvious reasons, and there was a strong likelihood of a lot of corpses [or what passed for them] having been moved around somewhat by carrion in the meantime....so it's a bit shaky and perhaps more importantly uncorroborated - for surely there would have been a fuss amongst those present had the CO's body been identified - as there was with Durnford's. All or most of those present would surely have included such a notable discovery in their accounts.
In further support of the notion that he died to the left front, Melvill was seen riding with the Queen's Colour past the generals' tent from the left, towards the saddle meaning that it had, at least momentarily, been out to the left. It would only go out in that direction - i.e. towards the enemy from its home in the guard tent [on the right], if that is where the colonel and the bulk of rallying troops were. As Coghill left after Melvill and reported the colonel's demise to him on the FT, this tells us that Pulleine was still alive [on the left front] when Melvill set out for the saddle and beyond.
Durnford's death is heavily mythologized in some of the more sentimental literature. There is a story of him shooting four Zulus for example - but in truth the evidence that he did so ain't there. Really all we know is where his body was found, what condition it was in (stabbed repeatedly post-mortem), and who, in some cases, was found lying round about him. Another mythologized element, picked up in pretty much all the secondary histories, is how the men who least admired him, the Natal Carbineers, 'rallied to' him. I suspect this is probably a bit unfair to Robert Bradstreet and Durrant Scott. Why should not the sons of Natal rally to their own officers (the commonest instinct in such a situation) rather than to an imperial officer they didn't much care for? The Carbineers had been in contact with the enemy the longest that day, and had fought a brave action throughout the morning under Scott's direct command. I fancy, therefore, the reality is that Durnford joined them rather than the other way round. The contention is also sustainable in time and space because Durnford was amongst the last away from the donga, and at some point after that had conversations in the saddle with Essex and Gardner, which must perforce be the same piece of time and space in which the carbineers were dismounting and turning their horses loose to make their stand beneath Mahlabamkhosi. Ultimately it is a minor point of no great consequence - as the most notable thing is that all the men in that particular stand fought like demons - as recorded by the Zulus - throwing their empty revolvers in their faces, fighting with hunting knives and rocks and so on. That is something for Natal to be proud of in her own right. It doesn't take an imperial officer to make that happen. The contention that it did is certainly not demonstrable in the sources. But he ended up there right enough, and met a heroic end with the best of them. It is obvious that a man who lets go of the reins of his horse in such a scenario is doing a brave thing by definition.
Interesting subject - little real evidence to work on - but only a process of deduction based on snippets, probability, tactical doctrine [such as it was in 1879], ethos and long study of how people behave in combat.
Regards
Mike
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