rorkesdriftvc.com :: View topic - Charlie Pope

Posted: Sun Apr 06, 2008 8:04 pm

Hello guys,

It's been a while since I last posted so I thought I better get one in..... Just been re-reading some of my book collection (It's been a while) and one point sticks out that I would like to get back into my head.

Lt Pope made a diary entry on the morning of the battle at Isandlwana. The timing of the entry would have been as Durnford arrived at camp - 10:30ish..but after the 07:00 'fall in' order, it states...

"Alarm - 3 Columns Zulus and mounted men on hill E. Turn out. 7000 (!!!) more E.N.E, 4000 of whom went round Lion's Kop. Durnford, Basutos, arrive and persue. Zulus retire everywhere. Men fall out for Dinners"

OK, so 4000 +/- Zulu's went round Lion's Kop which am I right in assuming he means Isandlwana or the North of the camp - Tahelane Spur? So if Pope knew this before Durnford arrived, surely the camp knew that it was about to be attacked from the rear or at least outflanked from the North West or West?

Also, Durnford sent scouts to the N.N.E from the camp and then for his own reasons went East then North East and not directley North North East where the action was about to kick off.

Apologies if this is a dumb question,

Regards,

Jamie

Posted: Sun Apr 06, 2008 9:29 pm

Jamie

I don't know if this advice is any help to you but what one has to appreciate is how Pope has condensed time in making a hasty diary entry - as we all do when writing in note form. So you have to cross reference his individual sentences (describing events) with all the other events described in other sources. Take Chard for example who is the best source for describing the movement on the Tahelane Spur - and timing it - see HCMDB for the timing.

I would time the diary entry an hour, and then some, after Durnford's arrival - so after 1130. It has to be late on because Pope's language is not accidental - it reflects Higginson's report to Durnford that the Z's are 'retiring everywhere'. That report we know was made to Durnford in the presence of Pulleine and from Pulleine it would have made its way down to the company commanders (though quite how we cannot be sure from the sources). I would be surprised, just as a basic bit of professional soldiering, if Pulleine did not call in all his company commanders at the time of Durnford's departure (which I regard as directly linked to Higginson's report) to brief them on what was going on.

In terms of compass direction don't forget that Raw and Roberts are sent out some time in advance of Durnford's own departure to scour the ground beyond the spur - they clear to the N and then begin moving NE across the lower plateau. So in theory, by the time Durnford himself sets out, his left is secure.

But once again, as with Lord C a day earlier, the Brits have been insufficiently systematic and are, I agree, not covering NNW and NW thoroughly enough.

Don't know if any of that helps. Fire back in with a follow-up if I have missed your point at all.

Regards

Mike

Posted: Mon Apr 07, 2008 1:47 pm

Jamie,
You are quite correct in drawing the conclusion that the camp, and all present, were aware that they were being outflanked. Not only was Chard's report indicative of similar Zulu movements, but also Brickhill and a host of others.
The diary entry can be debated. Was it a continuous entry or were the lines written as and when events occurred? No one can be sure. Certainly the events described vindicate our viewpoint that prior to Durnford's arrival, nearly one third of the Zulu army was sighted and on the move.
Don't want to enter into another boring debate that has been extensively aired before, but in my opinion, for some one hour after the sighting recorded by Pope, Chard etc, and before Durnford arrival, Pulleine's judgement was at fault. More so in that he already knew that Zulus were 'advancing in force' at 0805 hrs. No matter what arguments in defence of Pulleine may be advanced, history will record that he was aware of considerable bodies of Zulus in reasonably close proximity to the camp and duly sighted; but failed to order any real tactical dispositions to meet the threat - all this before Durnford's arrival.

Posted: Mon Apr 07, 2008 8:15 pm

Thanks Mike and Peter,

I appreciate the guidance. I find this particular area of debate crucial to understanding of the attitudes in camp and in particular Pulleine - prior to the start of fighting.

I guess it is all about battlefield and tactical management. Pulleine for what ever reason chose not to react to the events to the North and North East of the camp. The Zulu Army took full advantage of an open backyard door and took their chance brilliantly, firstly to manoeuvre unhindered in front of the camps left flank and secondly not provoke an earlier fight that would put the horns of the buffalo out of position as in Khambula.

Still can't get my head around Pulleine's thinking at this particular time. I know he was under orders and told how to defend this camp - and he stuck to it. Inside his mind he must have been scared and numb when everyone looked at him for orders as reports came in from all sides of the camp during the Zulu assault.

Regards,

Jamie

Posted: Mon Apr 07, 2008 8:55 pm

Jamie

I'm no match against Mike and Peter knowledge-wise, but when you've freshly read your books about Isandlwana, go back and also read previous topics on this and the old forum.

Evidence I've found in old postings has convinced me even more about my opinions of both Col. D. and Col. P., as well as other aspects of Isandlwana.

I'll not tell you what to look for, as that wouldn't be right, but read all the posts (very) carefully on this subject, and find clues, which shall make some things shockingly clear ! Shocked

Coll

Posted: Tue Apr 08, 2008 6:58 pm

Jamie,

As regards Pulleine's thinking, bear in mind that Pulleine was not afraid of an attack on the camp and, indeed, welcomed an attack.

"What a fool a fellow is,..........................now if we had kept quiet in camp we should have coaxed these fellows on and given them a right good thrashing."

Posted: Thu Apr 10, 2008 10:39 am

Mel

Exactly right.

Jamie

I can't agree that the words 'scared' and 'numb' represent an accurate or appropriate reflection of Col P's mental state. Few well motivated professional soldiers get into such a state of mind until the wheel really starts coming off. Even then the number who actually do so freeze (mentally) are few and far between - adrenalin and the ability to draw on knowledge, drills, doctrine and experience are what carries people through.

He was an experienced, able and well thought of officer - I am talking about the real Henry Pulleine of course, not Donald Morris's fictional Pulleine or the late Denholm Elliott's wet hen, both of whom have haunted AZW folklore for several decades now. Neither accurately reflects the real man. When it comes to the AZW, the ability to draw the distinction between what is real history and what is commonly repeated but inaccurate mythology is all important. Nonetheless he did make mistakes - for which I have fairly criticized him in print - the non-committal wording of the 8.05 despatch for example.

Peter

Your criticism of what you characterize as Pulleine's non-reaction to early sightings is wholly illogical. He did exactly what he should have done and what he had been ordered to do - stand to in front of the tents and act 'strictly on the defensive', behind what was actually quite an effective defensive surveillance network.

He had no offensive capacity to deploy in any case. The hundred or so mounted men were not a formed body of troops but, in large part, had horses that were already lame or close to being played out. The saddle-worthy bit of the command was employed on vedette duty - providing a close-in screen which, lest we forget, the Zulus failed to penetrate. The real failure of surveillance occurred at the column and army level - a failure to locate and fix (i.e. keep it located until defeated) the main impi. The vedettes were reinforced after the first alarm, which I would suggest was by pretty much the balance of the fit horses - mostly drawn from the men who were next for duty with the vedettes the following day. The men that later went down to the donga under Bradstreet would have been the men on the played out/resting horses, which of course were eminently useable in such an emergency.

It was Durnford who had to be persuaded that his duty was to stay at the camp and who, as soon as he thought that the Z's were 'retreating everywhere' [no battle at the camp after all] jumped on his horse to look for some trouble in the open, demanding in the process that Pulleine's former plan, which he had inherited, (cool, calm, collected, in the right place,) should be aborted in favour of deploying offensively to the NE and E (vague, tactically unsound, injudicious - results in battle being fought in the wrong place).

It would be forgiveable if he had taken fact finding as his goal and only involved small patrols of mounted troops in it - right asset for the right job - but he didn't. He involved two companies of NNC, the rocket battery, the main body of the NNMC (too much cavalry for any good to come of it), and would have involved two companies of the 24th had he been allowed to get away with it - in all cases the wrong assets for the job. Worse, he ordered Pulleine to give him his best support in fighting forward in the plain, instead of leaving him alone to get on with the close defence of the camp in accordance with his original dispositions.

Separately, the idea that Charlie Pope ran back and forth to his tent making separate diary entries stretches credulity too far; that is not what people do, so I don't agree with your remark. It is in fact a synopsis of the morning's events and was written at roughly 1130-ish (subject to the usual caveats about precise timings).

M

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 9:40 am

Mike,
In spite of some friendly jousting, I fear that East is East and West is West, on the role played by Pulleine. Historically, far too much emphasis has been placed on the course of the battle subsequent to the arrival of Durnford, and very little prior to his arrival. Your emphasis on Pulleine's conduct is that little fault, if any, is to be found. I propose to detail Pulleine's actions and his response to events prior to 1030 hrs, and suggest what he could have done, not what he did do. Your defence of his action rests that he did 'what he had been ordered to do - stand to in front of the tents and act strictly on the defensive.' I am unaware of any orders telling him to ' stand in front of the tents.' Perhaps you could direct me to the primary source for this statement? And no one was suggesting that Pulleine takes offensive action.
I also cannot agree that the 'saddle-worthy bit of command was employed on vedette duty.' By my reckoning the vedettes in position first light 22 Jan amounted to 14 to 16 men, paired in two's. There were considerably more effective mounts still in camp than 16. The men who went down to the donga was much, much later and after Durnford had arrived, so is not relevant to this discussion. To my mind Pulleine showed an extraordinary display of lack of flexibility. Any army commander in battle, given certain orders prior to the action, has to be flexible enough to use his initiative to alter fixed instructions depending on the tide of events. Those who gave him verbal instructions to defend the camp were miles away. Pulleine simply lacked the wherewithall to respond to events, more especially responding to colonial reports and indeed his own sighting of the Zulu in great force and his pedantic response. And this, in my view, was the direct cause of the battle lost, a view backed by the contemporary Horse Guard's letter confirming that on Durnford's arrival, it was too late.
So what were the alternative decisions that could and should have been taken? There were two specific windows of opportunty for a more opportunistic commander:
First: Two of the vedettes positions, namely on Qwabe ( Barker and Hawkins) and Nyezi,( Whitelaw) the latter located not far from the iThusi plateau who sighted Zulus. In the case of Barker and Hawkins, some 500 to 600. In the case of Whitelaw, many many more. This report reached Pulleine very early in the morning.( He was later to send his Blue note to Chelmsford at 0805) On receipt of the Whitelaw / Barker reports, his reaction could and should have been far more positive. Clearly colonial reports were on occasions deemed unreliable. What he should have done was to immediately respond by sending out a strong mounted recce accompanieed by an Imperial officer or two in order to verify the alarming intelligence brought to his attention. Had he done this, the Zulu movement out of Mabaso would have been discovered and we would no longer be debating Isandlwana or Rorke's drift. His note to Chelmsford would also have been penned differently, causing Chelmsford, in turn, to react differently. A missed opportunity by mis-reading the situation.
Second: When the Zulu army displayed itself on the ridge in force. as recorded by Pope et al, Pulleine's reaction was far from positive, rather passive. That was the time for some defensive action such as dropping of tents, forming close formation etc. What did Pulleine do? Little apart from troop assembly in front of the camp - stand to - stand down - breakfast etc. Simplified he failed to grasp the urgency of the situation, either through the arrogance that permeated Chelmsford's command, or his simple lack of appreciation of the Zulu capability for determined offensive action. Where exactly did he think at 0830 hrs or thereabouts, the Zulus on the ridge making their way westwards ( reported by Pope and Chard) were going? On a picnic? How could he not read that the camp was being outflanked?
Thus two windows of opportunity lost, opportunities that would or may have altered the course of the battle. All this before the arrival of Durnford. No amount of counter arguments can show Pulleine's lost opportunity. Flexibility, initiative and drive lacking, in my military book.
Cannot agree with your view on Charlie Pope's diary. Bye the bye, we have been trying to locate the original to no avail. Private collectors hands?
As ever,
Peter

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 12:49 pm

No real substance I fear Peter. You have a bee in your bonnet about dropping tents which almost everybody else sees as a complete red-herring. The tents were not in the fields of fire.

Orders have specified and implied components - form up in front of the tents is implicit in 'act strictly on the defensive', but since you (uniquely) deny the existence of any order and have publicly named Clery as a black-hearted liar (without evidence) you cannot be expected to empathize with P's conduct.

Pulleine did reinforce the vedettes. The number of played out and sick horses in the mounted component was significant (and is sourced though I cannot readily bring its origin to mind at the moment). There were 110 (thereabouts) mounted troopers - 16+ vedettes for one day (let's call it 20 allowing for Scott as officer of the day not being on his own) - and a similar 'fit' set of reliefs - call it 40-50 fit in all, leaving about 60 horses resting or sick.

There was no decisive engagement prior to the noon-(ish) contact, and no decisive manoeuvre by the Zulu army - only one preliminary move (seen by Whitelaw 0730-ish) and a false alarm (0900-ish). To suggest therefore that the battle was lost prior to Durnford's arrival is plainly ludicrous.

I have argued that the camp was always going to be lost (administrative disaster) if an attack occurred first thing on the morning of the 22nd because of insufficient troops to cover the poorly laid out (over-extended) camp, which was clearly designed to be defended by all 12 imperial coys. That still leaves the option of a 6 company 'battle of survival', which might at least have resulted in a 'draw'. Pulleine was prepared for a battle of survival by falling in, in 'column of companies' in front of the camp. Column of companies is one very quickly executed step away from forming square. He could not form a battalion square, except in extremis, without ceding the tents, the stores, the wagons and the oxen to the enemy, and allowing the NNC companies to be routed and scattered to the four winds (= mission failure).

He did react to the 0930-ish incident on Tahelane by subsequently occupying the spur with Cavaye's company, which enabled the covering of NW/N/NE fields of fire into the dead ground.

Durnford's arrival with 5 troops of carbine armed riders allows for more than a mere battle of survival to be fought and means that if an attack developed from this point on, the camp could indeed be successfullly defended - tight margins but at least it might have been possible. The reinforcement (though not intended as such) would have allowed the imperial troops to defend the front of the camp and the NNMC the saddle and rear. This then opens up the prospect of a winning match. But it didn't happen like that, because Durnford chose to penny-packet his assets all around the veldt - frittering combat formations on reconnaissance tasks. But it wasn't a reconnaissance was it - it was a quest for glory. Wrong action, wrong assets, wrong command direction to Pulleine (now his subordinate) - all of this amounts to a deeply flawed course of action. All because the enemy are 'withdrawing everywhere' (which, by the way, would have equalled mission success - camp defended as ordered).

Even if the Edendale, Basuto and Vause's tropps had been kept back at the camp, he could still have used two whole troops to scout the plateau and have enough left over to defend the rear.

But no - all swept away in that moment of madness when Higginson reports erroneously - the Zulus are retiring everywhere. Right - tally ho! Off we go.

Think about it. Wink

As ever

Mike

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 1:15 pm

Mike,
Tents not in the field of fire? What about the right horn?
I argue that the camp would not have been lost had Pulleine sent a strong mounted recce at 0730 hrs or thereabouts to confirm Whitelaw and Barton's report that the Zulu army was on the move. He would then:
1. Have alerted Chelmsford to give the latter time to return.
2.Prepared to meet an attack, an attack he failed to anticipate.
3. And guess what - opened a few ammo boxes and increased the supply to 100 rounds per man, as per manual.
The battle was lost simply because Pulleine had run out of time. By 0930 hrs it was already the wrong move to send Cavaye to Tahelane. What on earth was he doing in the two hours preceding this?
And again, for purposes of this debate forget Durnford and what happened after his arrival. Concentrate on what dear old Pulleine failed to do.
My thoughts now wonder on to how YOU would have handled the tactical position were you in Pulleine's shoes. You would disappoint me if you said you would do nothing different. I think I might just know you just a tad better to accept that answer. But I admire your resourceful defence, albeit equally without substance.
As ever,
Peter

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 4:56 pm

Mike & Peter,

Of course the tents should have been struck, here's why:
REGULATIONS for FIELD FORCES IN South Africa.
General Regulation No 19.
...Tents will always be struck when an attack is apprehended,...

Surely by the virtue of his 8.05 a.m. message Pulleine must have at the very least apprehended that an attack was possible?

Had Archibald Milne (no genius I know as WW1 would testify) seen the tents had been struck even he might have concluded something was afoot. However the tents had not been struck and despite observing the encampment for a period of at least one hour Milne draws the wrong conclusions of the events he is witnessing at a distance of some ten miles, thereby compounding, in my opinion, the blunder of the man who failed to order the striking of the tents whoever that might have been.

John Y.

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 5:22 pm

Thank you John for that salvo!
Further to Mike's response, quote:
" There was no decisive engagement prior to the noon-(ish) contact, and no decisive manoevre by the Zulu army - Only one preliminary move (seen by Whitelaw) 0730- ish and a false alarm (0900- ish). "
Therein lies the weakness in your argument. The Whitelaw sighting was critical. It showed the Zulu movement out of Mabaso. False alarm at 0900?
Well now, when the Zulus appear in force on the heights and then later start to outflank the camp in sight of all, is this not indicative of what is to follow? And what is racing through Pulleine's mind? Still not aware of the Zulu strength or intent? Just "bring them on and give them a right good thrashing?"
And to boot, Durnford is still on his way! Let the white flag flutter gently into the arena, Squire!
As ever,
Peter

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 5:25 pm

Peter,

Sorry I forgot to include this in my last. Look only again at my late friend, Kenneth Griffith, in his work Black as Hell... He's wandering around at Isandlwana with Pope's diary in his hand.

On his return from South Africa following Wild Geese & Black as Hell... Ken's marriage turned into a divorce (his second of three!) to pay for the settlement and the purchase of his new house he was forced to part with most of his Anglo-Zulu War collection, including Pope's diary.

I actually saw it about 18 years ago when it was in a private collection, I believe it might still be part of that collection.

John Y.

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 5:34 pm

John,
How very interesting. Would it be vaguely possible to contact the holder could well throw some light on events.
As ever,
Peter

Posted: Fri Apr 11, 2008 5:41 pm

Sorry John, Finger slipped and what I intended to say, was that if you are still in contact with the collector, would he give permission to have the original photo-copied?