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Two Battles At Isandlwana - Could It Have Happened ?
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On mentioning Chelmsford's return to the camp after the battle, made me wonder about the following.

If the Zulu army had not suffered as many casualties as they did in the engagement with Durnford and Pulleine's combined forces, could they have attempted another attack the following morning, the 23rd (apparently the original Zulu plan) as Chelmsford's remaining force made their way back on the western side of Isandlwana ?

Would Chelmsford's half of the column have stood any better a chance ?

I've no idea of the terrain on the western side of Isandlwana, between there and Rorke's Drift, so would it have been possible for Chelmsford to create a defensive position against this second attack ?

I just find it fascinating to think we could have been talking about 2 battles at Isandlwana, the first on (mostly) the eastern side of the mountain, the second on the western side, both halves of the combined force being confronted by the Zulu army over two days.

I apologise if this has been covered before in the old forum.

I'm just curious to know what sort of deployments Chelmsford would have made with his force, on the western side of Isandlwana, considering my lack of knowledge of the terrain in this area.

I guess I'm trying to imagine possible maps of 'this' battlefield similar to those in AZW books showing the battle that did happen, but a new battle and the British defence against the Zulu army, which itself would be shown on the map approaching in the chest and horns formation from a different direction than the first battle on the previous day.

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Dawn


Joined: 31 Aug 2005
Posts: 610
Location: Auckland, New Zealand
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Some others may be able to add to this list but another battle could not have been fought on the 23rd mainly due to

1. Serious losses suffered at Isandlwana. 3000 dead is not an insignificant number even in a force of 20 000.
2. Removal of the dead and accompanying ceremonies
3. Post battle doctoring to be undertaken
4.The exhaustion of the impi after a major confrontation.
5. Disciplining those lost in the euphoria of after battle victory.
6. Encouraging those with booty to abandon that booty to fight another battle.

We could go on and on.

Also it needs to be taken into consideration that Chelmsford, now aware that Zulu forces were closer than he thought, would have been on extreme alert and not so easily taken by surprise.

No, the Zulus decided to live to fight another day. Of course, if Chelmsford decided to attack, that would be a different story.

Dawn
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Mike Snook


Joined: 31 Aug 2005
Posts: 130
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Dawn

Chelmsford did have the opportunity to attack - he met the Undi Corps on its way back from RD on the morning of the 23rd. However both sides avoided an engagement, the Undi Corps because they were badly beaten up of. The reason, on the British side, was concern about ammunition. Lord C had no idea where he would next see an ammuntion box. The troops of course had 70 rounds a man - or at least the 465 men of the 2/24th did. The NNC and the vols had been firing in the Phindo Hills and their stocks were no doubt seriously depleted.

Incident is covered at LWOTF.

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Main impi withdrew to Ngwebeni Valley in the late afternoon and rested there for an extended period tending its wounded. They would have seen Lord C's column coming back over the plain towards sunset, but a new fight was of course the very last thing on their mind. For all the day had been a British disaster, the main impi was extremely badly battered and in no physical or mental condition to fight again. I know you realize this. Maps at HCMDB and LWOTF should give a reasonable feel for the ground between the river and Isandlwana but off the top of the head, here is a description.

From the river the ground slopes fairly gently uphill towards a low ridgeline which is where the first camp was established. There is also a downhill from left to right towards the Buffalo. In general the ground is open but even so fields of view are limited in most places.

From that first ridgeline it s a few more kilometres on to the Batshe Valley, for which I imagine you have a reasonable feel. Once you have climbed up the side of the Batshe its about another four kilometres to the Manzimyama Valley. There is a sort of open plateau effect between the two valleys with the Ngedla high ground a couple of kilometres off to the left and the Nqutu Plateau beyond that. There is a downhill slope to the right to the river gorge between Rorke's Drift and Sothondose's (Fugitive's) Drift.

In general, assuming mounted patrols were doing their business well, it would be difficult for the impi to get the drop on the British in this ground. What would have happened? OK let's have a go for the sake of a bit of fun...

Well, unencumbered by wagons as they were the 2nd/24th would have formed a battalion receive cavalry square. But as has been pointed out elsewhere on the forum such formations are tiny and would have had just enough room to shelter the general and his staff and the gunners. The gunners would have had to leave their guns at the last safe moment and dash back to shelter in the square a la Waterloo. The NNC battalions would have disintegrated and run away very early on - they might well have been trapped by the horns and massacred. The two isiGzoza coys might have stood firm but might have hindered the square by crowding in on it - much like the skimrishers got in the way at Abu Klea. The NNC Europeans would have either joined the 2/24 square, or might have formed another square with the IMI and vols. Possibly that square might have broken under pressure and shortage of ammunition.
Probably the most sensible option for the mounted troops, rather than form square, which nothing in their training equpped them for, would be to use their mobility to keep out of harm's way - but the problem on the ground in question is that they would be driven against the river at some point and end up in serious trouble - so they would need to get right away either towards RD or Isandlwana, and from there manoeuvre to attack the rear of the impi. However assuming the impi had thrown out horns they might get caught inside and driven back in on the 2/24 square.

The 70 rounds a man carried by the 2nd/24th would be enough to hold their ground and break the attack, but the conduct of the other troops might have caused sufficient chaos to break the cohesion of the infantry square.

On balance I think there would have been another massacre, or at the very least extremely heavy casualties.

What does anybody else think?

Regards

Mike
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Michael Boyle


Joined: 12 Dec 2005
Posts: 595
Location: Bucks County,PA,US
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Mike, I think that's a pretty fair summation of my position on the actual battle! (I know, I know there was no column commander with Lord C's mounted troops!)

Actually, I believe Dawn's sixth point in particular would be key, as it was King Cetshwayo was mightiliy miffed at the token amount of booty that made it's way to him and if the Zulu troops were willing to risk the wrath of their King in order to keep their booty then perhaps they would be less than enthusiastic at risking it to their mates by re-engaging. Of course there was not that much booty to go around so perhaps those still lacking would have considered another opportunity to be a bonus. However how many Zulus would have been available for a second attack anyway? We'll never know the true extant of their casualties but I would guess that at least 8,000 had been rendered hors de combat, reducing their original top estimate of 25,000 to 17,000. Subtract from this the 4,000 otherwise engaged at that time and you're down to 13,000 effectives distributed amongst the remaining amabutho. 10-1 perhaps, but this time up against four well prepared field pieces and the knowledge of what an attack on M-H armed British infantry actually involves. I don't think they would have presented quite the spirited attack they offered earlier in the day and would perhaps have simply 'sat on' the British defences awaiting clarification.

One must remember that 22 Jan was not just a water-shed day for the British, but for the Zulus as well.

As it was I seem to recall that a single Zulu (perhaps under the influence of British Rum) did attempt an ill-advised advance and was quickly dispatched to no one's apparent annoyance.

If, however the Zulu's had attacked I would think a more open British deployment upon the 'conical' kopje perhaps would have sufficed to hold them off if in fact they didn't press the attack as fiercley as their compatriots were then doing at RD. If they were just as fierce I wouldn't think think that the British would have stood a chance at night, without prepared defences.

At any rate I think Lord C's most astutue military move that day was to 'get out of Dodge'.

Best

Michael
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All

Thanks for your replies.

I haven't really studied any maps of the western side very thoroughly before starting this topic, but I did think it would be an interesting subject.

Therefore, instead of me trying to write my posting as if 'speaking', I'll find it easier to add a few aspects to be either considered or included. Again, no research into the terrain in this area has been done (hills, dongas, etc.) so please bear with me.

1. The first battle with Durnford and Pulleine (for this topic only) didn't inflict as many casualties amongst the Zulu army as those on the actual day.

2. The Zulu army, or the largest part still willing to fight (say 15-20,000 warriors) after retiring the previous day back up onto the ridge, seeing Chelmsford's approach, decides to rest for a while, before moving further to the west, possibly still on high ground, or behind it, in the hope of attacking Chelmsford's force in the morning, after he left the nek area.

3. I imagine, in the event of another fight, neither Chelmsford or the Zulus would want to fight on or near to the devastated camp, with the dead of the previous battle still lying where they fell.

4. Yes. The Zulus would know any surprise will already have been lost, so the Zulu Commanders will have to select an area where they think it will benefit them, as they prepare to attack Chelmsford.

5. In my view, the Zulus may try a 'mirror-image' of the previous day's initial direction of attack, this time being North/Northwest/West (these compass points not being exact, just meant to give an idea) adding to this their victory the previous day, which may make them even more determined, knowing that they could actually win again.

Can anyone supply the best location(s) where the Zulu army could quite possibly be 'lying in wait' for Chelmsford. Even with the mounted men in Chelmsford's force being aware of it. So as I may be able to pinpoint on a map of this area, where the Zulu army could have been situated, (not necessary totally concealed, as Chelmsford would have known they were near) as well as their deployment after the attack has started.

Also, Chelmsford's deployment if attacked from this area, in response to the Zulu chest and horns formation, as it would have developed on it's advance.

This, I think, would be a great example of possible tactics used in a battle that never was, but, although unlikely, could have been.

I guess it is something to think about (for me anyway) a kind of challenge, what I would do and where I think the Zulu army may have positioned itself, although probably not very accurate, as in time lapse, etc., from the first battle on the eastern side.

6. Chelmsford, I'm sure, will be at this time very anxious to get the remainder of his force out of Zulu territory without sustaining any more losses, so would have to use the units available, consider the quantity of ammunition left and how best to use it effectively (making each shot count), as well as using any terrain to his advantage (high ground, dongas, etc.)

As I say, I haven't truly thought this topic out, just imagined it would be a good discussion subject. A couple of the points above are possibly covered in the replies.

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Dawn


Joined: 31 Aug 2005
Posts: 610
Location: Auckland, New Zealand
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Mike

I was going to mention that Chelmsford and the Undi corps did spot each other on the 23rd but as it didn't lead to a battle, I felt it was a moot point.

And if they had engaged? I think it would have been an even match actually. Chelmsford may have been hard pressed to defeat an army whose ammunition doesn't run out (i.e. spears), but the Zulus, after a hard night fighting, may not have had the heart or the stamina. A tie game.

Dawn
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a.j


Joined: 30 Aug 2005
Posts: 80
Location: Thornaby-On-Tees, Great Britain
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There could have been two battles at Isandlwana because Chelmsford was ready for a fight when he re-entered the camp at Isandlwana and some of the Zulus were drunk and drunk with victory.

As we know the Zulus were a very disciplined fighting force, well those are just two factors that takes that discipline away.

So if the Zulus were taken by surprise those warriors who were not disciplined would have surged forward and a few more would follow, if the entire army would of it is a different matter, but I think there would be at least a large skirmish.
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Two Battles At Isandlwana - Could It Have Happened ?
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