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DateOriginal Topic
22nd May 2003Isandhlwana battle tactics
By Trevor Finney
Have you discussed on this site what the Brits could have done differantly on the fateful day of this battle.
Could a differant battle formation have saved the day?
Or would the Zulu commanders have been able to beat them anyway, by sheer weight of numbers?
Could the good old british square have stopped them?
Any thoughts anyone!
DateReplies
22nd May 2003Miguel
Just guessing, of course, but forming a strong square with their backs covered by the hill and begin shooting as soon as the zulus reached the maximum range of the MH, could have worked. It worked at Ulundi (although they had the gatlings there and not at Isandhlwana).

As I said, just guessing.
22nd May 2003neil Aspinshaw
Trevor.
I would happen it that the good old Square would have saved the day. The disposition of the firing line at Isandlwana was far to spread. New evidence, found by the archeologists' (cartridge cases), has proven the line as being over extended. The missing link could be the non compliance with" Field force regulations", not entrenching or even menial easy to prepare defences such as thorn bush zeriba, or broken bottles were set up which would have slowed an advance.
History is never far wrong, looking at how effective a rush charge,made against massed rifles can only be guaged at its sucess historically. possibly the good old "fuzzy wuzzy" in Kiplings verse actually suceeded, even so this was due to poor disposition within the square at El Teb.

The final fling, and possibly its most sucessful use of the good old square was probably Ondouman, the open groung in front of Kitcheners men was the Mhadists nemesis.
an interesting note to this, even armed with magazined lee metfords' the tommy still used "one up the spout", firing single rounds.

when you walk the flat open ground immediately in front of the camp at Isandlwana, there is probably 500 yards of open coverless area, the martini's ideal kiling zone. There also was a flanking impreneterable barrier (the mountain). even a fleet of foot zulu running flat out across this ground would take maybe 30-60 seconds. In that time some pretty substansive walls of lead would be coming the other way!.

In reality who really knows?, the what if's and wherefores of history make us what we are, without it life would be so dull.

usuthu!
Neil
22nd May 2003paul neville
The line was spread too thin at Isandlwana but the square would have saved them only for a brief time. The sheer weight of enemy numbers would have pushed them back into each other. Also the spreading out of the British forces was the major cause of their downfall. Maybe making a camp out of the wagons would have helped them somewhat, but the biggest downfall was a total ignorance by English blue-bloods as to Zulu fighting tactics and the common belief that they were untrained savages. I think it is a shame Chelmsford was not there with his men to be killed. It would have stopped Ulindi and the need for him to save face.
22nd May 2003paul neville
The line was spread too thin at Isandlwana but the square would have saved them only for a brief time. The sheer weight of enemy numbers would have pushed them back into each other. Also the spreading out of the British forces was the major cause of their downfall. Maybe making a camp out of the wagons would have helped them somewhat, but the biggest downfall was a total ignorance by English blue-bloods as to Zulu fighting tactics and the common belief that they were untrained savages. I think it is a shame Chelmsford was not there with his men to be killed. It would have stopped Ulindi and the need for him to save face.
22nd May 2003Alex Rossiter
But didnt the firing line almost stop the zulu's?
I though the zulu's were on the verge of falling back when durnford ran out of ammo and retreated, leaving the 24th on the verge of being outflanked, when the 24th fell back a combination of a sudden boost to the zulu's morale(at seeing the redcoats retreat) and the 24th not being able to put enough shot's out as they were retreating?

So in theory if durnford had his correct ammo , the firing line would have been sufficent to halt the zulu advance?
22nd May 2003Bill Cainan
Trevor

A couple of additional thoughts -

1. The ground at Isandlwana is particularly hard, indeed there was a reference to this on the site only a few days ago. It would make entrenching very diificult.

2. Forming a square ? It's not as easy as to just compare it with Ulundi, etc as those squares were "fighting squares". At Isandlwana the square would need to include the waggons, camp, oxen, etc. There were just not enough companies left in camp to form a tight square around everything.

3. I believe Alex is right when he said the line held its own, but was eventually flanked. The number of Zulus present is not an indication that they would automatically push the line back. Courage on its own is insufficient to deal with the long range MH fire, as the Zulus found out an Gingindhlovu, Kambula, and at Ulundi.

4. How could the British have won ? Basically by following Chelmsford's standing instructions ! Have the two full battalions lined up by Companies in front of the camp (and close to their Company ammunition waggons), the 6 artillery guns in the centre and the cavalry and NNC locking the flanks - all you need then is to have the Zulus to charge frontally at you. The cavalry and NNC could deter the horns. Don't try and use the waggons as a laager - there are just too many of them, and of course they are still needed to return to Rorke's Drift to collect the residue of the stores. Keep them behind the lines of infantry.

Ah, but hindsight is a wonderful thing !!

Bill
23rd May 2003Mark Hobson
The British did follow Chelmfords standing orders when setting out their line, but they just did it in the wrong place. As Bill says, to place the line immediately infront of the camp, close to the ammunition supplies, would have constituted a much stronger defence, with the hill itself covering their rear. Bending back their flanks in echelon would have prevented the zulus getting in behind, particularly when the right horn came in over the nek.
However, I find it hard to fault Pulleine's deployment decision. He was reacting to the general direction of the threat - to the north. Even Durnford, a much more experienced officer in African warfare, did not suggest he change things; infact he made things worse by asking Pulleine to send help should he, Durnford, get into difficulties. So Pulleine was trying to bridge the gap between himself and Durnford, hense his overstretched line.
As for why they did not entrench the camp or laager the wagons? Did Chelmsford do so on the 20th - 22nd January before he departed for Mangeni?
24th May 2003Trevor
Well said everyone.
But do you all think that the Big Guns were used to thier best advantage in the battle. I dont know if they had canister ammunition? " I am sure someone will know! " But surely if they did have. This would have turned the battle, as this kind of fire at close range would desimate any advancing line of Zulu. Obviously i am still banging on about a change of formation. A more condensed battle formation of some sort! Not the extended line as mentioned bu Paul. I understand orders are orders. But in obeying Chelmsford. The officer commanding at Isandhlwana. Basicaly signed the death warrents of his men by useing these tactics.
25th May 2003Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill
The battle of Isandlwana was not only fought in close proximity to the camp. In its many phases, over a period of about 20 hours, the two armies manoevered over an area covering about 35 sq. miles.

The first contact was during the afternoon of the 21st when elements of the Zulu army encountered Major Dartnell's reconnaisance near Mangeni Falls. Later, deceived by many camp fires burning in the nearby hills, Dartnell was duped into believing he was facing a large enemy force. In turn, his request for infantry support, led Lord Chelmsford to believe that Dartnell, in all probability, was confronting the Zuly army.

At 04.30 the following morning, (the 22nd), as Chelmsford led half his force east to join up with Dartnell, ten miles away, he was observed by the Zulu army as it moved on a parallel course, five miles distant, towards the camp. It was at this point that the Zulu commander, Ntshingwayo kaMahole, most probably decided that dead moon or not, here was an opportunity that no general worthy of the name would not seize. As King Shaka had once remarked when faced with a similar opportunity, "A partridge is about to settle in my hand".

The preliminaries of the battle proper, started at around 0700 hours when vedettes of the Natal Carbineers, stationed about 4 miles out from the camp, reported thousands of Zulu deploying towards Isandlwana from the Ngwebeni Valley, and opened fire.

However, to get on to the firing line, the main point of the discussion.

Neil is wrong in stating that new evidence found by the archaeologists, has proven the firing line was over extended. The new position of the firing line, as indicated by the archaelogical team, is speculation, not fact and not proven.

At around 11.45 when the battle proper commenced, there were, in fact, three separate firing lines:
1. Col. Durnford's, comprised of two troops of the Natal Native Horse (NNH), that held the Zulu left horn until out of ammunition, and having been refused replenishments, rode back through the camp and left the battlefield.
2. The line composed of Mostyn's and Cavaye's companies of the 1/24th (later supported by two other troops of the NNH) and briefly supported by Younghusband's Company of the 1/24. This line was positioned one to one and a half miles from the centre of the Camp on Tahelane Ridge, over steep and broken ground. The majority - if not all of Mostyn and Cavaye's companies and most of the NNH were either killed on Tahlane Ridge, or on their retreat back to the camp. Younghusband's company retreated up and along the slopes of Isandlwana hill where it made a last stand during the final moments of the battle. There was an unsuccessful attempt to reinforce these units with additional ammunition.

3 'The firing line' (for the want of a better description) was positioned about three quarters of a mile north east of the camp and consisted of two R.A. 7 pounder cannon, three infantry companies, those of Wardell and Porteous of the 1/24th, Pope's of the 2/24th and poorly armed elements of the Natal Native Contingent. In total this firing line comprised of no more than 250 imperial infantry and was overwhelmed by the Zulu centre and by the right horn having entered the camp from behind Isandlwana Hill. On the balance of probability it is unlikely that any additional ammunition reached the line, it having been most likely discarded in favour of flight.
25th May 2003Mark Hobson
The exact position of the British Firing line has never been fully established. For many years it was thought to extend eastwards from the northern tip of Isandlwana before taking a turn southwards at the rocky knoll, basically a right-angled line covering the northern and eastern approaches to the camp.
More recently it was generally considered to be straighter, beginning at the northern tip of the Isandlwana and extending beyond the rocky knoll towards the lower slopes of the conical koppie, parallel to the Nqutu escarpment.
Now the idea is that it was further forward still, along the ridge which overlooks the dead ground at the foot of the escarpment, and maybe even in the dead ground itself.
In the ongoing archaeological dig cartridge cases and the remains of ammunition boxes and tunic buttons were found in this area (which, by the way, is outside the fence which surrounds the battlefield) with suggestions that this proves the position of the firing line once and for all. Personally I don't see how. The discovery of battlefield remains here does not prove the line was or wasn't here, as after the battle the Zulus thoroughly looted the camp, dragging away all manner of things and probably dropping a good deal of their booty along the way, thus spreading things here, there, and everywhere. The discovery of a chamber pot out near the "site" of the line backs this up, as why would a chamber pot be there in the first place.