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Date	Original Topic
27th August 2001	Supply of ammunition at Rorkes Drift. By Jeff Lum A while ago my local Public Broadcasting Station did a re-examination of the battle at Islandlwana. Unfortunately, I barely caught the last 10 minutes of the program but it was enough to get me started. I vaguely remembered seeing the classic Michael Cane movie, I hadn�t made the mental connection between the two battles until much later. Lamenting over the loss of such an extraordinary program, I turned to my computer to see what else I�ve missed on the topic, and Eureka! I�ve found this wonderful site that contains such a wealth of history. Your efforts certainly deserve more kudos than I can ever deliver. The point that struck me most over the battle at Rorke�s Drift is the amount of munitions spent in the engagement. Lt. Bromhead estimated he expended about 20,000 rounds over the 12-hour affair and only had perhaps only 1,000 rounds remaining. If we consider only 100 men defending the Mission, shots were fired roughly at an average of 16.7 times per man/per hour. There were actually more men available at the start of the battle and the Zulu attacks were more intense at the beginning of the engagement than later. Also, the battle did not unfold at a uniformly consistent rate, but including each of those factors would increase the rate of fire. For the time being, I wish to adopt the smaller number simply to make the following point: The NNC who came and deserted as well as the contingent that had been detailed at the Drift might have increased the strength to about 450. Yet if we reasonably assume there were arms available for each of them and they were able to maintain the paltry rate of fire as computed above, the base would have spent their 21,000 rounds in less than 3 hours. Unless a 3-hour wall of heavy small arms fire by 450 men could have sufficiently intimidated the Zulu�s into backing off, they would have suffered the same fate as their comrades 12 miles away. So in light of the amount of available ammunition, did those two units of the NNC�s combined acts of cowardice actually serve to save the post?
Date	Replies
27th August 2001	John Young Jeff, Just to clarify for you, there was only one unit of Natal Native Contingent which deserted the post at Rorke's Drift. The other unit which I assume that you refer to was a mixed unit of some 100 men from Hlubi's Troop & the Edendale Troop of the Natal Native Horse. These men had fought from the start of the action at Isandlwana, almost to the bitter end, COWARDS? I think not. These men were some of the finest light cavalry to serve in southern Africa. These men had seen what had happened at Isandlwana, they had seen the Zulu impi defeat the "red soldiers" there. Many of the Natal Native Horse were not armed with Martini-Henrys or Swinburne-Henrys, but with the Westley-Richards carbine a .476" calibre weapon, or with .577" Snider carbine. The Natal Native Horse had lost their ammunition wagons at Isandlwana. As Rorke's Drift was the No.3 Column's Depot, it may have had some small amount ammunition of such calibres available,(The Royal Artillery still used the Snider carbine.) but I feel these would not have been in abundance. The reserve supply for No.2 Column, to which the N.N.H. belonged was I believe on route from Sandspruit under the command of Major H. Bengough. That is a fact rarely taken into consideration, how could they fight without adequate ammunition? The Natal Native Horse only decamped after actually skirmishing with the Zulus under Prince Dabulamanzi's command. Their Lieutenant, Alfred Henderson, reported that the men under his command would no longer obey orders to John Chard, but their desertion should be consider with the fact of their actions at Isandlwana. Captain Stevenson's Natal Native Contingent unit deserts when they saw the N.N.H. leaving. They decamped without firing a shot and at the fore-front the departure was Stephenson and his white N.C.O.'s, a fine example to their men. These men I'll give you as cowards, as to their poorly trained charges, I personally doubt many of them could loaded a gun let alone fired one. If they had stayed I contend they would have contributed little to the defence, but that is my humble opinion. As to the documentary, it hasn't been shown yet in the U.K., even in these days of modern technology we're behind the times. John Young
28th August 2001	Peter Critchley Hi Jeff, It's certainly an interesting idea - One which I hadn't given much thought, but it would seem to make sense, that had there been more ammunition shot, the supply would have been expended far sooner that it was in reality. I would tend to agree then, that the smaller numbers actually contributed in some small way to the success... Peter Critchley Webmaster http://www.rorkesdriftvc.com
28th August 2001	Lee Stevenson Just to add to this debate. Bromhead's estimate of 20,000 rounds expended at Rorke's Drift. The number of Zulu bodies reported as recovered in the immediate vicinity and buried after the battle ranges from 350 to 450, although most observers suggest far more, allowing for those 'dangerously' wounded and who may have subesquently died some distance from the post.(there are reports of bodies turning up for weeks afterwards) One can only speculate then just how many of the Zulus were actually 'wounded' from rifle fire and made it back to Zululand, but also just how many of the 20,000 rounds went off into the African mud?? Lee
28th August 2001	Jeff Lum To Mr. Young, Thank you on your insight on the NNH's arms. Forgive me for overgeneralizing both Native Natal units. As I understand, the better trained NNH under Henderson were attached to Durnfords group and had began their round trip between Isandlwana and the Drift at 3:30 that same morning. I believe Captain Stephenson who was in command of the NNC at the post was subsequently court marshalled for his act while Henderson's unit saw subsequent service. I would be glad to hear any further details anyone might have on both of them. I understand Henderson and his mounted unit subsequently managed to redeem themselves, But if I were one of the defenders at the station on that same afternoon, I doubt I could be so forgiving in my impression of him at that momenent, Especially if I knew that Lt. Adendorff was willing to make a second stand, Jeff L.