The Rorke's Drift VC Discussion Forum
(View Discussion Rules)

** IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO ALL USERS **

PLEASE NOTE: This forum is now inactive and is provided for reference purposes only. The live forum is available at www.rorkesdriftvc.com/forum

(Back To Topic List)

Date	Original Topic
21st August 2001	Military intelligence during Zulu War By Lyn Purves What emphasis did the British army in the late 19th century put on good military intelligence? Given the constraints of the time, couldn't the intelligence at Isandlwana have been much better ? It appears that Pulleine only realised the extent of the danger to the camp when the main Zulu army appeared on the hills to the north east, already on their way to attack the camp: meanwhile Chelmsford had already marched out across the plain thinking the main Zulu force was in the hills to the front of the camp.
Date	Replies
22nd August 2001	Alan Critchley Lyn, Not sure to the extend of emphasis which was put on intelligence. It must have played a great part, but remember that the British were more accustomed to fighting European armies, or armies which fought in the Euopean style, like the Indians. I have to take a partisan approach here by saying that British intelligence must have been reasonable good since we had the best fighting force in the world and ruled a quarter of the world. No mean feat. The intelligence at Isandlwana was dependent on observation. Coming from RSA, you'll be aware of the vast areas involved. The Zulus actually intended to attack the following day but when discovered, moved out. The Zulu is a very mobile warrior, and if reports that he was seen towards Uludi were reported, this would seem logical to Chelmsford, hence his move in that direction. Alan
22nd August 2001	John Young Lyn, The British & Colonial forces which embarked on the invasion of KwaZulu, were I consider the best informed of any troops which fought in any campaign up to that date. Chelmsford had gone out of his way in the preparation of booklets & pamplets which covered a number of subjects ranging from the composition of the Zulu army and its tactics to the management of local forces under white officers & n.c.o.'s. His Field Regulations covered the very minutia of campaigning in KwaZulu. That he, the author did not adhere to his own regulations and instructions is a different subject. As to the roles played by Intelligence Officers, obviously men like William Drummond, Llewelyn Lloyd & John Dunn contributed greatly from their local knowledge. Where the scenario falls down is an inadequate light cavalry force acting as the eyes of any advancing column. Wood & Pearson used the forces at their disposal well, yet as demonstrated at Isandlwana. No.3 Column is found wanting. Remember Chelmsford's request for cavalry had been denied him, and he was having to make do with those at his disposal. Another factor to consider is the contempt which the Zulu were had as a enemy, Chelmsford was basing his game plan on the lessons he had learnt against the AmaXhosa in the 9th Cape Frontier War. The AmaXhosa's hit & run tactics were used as they had been used in the previous eight frontier campaigns, only once at Centane was there a truly pitched engagement. Chelmsford, I feel, had not bargained on the Zulu resolve. A total underestimating of the enemy. Chelmsford's staff in particular Crealock & Clery have alot to answer for especially with regard to the advance to Isandlwana and the positioning of the camp there. As to laagering don't forget that despite his efforts to recruit one, Chelmsford did not have a "Laager Master" for No.3 Column. Both Crealock & Clery, a former Professor of Tactics at Sandhurst, had questioned the way certain officers deployed their forces. They too also scotched certain deployments at Isandlwana as unnecessary, which with hindsight may have given some clue as as to the Zulu presence. Intelligence blunders and complacency, I consider, were also responsible for loss of the Prince Imperial, and the action at Ntombe. So in my humble opinion the theory behind the intelligence was excellent, but the practice is found to somewhat wanting. John
23rd August 2001	Lyn Purves John and Alan Thank you for your very interesting comments - I appreciate your time and effort involved. The answers were interesting because from what I've read about the Boer war, it seems to me that there were some serious lapses in intelligence in certain actions there too - and I began to wonder whether this was a late 19th century British Army failing. So thank you for the information.