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Date	Original Topic
4th November 2002	Isandlwana By Bill Cainan What really happened on the firing line at Isanlwana ? Only Curling survived and unfortunately his account concentrated on what happened to his guns. Over the years there have been many accounts attempting to unravel the mystery, and 2002 has seen more accounts than most - with more to come I believe. Certainly most of the more recent accounts try and disect the battle in half hour segments which accurately reflect the flowing nature of the battle. Ron Lock and Peter Quantrill have done a very good job in their recent "Zulu Victory". However, to see the battle in its overall perspective I would strongly recommend the new Ian Knight booklet "Isandlwana - 1879" in the Osprey Campaign series. In keeping with most of the Osprey booklets, the text merely gives a general overview, however the maps and 3-D birds eye views are absolutely superb and take into account all of the latest theories and archaeological evidence. I would strongly recommend getting this book for the maps alone ! One note of caution - A& E Companies have been transposed in a number of places, but how many authors these days get sufficient time to proof read !! How about someone doing a full review of the books published in 2002 ? Although, on reflection, remembering the "exchange of correspondence" earlier this year, this might not be such a good idea ! However I would like to see some of the leading lights on the AZW going into print on what they THINK happened on the firing line as opposed to just trying to intepret the available evidence, which is fragmentary at best ..... My believe is that the collapse occurred when Pulleine ordered a general fall back on the camp instead of trying to disengage the Companies en echelon from the right, with the withdrawal of each company being covered by the fire of the stationery company to its left. Anyone like to suggest an alternative ? Bill
Date	Replies
5th November 2002	John Young Bill, Let's get one thing clear from the start, Henry Curling WAS NOT the only survivor from the firing line. I pointed this out when I was making comments on Adrian Greaves' 'Isandlwana'. He may have been the only Imperial officer to survive, who was constantly on the firing-line. But what of the other nine survivors from 'N'/5 R.A.? Edward "Lucky" Essex in his own words; '...acted as a company officer...' must surely be considered on have been on the firing-line? But obviously not throughout. Others too fit the bill. I'd like to think that F.W.D. Jackson's long-awaited work due on 1st December, 2002, might go some way to reaching further conclusions. I was only re-reading the Jackson/Morris letters which published in the Victorian Military Society's 'Soldiers of the Queen', the other night, Jackson puts pay to many of Morris' assumptions. My own conclusion for what it is worth, being neither an academic or historian - the positions were too far out, and in being so were stretched over too great a distance to counter a mass threat. However, hindsight is a wonderful thing, isn't it? John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
5th November 2002	John Young Bill, I've just seen the transposed companies error it appears throughout on the maps, as well as on the 'orbat'. Well spotted that man. JY
5th November 2002	Peter Ewart However tempting it is (and it is!) to try, I cannot believe we will ever completely know exactly what happened during that hour or so, nor produce any definitive collective decision as to exactly "what went wrong" - or, indeed, "what went right" as far as the other side was concerned. We all know a great deal more than we once did, thanks to the researches of Morris, Jackson, Knight, Laband, Lock & Quantrill etc etc., all of whom have enabled us to understand a much more detailed picture of the day as it built up minute by minute, even though - as is inevitable and to be expected - a number of their conclusions differ. Sometimes this is because newly discovered sources, unavailable or unknown about earlier, can shed new light but also different historians will always place differing emphasis on respective accounts. Morris, for example, still doesn't budge an inch on his original ammunition views & has explained why. The difficulties which they have encountered will always remain - the gaps in testimonies because of the relatively low number of survivors and the subsequent very poor immediate efforts in collecting & preserving eyewitness accounts. Another reason - perhaps the most infuriating, and one which Lock & Quantrill have emphasised - is that the various eyewitness accounts which place a time on an event tend to differ hugely. Establishing when a message arrived (or should have arrived) or when this or that part of the line broke becomes almost impossible - which in turn affects opinions on causes for other occurrences. This even applies to those who were training telescopes on the field of battle from several miles away in each direction at the same time! The recent hopes that archaeological investigation may throw light on matters are, I'm tempted to believe, a little optimistic, although obviously I hope I'm wrong. I know that no conclusions will be drawn without great care, but it is so easy to overlook the fact that, when considering the remaining debris found over a wide area, the camp was being prepared, scouted and ridden over for days before the battle & was certainly raked over by both sides in the months which followed, not least the dragging of material away in more than one direction by Zulus as well as the marching of the column out and back to camp on the 22nd. The bones were buried and reburied so many times in the first few years that only confusion is left, and the missionaries gathered more in from far flung places even after that. Much of the junk remained throughout the 1880s but generations of Zulu children and subsequent local building will all have played their part. Fragments from the rocket battery, for example, may well be found not that far from under the spur, which is obviously not where it was overrun, but a year after the battle one of the abandoned rockets caught alight in a grass fire & whizzed off (presumably due westwards) "with a swoop and a roar" into the settlement just N & NW of the old camp, scattering all in fright. So any artefacts found in an unexpected place won't necessarily mean much. Could they have got there another way? The answer will almost always be yes. Still, we'll see. Although the usual conclusion is that the line was drawn too far out - whether in connection with Durnford's foray or not - the mistakes had already been made. Poor staff work led to so many errors. Even Grenfell admitted it simply hadn't been good enough, although not until he was a FM! Even the transport & supply problems - the bain of the whole campaign - led to certain decisions, deployments and timings which were understandable but unfortunate & costly. Perhaps the biggest change in opinions in the last 35 years or so is that the affair has become much less of "Poor Durnford's Disaster"! As a footnote, I also immensely enjoyed L&Q's "Zulu Victory" & was impressed (& surprised) at the amount of "new" material or material treated in another way, as well as the analysis of some of the PRO material. The detailed reconstruction of the doings around Mangeni, for example, was superb. The odd primary sources continue to surface here and there, and will continue to do so, but I don't suppose will add much now. Or will they? Peter Ewart
5th November 2002	Bill Cainan John Yes, you're quite right about the survivors. What I meant to say (and didn't !) related to survivors from the firing line who had subsequently written accounts - on which our great debate has been fuelled ever since ! I think Peter has summed it all up very well. "Lucky" Essex - well now there's a subject for a controversial book - how/why did he and the handful of other Imperial Officers manage to get away ? Should they have stayed ? Bill
6th November 2002	Graham Alexander How and why- two interesting points to consider. How can be accounted for in two ways. A considerable amount of luck and a good horse. Both Esex and Cochrane mention in their letters that they "Had a good horse " and both Gardner and Curling were riding their own chargers. These animals were usually the best that money could buy. Smith-Dorrien was the exception to the rule by riding a " Broken kneed crock " which only just made it to the Fugitives drift. It was essential to be mounted to avoid the running Zulus, who even then managed to catch and kill some of the riders. However, riders of good quality horses which could maintain a prolonged and steady pace had the only real chance of escaping. Why must be considered by looking at the situation as the defence collapsed. Every surviving officer was present until the Zulus started to pour into the camp. At that time everyone knew that the game was up and started to retreat. Companies of troops on foot had no chance against the number of Zulu warriors present Only mounted men got away. Should the officers have stayed ? They were not cowards, but knew that they could do no more. Put yourself in their place. Would you have stayed and faced certain death or tried to take your chance with many others who were all falling back to the Buffalo river. None of the surviving officers considered that they had not performed their duties correctly and none showed any subsequent regret for their actions. Essex proved his bravery by his future actions during the 1st Boer war. They all took their chance of survival when it was offered.
6th November 2002	Bill Cainan Graham Thanks for your interesting comments, and I would agree with most of what you say. I would pick up on only one phrase - "they could do no more". Tthese men were all commissioned officers and I believe they had a duty to the men, whether they were in direct command of them or not. Following the collapse of the firing line and the subsequent retreat through the camp area, there must have been many groups of leaderless men. Should the officers have provided these groups with leadership, even though it would have meant certain death ? It can be argued that the Company Officers had an absolute and clear duty, but that others with lesser responsibilities had a less clear duty. What would I have done ? I'd like to think I'd have got off my horse and linked with a group of soldiers - but who knows. Until you are faced with the actual situation I'd say it's impossible to say with any certainty what you would do. However, if I had escaped I'm pretty sure I'd have spent the rest of my life asking whether I should have stayed or not. And I doubt if I'd have ever expressed those thoughts in writing as that would virtually be a public admission of failing to perform a duty !! It is interesting to note that Curling hardly ever voluntarily referred to the battle in subsequent correspondence once he had left South Africa . And maybe that was why Smith Dorrien fought with such great stubborness at Le Cateau, and Essex stood so firm at Majuba. Were they trying to exorcise a ghost ? However, this is all hypothesis - who knows really ? Bill
7th November 2002	Julian Whybra Just to mention, John, about the 9 artillerymen who escaped with Curling - one was with the Rocket Battery and the other eight were all in the camp itself doing various duties. You are quite right though, there were plenty of other survivors from the firing line.
7th November 2002	John Young Bill, Back in 1991 I had the honour to meet with David Smith-Dorrien, then the only surviving son of Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien. I had become deeply interested in Horace Smith-Dorrien through a friend of mine, the late George Rice. George's father had fought under him at the stand at Le Cateau. George's father heard the General yell out; "Don't fight too bravely lads! Remember Isandlwana!" A line I that worked into lecture on Smith-Dorrien which I presented at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. In my opinion Horace had 'no ghosts to exorcise', but for him the B.E.F. would have been swept to Channel - he was the most contemptible of "...that contemptible little army." His adversary, General Alexander von Kluck, stated, "I tried very hard to outflank them(Smith-Dorrien's IInd Corps, B.E.F.), but I could not do so. If I had succeeded the war would have been won." The great British patriotic poet and war historian, Sir Henry Newbolt, wrote; 'Smith-Dorrien saved us ...simply by being himself...' In my humble opinion, Isandlwana did not haunt Horace Lockwood Smith-Dorrien, it shaped him into being the saviour of the B.E.F. But please don't get me started on his shameful treatment in 1915 at the hands of those who had initially applauded his actions, who had the ear of the highest in the land. If ever a British hero deserved to be recalled in effigy then it should be Smith-Dorrien - "The Man Who Disobeyed." John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
8th November 2002	John Young Julian, On your point re-the Royal Artillery survivors, I wasn't including Gunner (Acting Bombardier) 2766 George Goff in my total. As you know Curling incorrectly stated that Sergeant 3483 William Edwards survived leaving as my contender - Sergeant 216 John Costellow, as borne out by F.W.D. Jackson's findings. Trumpeter 1561 Nicholas Henry Martin's place was with officers, putting him, I contend, in the firing line as much as Stuart Smith & Henry Curling. The two surviving Shoeing Smiths 1142 Joseph Steer & 361 George Townsend, were, I assume, rear-elcheon members of the battery, and may have had no part on the front/firing line. But now who can say whether Gunner 665 William Green, wasn't a "Gun-number" of one of the two cannon? As well, apparently, performing his duties as Curling's 'servant'. What of Drivers 1687 John Baggeley; 1954 James Burchell; 2023 Edward Price & 1387 Elias Tucker? Tucker's letter which apeared in 'The Western Morning News' of 28th March, 1879, would seem to imply that he, at least, was serving ammunition to the cannon. If so, could the same not apply to the other Drivers? Could not Curling's statement '...the drivers pulled off their horses. ...' Be construed two ways? 1, '...the drivers [were] pulled off [of] their horses... [and killed.]' 2, '...the drivers pulled off their horses... [from the limber, and made good their escape.]' Just a thought! What of Gunner 1231 Thomas Hallaghan? Wasn't he suggested by yourself in 'The Ten Gunners:Addenda' - 'Soldiers of the Queen' Issue 58/9 January 1990? If we did include Hallaghan & Goff, then obviously there would be twelve survivors of 'N'/5. This in turn brings me to another query, how is it that the two Shoeing-Smiths that I have referred to above, and in my work, 'They Fell Like Stones', have failed to make it into Dr.Adrian Greaves' list of survivors, page 113 of 'The Curling Letters of the Zulu War...'despite us both apparently consulting the same source material, see page 101 of the 'Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research' Volume LVI, No. 226 - Summer 1978? Perhaps Dr. Greaves could please clarify that point? John Young, Chairman, Anglo-Zulu War Research Society.
8th November 2002	Julian Whybra Yes, John, I admit I wasn't expecting to have such a thorough debate about it! However, the two articles I wrote in the SOTQ (Issues 54 and 58/9) conclude that there were 12 gunners who escaped: 1.Curling 2.Sergt Costellow (from Tucker's letter) 3-10. the eight ORs mentioned by Curling (and you above!) namely Burchell, Price, Baggeley, Steer, Townsend, Martin, Green and Tucker (who states in his letter that HE was Curling's servant and, incidentally, that there were 4 survivors from the firing line in the artillery [himself, Curling, Costellow and Green] contrary to Curling's own statement and no mention of Martin either though I'd agree his place would have been with the officers) 11. Goff (attached to the Rocket Battery, detached from N/5) and 12. Hallaghan, whom I still maintain may have been a survivor mainly due to Blair Brown's remark, Curling's later letters, and Harness's letter dated 25.1.79 specifically stating that there were 12 survivors and 62 kias in the battery. All the research, reasons and sources I state in my (not David Jackson's, by the way) original articles which readers can look up for themselves. I'm afraid I can't help you with Adrian Greaves's losing a few men - a typographical error, perhaps?
8th November 2002	John Young Julian, Re-your point on Tucker, my mistake, what I actually meant to type was 'groom' for Gunner Green, as he is identified in 'The Curling Letters...' by Dr. Greaves. JY